

EVOLUTION OF DIALECTIC IN WESTERN THOUGHT

HARSH NARAIN

The present work is a full story, told in a style which is as much artistic as logical, of the evolution of Dialectic in European thought. The author has, with eminent success, taken his readers through the entire 'labyrinth of its biography', substantiating, at the same time, whatever he has said by quoting relevant passages from works of classical thinkers ranging from Heracleitus, Zeno, Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, through Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, to Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin and other dialectical materialists of recent days. In this respect the work is of the type of a brilliant, short encyclopaedia, testifying to his amazing, and yet accurate scholarship But what is perhaps more to his credit is that, openly or often from behind the scene, he has *examined* and that in a right objective attitude which is as much logical as fact-abiding and conducive to healthy imagination—not only the main trends but all the subtle nuances of standard theories.

Philosophically, our author is at his best in his study of Hegel. A comprehension, like his, of the fundamentals of Hegelianism is decidedly rare in these days, and all the basic points he has raised in that connexion and tried to solve are worth serious consideration. This does not, however, belittle what else he has said on Greek stalwarts, German transcendentalists and Marx and his associates and followers

Once a reader has gone through the book he is bound to be led to wait impatiently for whatever the author has got to say in his proposed forthcoming volume *Dialectical Dimensions of Indian thought ...*

The work, on the whole, is the result of meticulous, mature and sound scholarship and a significant contribution to the study of a challenging tradition of European thought

—**Kalidas Bhattacharyya**

To Dr. Navajeevan Rastogi,
with best compliments & regards
Harsh Narain
5/4/73

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To

my late lamented father



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FOREWORD

Dr. Harsh Narain's monograph on the evolution of the concept of 'dialectic' in European philosophic thought is the first of its kind to appear in this country, and probably in the English language. As the author has shown, the term dialectic has meant different things to different philosophers from Plato to Hegel and Karl Marx, each of whom conceives its role and importance in his own way. One thing that seems clearly to emerge from the attempted definitions of 'dialectic,' or the characterizations of dialectical thought or consciousness, is the fact that thought or knowledge does not consist merely in the mirroring of reality—that human cognition or consciousness, far from being a matter of passive contemplation, is marked by tensions and conflicts of diverse kinds. These tensions and conflicts seem to be ultimately rooted in the creative elan of the human spirit which, refusing to acquiesce in the status quo of things, is ever seeking to project its own goals and values on the course of events. This impulse to rearrange and remodel the given first expresses itself in the form of negation or negative apprehension, which may therefore be taken to be the central element in dialectical consciousness in all its phases.

Dr. Narain has attempted to present the ideas of the thinkers concerned, as far aspossible, in their own words; as a consequence, the expository paragraphs occasionally bear the appearance of being little more than strings of quotations. But, while the amazing wealth of quotations and references bears testimony to the author's wide acquaintance with relevant literary sources, the skilful handling of them imparts to us the awareness not only of the central meaning of the concept under discussion but also the subtle nuances and the rich complexity characterizing it in the works of its author. Indeed, Dr. Narain often sueceeds in communicating to us the very ambiguity, hesitation and tension that marked the thought-movement of the philosopher being studied by him. He has refrained, and perhaps wisely, from hazarding too explicit generalizations about 'dialectic' and its role in human thought and culture.

This monograph appeared in instalments in *Ānvīkṣikī*, the Research Bulletin of the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, and has been offprinted from it, mutatis mutandis. I hope it will be found useful and stimulating by a wide circle of readers.

Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy,
Banaras Hindu University,
Varanasi--5

N. K. Devaraja

PREFATORY NOTE

The present work happens to be the first half of a composite work which has grown out of a paper on the concept of dialectic with special reference to Indian thought written by the author for a modest seminar. For certain unavoidable reasons, it has not been possible to publish the whole work in one volume, though it is presupposed on p. 22 infra, suggesting the previous plan dropped later. It is, therefore, proposed to bring out its other half separately, in near future, under the title *Dialectical Dimensions of Indian Thought*. Dialectic is, technically speaking, a conceptual framework well worked out in Europe, and is, that way, a speciality of the European philosophical tradition. We have, therefore, thought it fit to deal with its evolution in European thought and take our readers through the labyrinth of its biography in the gamut of the European philosophical tradition before dealing with its performance on the stage of Indian thought (in the projected volume).

In this work, care has been taken to present the views of the authors dealt with, as far as possible, in their own words, with comments calculated to aid the reader in a critical appreciation thereof. The author is rather allergic to the tendency, so general, to ignore or withhold from the reader the wording of the texts pertaining to the views sought to be examined. Exponents of philosophy are often over-eager to substitute their own words for the texts. This practice is not unoften a source of muddle on the part of even serious scholars who go by the words of the exponents. It conduces to quackery, not scholarship. It is in fact always better to communicate knowledge at first hand than at second, third, or fourth hand, and exactly the latter is the case with those not communicating the texts to the reader while trying to communicate knowledge based on them. It is indeed a case of unwarranted presumption on the part of such authors to install themselves between the texts and the reader, which tendency is

responsible for much misconception and confusion in understanding the classics. Art lies in concealing art, and the art of interpretation lies in concealing interpretation. As a matter of fact, no amount of substitution, paraphrasing, or rephrasing can take the place of the original, which is the permanent possibility of interpretation, even as, to follow John Stuart Mill, matter is the permanent possibility of sensation. Hegel and Marx dealt with in this work are to our mind the most misunderstood of modern phliosophers. The device of ample quotation appears to be the only one to remedy the wrong done to them by their critics as well as their undiscerning disciples.

The author has had to ransack the whole lot of the works of the philosophers dealt with in this work. None of his findings are based on merely secondary sources, which, to be sure, he is far from abreast of. In fact, he is not a scholar that way. In tracing the origins of dialectic, in the opening chapter, however, he has profited by Gilbert Ryle's paper on 'Dialectic in the Academy'. In the understanding of Hegel, in the second chapter, he has been aided by McTaggart's *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic*, the most illuminating work on the subject not receiving its due today, as also J. N. Findlay's *Hegel: A Re-examination*, one of the very few works from the pen of our contemporaries taking Hegel seriously. Herbert Marcuse's *Reason and Revolution* has also had its share in influencing the author's evaluation of dialectic. So far as the understanding of Marx and Engels is concerned, little secondary material was found indispensable to the present project.

The bibliography appended at the end comprises only the literature actually referred to in this work.

The author is beholden to the Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, and its staff, especially to its Director and Head of the Department of Philosophy, Professor N. K. Devaraja, for providing facilities for publication of this work. To Dr. Devaraja, the author owes a further debt of gratitude for graciously contributing a Foreword to this work. The author also acknowledges his gratitude to Dr. Lallanji Gopal, Sayaji Rao Gaekwad Professor of Indian Civilization and Culture, of the same Department/Centre, Dr. K. Shivaraman, ex-Reader

in Philosophy, B. H. U., and now Professor, Dept. of Religion, of McMaster University, Mr. J. D. Shukla, I. C. S., and Mr. J. N. Tiwari, I. A. S., for taking interest in his project. Thanks are also due to the author's colleague Mr. C. P. M. Namboodiry for appreciating the author's venture in the course of a stimulating discussion on Marxism.

The author also records his heartfelt gratitude to the members of Lucknow Akademi, especially to Mr. Amrit Lal Nagar, Mr. K. C. Sonerexa, Dr. Navajeevan Rastogi, Dr. Ashok Kumar Kalia, Mr. Krishna Kant Agnihotri, and Dr. Ravindra Nath Kalia, who have all along been rather goading him to publish this work as also other materials with him. He is further beholden to Mr. K. C. Sonerexa on whose suggestion the work was originally undertaken.

Thanks are also due to Mr. Saraswati Kant Pandey, Librarian, Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Banaras Hindu University, who was ever ready to arrange for books for the author both from the Centre's Library and from outside.

Varanasi **Harsh Narain**
November 29, 1972

INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The concept of dialectic took its birth in the Hellenic world with all its important ramifications. Thence it travelled to Germany. It was noticed by Kant when it was still in its infancy. It attained discretion in Fichte and came of age in Hegel. Thereafter, it wedded materialism in Marx and Engels, to whom, strikingly incongruous and unhappy as the wedlock was bound to prove and did prove, its fidelity has all along been unquestioned, undivided, and absolute, short of the possible exception in the case of Jean-Paul Sartre. The birth of dialectic is the subject-matter of Chapter I; the coming of age of dialectic, of Chapter II; and the marriage of dialectic with materialism, of Chapter III. Chapter IV is the concluding chapter, which sets out a review as well as some critical appreciation, by way of a supplement, of the ground covered in Chapters I to III.

The author has no access to any Continental language, hence he knows nothing at first hand so far as the position obtaining on the Continent is concerned. Sartre produced a massive volume on dialectic entitled *Critique de la Raison Dialectique* (Critique of Dialectical Reason) in 1963, but, to the best of the author's knowledge, no full translation of it has yet appeared in print. Only the prefatory essay accompanying the work has so far been translated into English,[1] which does not deal with dialectic, however, and hence is not germane to our inquiry.

Dialectic has developed, in the main, along two more or less independent lines, viz. dialectic as a form of reasoning and dialectic as the concept of struggle of opposites. The first kind of dialectic may be called dialogical dialectic, reasoning dialectic, or, in the words of Arthur Schopenhauer, dialectic as 'a technic of reason' and the second, objective dialectic or metaphysical dialectic. Schopenhauer's distinction between logic, dialectic, and rhetoric is instructive : 'Logic, Dialectic, and Rhetoric go together, because they make up the whole of a *technic of reason*, and under this title they ought also to be taught—Logic as the technic of our own thinking, Dialectic of disputing with others,

and Rhetoric of speaking to many (concionatio); thus corresponding to the singular, dual, and plural, and to the monologue, dialogue, and the panegyric.'[2] Short of rather a bird's-eye view of it taken by us while tracing the origins of dialectic, dialogical dialectic does not figure in the present work. This is, in fact, our self-imposed limitation.

While dealing with the Hegelian dialectic, we have concentrated upon a more or less detailed analysis of the concept of dialectic in general without bothering the reader overmuch as regards the scheme of dialectical categories painfully elaborated in Hegel's *Logic* and *Science of Logic*. Not that a discussion of the scheme would be fruitless or pointless. In fact, a thorough examination of the Hegelian categoriology is a great desideratum. But the author does not feel competent to undertake the job and thinks it fit to leave it for some defter hand to grapple with. Moreover, considering the scope of this work, it does not appear to be imperatively necessary to include an account of the individual categories in it.

Both the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic are rooted in what is called the dialectic of nature. Engels holds that 'Nature is the proof of dialectics.' It is an irony of the situation that the dialectic of nature happens to be the weakest link in the dialectical chains of both the schools of dialectical thought. It is, indeed, not child's play to introduce order into the hopelessly confused region of the phenomena of nature and fit them into a neat dialectical framework. Some of the contemporary protagonists of dialectic hope to succeed in doing so just by muttering dialectical formulae. We have, therefore, not considered it worth while to devote much time and space to the discussion of this rather underdeveloped aspect of dialectic, although we are inclined to believe that, if there can be a test of dialectic, it can be only nature. As a matter of fact, in this work we are concerned more with the fundamental concept of dialectic in general than with its application in special fields.

In dealing with the Marxian dialectic, the author has taken due account of the writings of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Mao Tse-Tung, whose works are available in English. The author is not abreast of the developments in dialectical thought in the red world in general, for the simple reasons that the

works of the few writers there passing for theoreticians are not available in English, that the little material on the subject that does happen to trickle down to the English-knowing world is often too sketchy and slipshod to be of much use to us,[3] and that the little information we do happen to possess about the state of affairs in the red world is enough to convince us that there little fresh thought is being brought to bear upon the philosophy of dialectic, with the result that contemporary Marxist philosophy fails to arouse interest in our part of the world. In fact the author knows only one work accessible to us as a historical and systematic survey of philosophy in the Soviet Union.[4] Those, therefore, interested in the situation of dialectic in the Soviet Union may refer to this valuable account thereof. Besides, as is so well known, dialectical materialism is not just one system among others for academics and minutiae-mongers to find fault with as freely and playfully as suits their passing moods, criticize as ruthlessly as they choose to, and accept or reject as equanimously as they happen to. Dialectical materialism is a world-view, a philosophy of life; which aims at changing the world and not merely interpreting it. It has already, for better or for worse, changed merely half of our planet, where it is ruling as a veritable gospel. 'Philosophy,' says Whitehead, 'never reverts to its old position after the shock of a great philosopher.'[5] Marx would have proposed, The world no longer remains the same after the shock of a great philosopher. And a gospel needs to be interpreted not freely but responsibly: it inculcates not free thinking but responsible thinking. Free thinking may be of superlative importance in matters academic, but, in matters pragmatic involving the life and death of a civilization, free thinking has to yield place to responsible thinking, though, in effect, responsible thinking soon comes to be whittled down to thinking responsible exclusively to the powers that be. Spontaneity and creativity begin to suffer in the process, which means the plugging up of the perennial source of newer gospels so imperatively needed for constant renewal of humanity. Philosophy, in Bertrand Russell's words used of art, springs from the wild side of human nature, and, since in the world of committed writers the wild side of human nature is not allowed to be so wild as elsewhere, for whatever reasons, little original or bold contribution to philosophy is to be

expected there. N. Lossky reports how A. M. Deborin, presumably the greatest theoretician of dialectical materialism after Lenin's times, had to recant from his interpretation of dialectical materialism, make open acknowledgement of his theoretical lapses, admit too much addiction on his part to menshevizing idealism and the separation of theory and practice, and publicly thank the Central Committee and especially Stalin for having restrained him just in time.'[6] In the circumstances, one does not lose much if one is deprived of a peep into the state of dialectical materialism in the Marxist world today.

The work is the result of a patient study of its sources on their own. Care has been taken to ensure that, as far as possible, not one piece of information is allowed to be included in it without clear indication of its source. Our motto is the same as that of Mallinātha, the great commentator of Kālidāsa, which is: 'Nāmūlaṁ likhyate kiñcin, nānapekṣitam ucyate' (Nothing unfounded is being written, nothing irrelevant is being said). This has resulted, naturally, in a multiplicity of references and notes.

References and Notes

1. As *The Problem of Method* (London : Methuen & Co., 1963) and *Search for a Method* (New York : Random House, 1963), Hazel E. Barnes, tr.
2. Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Idea*, R. P. Haldane and J. Kemp, trs. (9th impression, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1948), Vol. II, p. 285.
3. I. Mészáros, *Lukács' Concept of Dialectic* (London : Merlin Press, 1972), for instance.
4. Gustav A. Wetter, *Dialectical Materialism*, Peter Heath, tr. (London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
5. Whitehead, *Process and Reality*, p. 14.
6. N. Lossky, *Filosofiya i psikhologiya v U. S. S. R.*, quoted in Wetter, p. 136.

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Chapter I

DIALECTIC COMES INTO BEING

Dialectic is a Greek term (dia+legein) originally signifying discourse, debate, discussion or discussion by the method of question and answer. Diogenes Laertius (200 A. C.), who defines dialectic as 'the art of discourse by which we either refute or establish some proposition by means of question and answer on the part of the interlocutors'[1], quotes Aristotle (384-322 B. C.) as holding, in the latter's *Sophist* (otherwise known as *Sophistical Refutations*) as Sextus Empiricus (200-250 A. C.) tells us, that dialectic was invented by Zeno of Elea (490-430 B. C.) and rhetoric by Empedocles (450 B. C.). This view is also shared in our day by A. E. Taylor and H. D. P. Lee.[2] In the English rendering of the *Sophistical Refutations*, however, we fail to find a clear confirmation of this view. On the other hand, as will appear presently, there are passages in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* which serve to suggest that dialectic was invented by Plato (427-347 B. C.) and that even Socrates (470-399 B. C.) made some contribution to its genesis.

In the *Parmenides*, however, Plato appears to suggest that dialectic was invented by Parmenides (6th-5th century B. C.) and first systematically practised by Zeno. There Parmenides charges Socrates with lack of 'sufficient training' in 'the art which is called by the vulgar idle talking and which is often imagined to be useless.' Then Socrates enquires from him the nature of the exercise and Parmenides replies, 'That which you heard Zeno

practising'.[3] Parmenides also advises him to 'consider not only the consequences which flow from the hypothesis that something is, but also those which flow from the hypothesis that it is not'.[4] Thereafter, upon the request of Socrates and Zeno, Parmenides proceeds to demonstrate the method.

The method of Parmenides illustrated in the *Parmenides* and of Zeno illustrated there[5] and by Aristotle[6] and Simplicius (6 th century) can scarcely be described as a question-answer method. Parmenides, assailing its two essentials—multiplicity and change—, dismisses the world of sense as illusory and false and postulates homogeneous and changeless 'Being' as the only reality. Zeno set himself the task of defending the thesis of his master, Parmenides, as against Heracleitus (536-470 B. C.) and Empedocles (490-430 B. C.). Zeno's 'whole' is a static whole, a 'block-universe', a 'desolate Whole, breezeless and motionless'. Aristotle deals with Zeno's arguments leading to such a conception of the universe at length.[7] Zeno's method of defence of Parmenides is indirect. He first assumes that the commonsense view of reality is true and then reasons out that it involves greater absurdities than those laid to the charge of Parmenides. Challenging chiefly the concepts of multiplicity and motion, he tries to establish that they are self-contradictory and hence unreal and that, therefore, only the changeless one is. His arguments against motion—Achilles and tortoise, the flying arrow, etc.—are familiar puzzles, which have intrigued the minds of philosophers ever since. Sample, in passing, his argument against multiplicity, in the dialogue, real or imaginary, between him and Socrates : 'What is your meaning, Zeno ? Do you maintain that if being is many, it must be both like and unlike, and that this is impossible, for neither can the like be unlike, nor the unlike like—is that your position ? Just so, said Zeno. And if the unlike cannot be like or the like unlike, then, according to you, being could not be many; for this would involve an impossibility. In all that you say have you any other purpose except to disprove the being of many ?...Is that your meaning, or have I misunderstood you ? No, said Zeno; you have correctly understood my general purposc.'[8]

Zeno's method aimed at demonstrating, in the first instance, that the opponent's view was full of contradictions. In the second instance, his method consisted in adducing arguments to prove a proposition and then immediately overthrowing them by equally

strong arguments. The dialectical situation thus created has proved a fertile ground for the growth of dialectic as conflict of opposites. In the process of the use of his method, Zeno encountered a number of contraries given in the 'Hypotheses' of the *Parmenides*—more or less the same as listed by F. M. Cornford: one and many, divisible and indivisible, finite and infinite in number, rest and motion, in itself and in another, same and different, like and unlike, in contact and not in contact, large and small, equal and unequal.[9] Simplicius notes that Zeno's arguments often turned on dichotomy and that he used arguments from dichotomy.[10] We shall see that in the long run dialectic was pinned down to clash of contraries/contradictories.

Zeno was almost exclusively preoccupied with argumentation involving a chain of *reductiones ad absurdum* (refutation by reduction to impossibility), not requiring the duality of questioner and answerer. Both Socrates and Plato make full use of this method in their dialectical or conversational reasoning.

From the foregoing considerations, it is evident that Zeno does merit the title of being the inventor of dialectic, in, as we shall see in the sequel, two of its forms: conversational thinking or reasoning and conflict of opposites.

The followers of Euclid of Megara (400 B. C.)[11] put their arguments in the form of question and answer, whence they soon came to be called 'dialecticians'. One of them, Embulides, is famous for invention of the crux 'The Liar'. Suidas (975 A. C.) ascribed invention of dialectic to Euclides and Bryson together.[12] The ascription is obviously untenable.

Diogenes Laertius credits Protagoras (480-410 B. C.) with discovering the possibility of two opposite propositions about every subject, fashioning arguments on this assumption, and using questions in arguments.[13] Protagoras did write a treatise on the *Art of Eristic*[14] as also, significantly enough, the *Art of Wrestling*.[15] He is also credited with distinguishing match-winning from truth-hunting eristic.[16]

Diogenes Laertius elsewhere makes the confusing statement that 'Plato was the first to frame a science for rightly asking and answering questions having used it himself to excess'. The confusion

is worse confounded when he says that Arcesilaus (316-241 B.C.) was the first to argue on both sides of a question.[17]

Protagoras is also credited with introducing the Socratic Method, viz. the method, brought to perfection by Socrates, of fashioning questions in such a way that the answerer need have to say only 'yes' or 'no' in reply and that the answerer is finally driven into self-contradiction. This method marks an important advance in the evolution of dialectic.

Aristotle maintains that 'two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science.'[18] It is also significant that he treats induction as a part of dialectic.[19] Therefore, Socrates must be credited with some contribution to the development of dialectic.

But in Aristotle there are two passages suggesting much more clearly that dialectic was first discovered by Plato. One of the two passages deals with Socrates. It reads thus : 'for there was as yet none of the dialectical power which enables people even without knowledge of the essence to speculate about contraries and inquire whether the same science deals with contraries; for two things may be fairly ascribed to Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are concerned with the starting-point of science.'[20] Here 'as yet' means upto the time of Socrates, with whom the passage deals. The other passage, occurring in a chapter devoted to Plato, says that 'the earlier thinkers had no tincture of dialectic'.[21] Here 'earlier' means earlier than Plato. This statement of Aristotle is also attested to by Diogenes Laertius who says that 'in my opinion Plato...ought to be adjudged the prize for its invention as well as for its embellishment',[22] though we have seen above how he confuses the issue by mentioning the names of Protagoras, Plato, and Arcesilaus in this behalf.

It appears to be indisputable that the term 'dialectic', with its inflections, is Plato's invention and first occurs in his *Meno*,[23] in the sense of the 'use of premises which the person interrogated would be willing to admit'. It also occurs in the *Republic*[24] in the sense of 'using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—that is to say, as steps and points of departure into a

world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principles of the whole. ...from Ideas, through Ideas, and in Ideas she ends'. At a later stage in the same work,[25] he defines dialectic as 'such an education as will enable them [children] to attain the greatest skill in asking and answering questions'. In the *Cratylus*,[26] he describes as a 'dialectician' 'a man who knows how to ask and answer questions'. In the *Republic*,[27] he exhorts the mature to 'imitate the dialectician who is seeking for truth, and not the eristic who is contradicting for the sake of amusement'. He appears to be fully conscious of 'the difference between the mere art of disputation and true dialectic'.[28]

In the *Republic*[29], *Phaedo*[30], and *Sophist*[31], by dialectic Plato appeare to mean, respectively, 'the power of conversing', 'the art concerning discussions', and 'the procedure of discussion'. As will transpire in the sequel, he appears to be firmly of the view that the supreme method is that of question and answer. According to him, question-and-answer is essential to not only teaching but also discovery.[32] In his exclusive devotion to the dialogue form of writing, some bave read the belief that thought has its origins in conversation. Thus, according to Plato, the dialectical method is the conversational method, the method of discovery of truth by question-and-answer, the method of conversational thinking, and must be distinguished from what is called mere eristic, eristic matches or duels.

Dialectic of this sort receives further embellishment at the hands of Aristotle. He postulates three kinds of rensoning: (1) demonstrative reasoning, 'when the premises from which the reasoning starts are true and primary, or are such that our knowledge of them has originally come through premises which are primary and true'; (2) dialectical reasoning, which 'reasons from opinions that are generally accepted'; and (3) contentious reasoning, which 'starts from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but are not really such', or which 'merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted'.[33] He avers elsewhere, 'Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claims to know...'.[34] It is, however, 'a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all enquiries.[35] Elsewhere, he divides arguments in dialogue form into four classes: didactic arguments,

dialectical arguments, examination-arguments, and contentious arguments. 'Didactic arguments are those that reason from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer (for the learner should take things on trust): dialectical arguments are those that reason from premises generally accepted, to the contradictory of a given thesis: examination-arguments are those that reason from premises which are accepted by the answerer and which anyone who pretends to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know... : contentious arguments are those that reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premises that appear to be generally accepted but are not so'.[36]

It appears that rhetoric[37] as well as dialogue is the root and this form of dialectic is the fruit.[38] This dialectic (meant to yield proof) starts its career from rhetoric (meant to persuade) and dialogue, through match-winning eristic or disputation responsible for much that is known as sophistry or sophism and chiefly concerned with forcing or rebutting elenchi, and culminates in dialectic as truth-hunting eristic. This dialectic works through question-and-answer. The questioner can only ask questions, rather atomic questions, viz. questions couched in atomic propositions, cast in such a way that the answerer may discharge the obligation of saying, with certain reservations, only 'yes' or 'no', assigned to him by the dialectical procedure. The answerer puts up his *thesis* and the questioner tries to extract from him an *antithesis* and thereby drive him into an elenchus. It appears that Plato's constructive method of dialectic owes its origin to Socrates' destructive method of elenchus, viz. showing up a thesis by putting questions to its upholder.

For Plato as for Aristotle, dialectic is a serious art of disputation which should be practised only by the mature. In fact, Plato prescribes thirty years as the lower age-limit for dialecticians and strongly dissuades youngers from indulging in it. In this connexion, he makes an interesting statement: 'Whenever boys taste dialectic for the first time, they pervert it into an amusement and always employ it for purposes of contradiction,...delighting, like puppies, in pulling and tearing to pieces with logic anyone who comes near them.'[39] Such dialectic may be called 'reasoning dialectic,' as Hegel would have it.[40]

Dialectic assumes rather radically different forms in Plato and Aristotle themselves. In the *Republic*, Plato prescribes training of the philosopher-king to be concluded with dialectic, which is the highest kind of knowledge,[41] 'the coping-stone of the sciences, and is set over them.'[42] He asserts that 'the comprehensive mind is always dialectical'.[43] According to both Plato and Aristotle, the subject-matter of dialectic comprises 'universal properties, such as those which are called being and not-being, likeness and unlikeness, sameness and difference, and also...unity and any other number which occurs in our judgement of objects, odd and even numbers'.[44] So, such dialectic can be equated with categoriology. According to Aristotle, 'Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic. Both are alike concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science'.[45] He has it that dialectic has 'a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. ... for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all enquiries'.[46] He elsewhere avers, 'Neither Rhetoric nor Dialectic is the scientific study of any one separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments'.[47] Note the distinction between dialectic, philosophy, and sophistic : 'Dialectic is merely critical where philosophy claim to know, and sophistic is what appears to be philosophy but is not'.[48]

In the *Republic*, Plato appears to equate dialectic with philosophy, contending 'that other sort of knowledge which reason herself attains by the power of dialectic, using the hypotheses not as first principles, but only as hypotheses—as steps and points of departure into a world which is above hypotheses, in order that she may soar beyond them to the first principles of the whole...'.[49] He makes further elucidation of the point thus : 'Then dialectic, and dialectic alone, goes directly to the first principles and is the only science which does away with hypotheses in order to make her ground secure; the eye of the soul, which is really buried in an outlandish slough, is by her gentle aid lifted upwards; and in this work she uses as handmaids and helpers the sciences which we have been discussing.'[50] Compare Aristotle's definition of philosophy, or rather first philosophy, built, in all probability, out of the material provided by Plato: 'For the attributes of this in so far as it is being, and the contrarieties in it qua being, it is the

business of no other science than philosophy to investigate....'[51] It is to be noted, however, that here, too, Aristotle takes care to keep dialectic and philosophy apart, by hastening to add : 'while dialectic and sophistic deal with the attributes of things that are, but not of things qua being, and not with being itself in so far as it is being....'[52] Plato also describes dialectic as 'the study of all wisdom whatever'[53].

In the *Phaedrus*,[54] *Statesman*,[55] and *Sophist*,[56] Plato assigns to dialectic the task of division, viz. categorization of kinds, usually dichotomously, into *summa genera, genera, species, sub-species*, and *varieties*. Here, too, dialectic is, broadly speaking, interchangeable with categoriology.

It would be pertinent to note in passing that the dialectic of Plato and Aristotle has been revived in our day by Mortimer J. Adler, according to whom 'Dialectic is...the kind of thinking which takes place when human beings enter into dispute, or when they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some theory or idea'[57]. Compare Aristotle's statement that 'Dialectic...does proceed by questioning.'[58] Adler also avers that 'dialectic is a kind of thinking to be distinguished from the inductive or deductive thinking engaged in by the "single mind"[59], a distinction originally made by an earlier philosopher, the great Eduard Von Hartmann, who has it that 'Three leading methods of research are to be distinguished—the dialectic (Hegelian), the deductive (from above downwards), and the inductive (from below upwards)'[60]. When Plato describes dialectic as 'the study of all wisdom whatever'[61], dialectic becomes another name for philosophy—'the technical aspect of philosophy', 'the intellectual type of philosophy', as Richard Robinson would have it.[62] In the same vein, Adler maintains that 'philosophy...is nothing more or less than dialectic'[63] and that 'In order not to be a dialectician, one must be a dogmatist...'[64]. Indeed, as we have seen, Plato himself makes it clear that 'Dialectic is the science of first principles distinguished from other sciences by dispensing with hypotheses and is the coping-stone of the sciences'[65].

According to Plato, things have unchanging essences,[66] and his dialectic is concerned to unravel the mystery of 'what neither

comes into being nor passes away, but is always identically the same.[67] The unchanging essences are called forms, the highest form being styled the Form of the Good,[68] the object of dialectic and dialectic alone.[69]

Earlier than Plato and Socrates, the Eleatics—Parmenides and Zeno—showed much more rigidity in their belief in unchanging Being. They contend that Being is and that Becoming is not at all. They were substance-philosophers, viz. philosophers for whom substance was the fundamental ontological category. To the contrary, Heracleitus was, generally speaking, a process-philosopher, for whom it was not substance but process which was the fundamental category.

In Heracleitus, we find an altogether different pattern of dialectic, the culmination of which was reached in Hegel, as we shall see in the sequel.

Heracleitus maintains that only Becoming is and that changeless Being is only illusory. According to him, everything is in a state of flux: 'Everything flows and nothing abides; everything gives way and nothing stays fixed.[70] More trenchantly, 'It is in changing that thing find repose.'[71] This theory of universal flux is beautifully illustrated in the statement, 'You cannot step twice into the same river, for other waters are continually flowing on.'[72] His universe is, put in a different way, 'an ever-living fire.'[73] At the human level, its phases are 'craving and satiety.'[74]

To quote from Stace, 'Not only do things change from moment to mement, even in one and the same moment they are and are not the same. It is not merely that a thing first is, and then a moment afterwards is not. It both is and is not at the same time. The at-onceness of "is" and "is not" is the meaning of Becoming, which is the identity of Being and not-being.'[75] Indeed, Heracleitus contends that everything is in conflict with even itself, when he suggests, 'The one in conflict with itself is held together, like the harmony of the bow and of the lyre.'[76] He defines origination as passage of not-being into Being, and decease as passage of Being into not-being.[77]

Heracleitus's philosophy of universal flux is the direct antithesis of Eleaticism in one more respect. Whereas the real of Parmenides and Zeno, which is a changeless whole, has a

logic tolerating no contradiction whatever, the *Logos* of Heracleitus is expressible only in seeming contradictions. Of the slightly fewer than 150 sentences from Heracleitus's work which have come down to us, about one-sixth deal with opposites. The flowing reality is, as it were, constantly flowing into the opposite, so that the effect is always the opposite of the cause. 'Cool things,' says Heracleitus, 'become warm, the warm grows cool; the moist dries, the parched becomes moist.'[78] He also remarks, 'Fire lives in the death of earth, air in the death of fire, water in the death of air, and earth in the death of water.'[79] The rubric of the Eleatics is 'neither...nor'; that of Heracleitus, 'both... and'—namely, 'neither one nor many' and 'both one and many', respectively. 'God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety and want;'[80] 'Opposition brings concord. Out of discord comes the fairest harmony;'[81] 'It is by disease that health is pleasant; by evil that good is pleasant; by hunger, satiety; by weariness, rest;'[82] 'Sea water is at once very pure and very foul : it is drinkable and healthful for fishes, but undrinkable and deadly for men;[83] 'Pigs wash in mud, and domestic fowls in dust or ashes;'[84] 'Doctors cut, burn, and torture the sick, and then demand of them an undeserved fee for such services;'[85] 'The way up and the way down are one and the same;'[86] 'Into the same rivers we step and we do not step;' 'It is one and the same thing to be living or dead, awake or asleep, young or old. The former aspect in each case becomes the latter, and the latter again the former, by sudden unexpected reversal;'[87] 'strife is justice, and...all things come to pass through the compulsion of strife.'[88] Such fragments from Heracleitus serve to throw into clear relief his position as one of the fathers of dialectic in general and *the* father of dialect as it came to develop in Germany later. We shall study this development in the sequel. It is not surprising when Heracleitus declares, 'War is both father and king of all....'[89] This dictum is symbolical of the struggle of opposites at all levels. In fact, he censures Homer for praying that 'strife might perish from amongst gods and men,' on the ground that, if strife ceases to exist, 'then all things would cease to exist.'[90]

According to some, despite the Heracleitean epigrams quoted above, it is not change but *Logos* which in fact occupies the central position in Heracleitus. The term Logos is variously translated as Word, Rationale, Reason, Order, Law. To us, its nearest equiva-

lent appears to be the Vedic expression 'Ṛta'.[91] That way, the nearest English equivalent for the term would be the universal cosmic law/reason. Now, according to Aristotle, Heracleitus did believe in the existence of one single sub-ject, which endures through the fleeting super-ject. Writes Aristotle, 'But what these thinkers [Hesiod and his followers] maintained was that all else has been generated and, as they said, "is flowing away," nothing having any solidarity, except one single thing which persists as the basis of all these transformations. So we may interpret the statements of Heraclitus of Ephesus and many others.'[92] The discernment of *Logos* in the flux of existence as a universal phenomenon does appear to constitute for Heracleitus wisdom as contrasted with 'learning many things.' 'Wisdom,' according to him, 'is one and unique;'[93] 'Wisdom is one—to know the intelligence by which all things are steered through all things.'[94] He goes to the length of suggesting that 'The hidden harmony is better than the obvious.'[95] It does seem to suggest that Heracleitus saw conflict only on the surface, not in the heart of things. As regards *Logos*, he writes, 'Although this Logos is eternally valid, yet men are unable to understand it.... That is to say, although all things come to pass in accordance with this Logos, men seem to be quite without any experience of it.... We should let ourselves be guided by what is common to all. Yet, although the Logos is common to all, most men live as if each of them had a private intelligence of his own'.[96] Apparently, this *Logos* is not something which flows.

Till a substantial amount of the work of Heracleitus is recovered, the possibility of which stands ruled out almost altogether, it is not possible to decide between the two views.

G. T. W. Patrick notes, and partinently, that, though there are neither definite avowals not clear-cut distinctions in the fragments from Heracleitus which have come down to us, Heracleitus seems to posit two distinct classes of oppositions, one in which the opposites are endlessly passing into one another and are reciprocal transmutations of each other and the other in which there is a mere identity of opposites, such as good and evil.[97]

Heracleitus's concept of the constant conflict of the contraries constitutes the first great landmark is the history of dialectic. Indeed, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), the greatest

dialectician of all times, was so much impressed by Heracleitus that he declared that 'there is no proposition of Heraclitus which I have not adopted in my logic'.[98]

To sum up the various lines of development of the concept of dialectic among the Greeks, dialectic has had its roots in dialogue and rhetoric and soon emerged as procedure of discussion. It then took the form of the Socratic Method at the hands of Protagoras and Socrates, who gave it the appearance of the destructive method of elenchus. It became conversational thinking or reasoning in Zeno, Plato, and Aristotle. In Plato and Aristotle, it also makes its appearance as here logic, there categoriology, and elsewhere first philosophy. It is found in Zeno as reductio ad absurdum through conflict of thesis and antithesis. In Heracleitus, it is found in two rather well-defined forms: (1) conception of reality as pure becoming, as process, as flux and (2) identity, interpenetration, and strife of opposites. It is Heracleitus who is responsible for laying the foundation of that type of dialectic of which we have been aware since the time of the great Hegel, in whom dialectic comes of age and attains maturity.

Drawing profusely upon Plato and Aristotle, Plotinus (205-270), the Egyptian philosopher adjudged the most important Neoplatonist, raises the question if dialectic is 'the same as philosophy' and answers, 'It is the precious part of philosophy.... Dialectic does not consist of bare theories and rules : it deals with verities....Dialectic, that is to say, has no knowledge of propositions—collections of words—but it knows the truth...it knows, above all, the operation of the soul...it leaves petty precisions of process to what other sciences may care for such exercises.'[99] Dialectic, according to him, deals with the nature and common qualities of things, categories of being and non-being, the good and the not-good, the eternal and the not-eternal.[100]

Little contribution to the concept of dialectic appears to have been made by the scholastics. After them, interest in dialectic had been on the wane till Germans came to its rescue. In between, however, the famous French philosopher Réné Descartes (1596-1650) turned to dialectic just to adjudge it valueless as a means of valid knowledge According to him :

'the Dialecticians are unable to devise syllogism which has a true conclusion....hence the ordinary Dialectic is quite valueless for those who desire to investigate the truth of things.'[101] Indeed, he goes on to the length of suggesting that 'it should be transferred from Philosophy to Rhetoric'. He does not consider that type of dialectic which aims at discovering the truth by making the false contradict itself.

The first German philosopher to take dialectic seriously was Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). According to him, the ancients practised dialectic as the logic of illusion. 'It was a sophistical art of giving to ignorance, and indeed to intentional sophistries, the appearance of truth, by the device of imitating the methodical thoroughness which logic prescribes, and of using its "topic" to conceal the emptiness of its pretensions.'[102] He argues : 'We must first, independently of logic, obtain reliable information; only then are we in a position to enquire, in accordance with logical laws, into the use of this information and its connection in a coherent whole or rather to test it by these laws. There is, however, something so tempting in the possession of an art so specious,...that general logic which is merely a *canon* of judgement, has been employed as if it were an *organon* for the actual production of at least the semblance of objective assertions, and has thus been misapplied. General logic, when thus treated as an organon, is called *dialectic*.'[103]

The passage speaks for itself. Here Kant expresses his disapproval of dialectic as abstract logic functioning irrespective of experience. Otherwise, he makes full use of dialectic.

In drawing up his list of categories, Kant collects them in four classes,[104] each class containing three catgories, the first two divided by dichotomy and the third supervenient upon combination of the second category with the first. Thus, each class of the categories can be said to be modelled on the pattern of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, a formula used by Kant himself in his *Critique of Judgement*.[105]

Kant's table of categories is subjoined for ready reference :[106]

I

Of Quantity

Unity
Plurality
Totality

II

Of Quality

Reality
Negation
Limitation

III

Of Relation

Of Inherence and Subsistence (substantia et accidens)
Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
Of Community (reciprocity between agent & patient)

IV

Of Modality

Possibility—Impossibility
Existence—Non-existence
Necessity—Contingency

In the 'Antinomy of Pure Reason', Kant lists four cosmological ideas, each juxtaposed to an antithetical idea, calling the one thesis and the other antithesis, and designating the dialectical situation as an antinomy. His antinomies, four in number, are:[107]

(1) Whether the world has a beginning in time and is limited as regards space.

(2) Whether everything composite is made up of simple parts.

(3) Whether everything takes place solely in accordance with laws of nature and there is no freedom.

(4) Whether there is an absolutely necessary being at the root of the world.

Each of these issues involves two mutually opposite sides, equally strong.

According to Kant, the cosmological antinomies can only be four, because 'there are but four cosmological ideas corresponding to the four titles of the categories'[108]. Upon this, Hegel observes that not only these four but all other concepts also are a unity of opposite moments and can, therefore, be asserted in the

shape of an antinomy. Indeed, according to him 'as many antinomies could be set up as concepts were yielded'.[109]

References and Notes:

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2. Richard Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), p. 91, read with Ryle, p. 44.
3. *Parmenides* 135d. All references to the writings of Plato in this work are, unless otherwise indicated, from *The Dialogues of Plato*, B. Jowett, tr. (4th ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), in four volumes.
4. *Ibid.* 136a.
5. *Ibid.* 127d-e.
6. *Physics* 233a and 239b. All references to the writings of Aristotle in this work are, unless otherwise indicated, from *The Works of Aristotle*, tr. under the editorship of W. D. Ross, *Great Books of the Western World*, Robert Maynard Hutchins, ed., Nos. 8 and 9 (Chicago etc. : Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952).
7. *Physics* 209a, 210b, 233a, 239b, 250a, 263a.
8. *Parmenides* 127d-e.
9. F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (2nd impression, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), p. 58.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 180.
11. He should not be confused with the great geometer, Euclid of Alexandria (300 B. C.), author of the *Elements.*
12. Ryle, p. 45.
13. *Sophist* 232 d-e.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*
16. *Theaetetus* 167d-168.
17. Ryle, p. 54.

18. *Metaphysics* 1078b.
19. Aristotle, *Topics* 105a: '...we must distinguish how many species there are of dialectical arguments. There is on the one hand Induction, on the other Reasoning.'
20. *Metaphysics* 1078b.
21. *Ibid.* 987b.
22. Ryle, p. 54.
23. *Meno* 75d.
24. *Republic* 511b-e.
25. *Ibid.* 534d-e.
26. *Cratylus* 390c.
27. *Republic* 539.
28. *Philebus* 17a.
29. *Republic* 511b.
30. *Phaedo* 90b.
31. *Sophist* 227a.
32. Plato, Letter VII, 344b, L. A. Post, tr., *The Collected Dialogues*, Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns, eds., Bollingen Series, No. LXXI (5th printing, Princeton: Princeton University Press, March 1969), p. 1591.
33. *Topics* 100ab.
34. *Metaphysics* 1004b. In this sense, the philosophical, or rather linguistic, analysts of today are dialecticians, not philosophers.
35. *Topics* 101b.
36. *Sophistical Refutations* 165a-b.
37. 'Rhetoric may be defined as the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.' *Rhetoric* 1355b.
38. 'Rhetoric is the counterpart of Dialectic.' *Rhetoric* 1354a. Also see *Topics* 164a5, 167b8, 174b19, 183b.
39. *Republic* 537-539.
40. G. W. F. Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson, trs. from the German (2nd reprint, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul; New York: The Humanities Press, 1963), Vol. II, pp. 52-53.
41. *Philebus* 57e.
42. *Ibid.* 534e.
43. *Ibid.* 537c.

44. *Theaetetus* 185c-d. Also see *Sophist* 254-259; *Parmenides* 136; *Philebus* 58a; *Metaphysics* 995b, 998b, 1004a-1005a.
45. *Rhetoric* 1354a.
46. *Topics* 101b.
47. *Rhetoric* 1356a.
48. *Metaphysics* 1004b.
49. *Republic* 511b-c.
50. *Ibid.* 533c-d.
51. *Ibid.* 1061b.
52. *Loc. cit.*
53. *Republic* 475, 486a.
54. *Phaedrus* 265-266, 277b.
55. *Statesman* 286d. Cp. 258b, 261-268c.
56. *Sophist* 253d.
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58. *Sophistical Refutations* 172a.
59. Adler, op. cit., p. 10.
60. Eduard Von Hartmann, *Philosophy of the Unconscious*, William Chatterton Coupland, tr. (New York: Kegan Paul, Trench, Turbner & Co., 1931), p. 6.
61. *Republic* 475, 486a.
62. Robinson, op. cit., p. 71.
63. Adler, op. cit., p. vi.
64. *Ibid.*, p. vii.
65. *Republic* 534e.
66. *Parmenides* 125b-c.
67. *Philebus* 61e.
68. *Republic* 517b.
69. *Republic* 532 a-b.
70. Heracleitus, Fragment 20, vide Philip Wheelwright, *Heraclitus* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), wherein 124 fragments from the lost work of Heracleitus have been collected.
71. Fragment 23.
72. Fragment 21.
73. Fragment 29.
74. Fragment 30.
75. See W. T. Stace, *A Critical History of Greek Philosophy* (7th reprint, London : Macmillan & Co., 1950), p.74.

76. *Symposium* 187a.
77. Stace, op. cit., p. 75.
78. Fragment 22.
79. Fragment 34.
80. Fragment 121.
81. Fragment 98.
82. Fragment 99.
83. Fragment 101.
84. Fragment 103.
85. Fragment 107.
86. Fragment 108.
87. Fragment 113.
88. Fragment 26.
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93. Fragment 119.
94. Fragment 120.
95. Fragment 116.
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97. G. T. W. Patrick, *The Fragments of the Work of Heracleitus on Nature* (Baltimore, 1889), p. 63, quoted in F. Th. Stcherbatsky, *Buddhist Logic* (New York : Dover Publications, Inc., 1962), Volume One, p. 430.
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104. Hegel notes that the four 'are intended by Kant himself merely as titles for his categories, though in fact they are categories themselves, only of a more universal nature'. Hegel, *The Science of Logic,* W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, trs. (2nd impression, London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan Company, 1951), Vol. I, p. 91.

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104. Hegel notes that the four [illegible] intended by Kant himself [illegible] as titles for his categories, though in fact they are [illegible] themselves only of a more universal nature. [illegible] *Logic*, W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, tr. [illegible] impression; London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Macmillan Company, 1951), Vol. I, p. 91.

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Chapter II

DIALECTIC COMES OF AGE

The triplicity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis was taken over and developed by Schelling (1775–1854) and Fichte (1762–1814) in their own, idealistic ways. It also passed on to Hegel, who is considered, rightly, the culminaion of dialectical thought.

For Fichte, the fundamental propositions of philosophy are:

1. 'The ego simply posits in an original way its own being.'[1] He adds that 'To *posit* itself and to *be* are, as said of the ego, completely the same.'[2] Positing is being.
2. 'a non-ego is simply opposed to the ego.'[3]
3. 'I posit in the ego a divisible non-ego as opposed to a divisible ego.'[4]

As opposed to the Hegelian dialectic, as will transpire in the sequel, the Fichteian dialectic starts from the ego, whose mere positing is being.

Ascribing an honourable lineage to dialectic critically enough,[5] Hegel generalized the dialectical method beyond the confines of human discourse, replaced 'barren formal logic' by dialectical logic which he shaped so as to coincide with metaphysics, ontology, or philosophy,[6] and made dialectic the underlying pattern of all intellectual activity and all change in nature. Before proceeding further in setting out the Hegelian dialectic, we would do well to remind the reader that Hegel happens to be the most controversial figure in the history of Western philo-

sophy and that, therefore, we must be extra-cautious in dealing with him. Besides, thanks to the Hegelians, a good many extraneous theses—such as 'objective idealism', theory of coherence,[7] theory of internal relations—are foisted upon him, turning him into the greatest abstraction-monger of all times.

Hegel has all along been regarded as an idealist par excellence—objective idealist, absolute idealist, but idealist of course. Karl Marx (1818–1883) saw the Hegelian dialectic stand on its head and found it necessary to turn it right side up again to transform Hegel's dialectical 'idealism' into his (Marx's) dialectical materialism.[8] He and Engels (1820–1895) also have it that 'In direct contrast to german philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven.'[9] But a close scrutiny of Hegel's texts leads to a different conclusion.

The following considerations serve to cast doubt on the validity of the view of Hegel as an idealist in the popular sense of the term.

Frederick Engels regarded the Hegelian system as 'merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down in method and content.'[10] Lenin also notes close approximations in Hegel to materialism.[11] According to him, 'Objective (and still more, absolute) idealism came *very close* to materialisun by a zig-zag path (and a somersault), even partially *became transformed into it*'.[12] He also notes that 'the whole chapter on the "Absolute Idea" scarcely says a word about God (hardly ever has a "divine" "notion" slipped out accidentally) and apart from that—*this N. B.*—it contains almost nothing that is specifically *idealism*, but has for its main subject the *dialectical* **method.** The sum-total, the last word and essence of Hegel's logic is the *dialectical method*—this is extremely noteworthy. And one thing more: in this *most idealistic* of Hegel's works there is the *least* idealism and the *most materialism.* "Contradictory," but a fact !'[13]

Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind* appears to be a reaction against the cult of insubstantiality and abstraction-mongering excessively in the air since Kant. In its Preface, he declares : 'The systematic development of truth in scientific form can alone be the true shape in which truth exists.'[14] Earlier than Engels who made the emphatic declaration that 'modern materialism...

no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences',[15] Hegel set before himself the goal of helping 'to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science—that goal where it can lay aside the name of *love* of knowledge and be actual *knowledge*'.[16] Of those who distrust conceptual thinking and are for a direct passport to the Divine through feeling and intuition, he sardonically remarks: 'But just as there is a breadth which is emptiness, there is a depth which is empty too ... When such minds commit themselves to the unrestrained ferment of sheer emotion, they think that, by putting a veil over self-consciousness, and surrendering all understanding, they are thus God's beloved ones to whom He gives His wisdom in sleep. This is the reason, too, that in point of fact what they do conceive and bring forth in sleep is dreams'.[17] According to him, conceptual thinking, reflection, or reason is quite competent to deal with the ultimate truth. 'We misconceive therefore the nature of reason', writes he, 'if we exclude reflection or mediation from ultimate truth, and do not take it to be a positive moment of the Absolute. It is reflection which constitutes truth the final result, and yet at the same time does away with the contrast between result and the process of arriving at it.'[18] He describes discursive thought, 'Understanding', which performs the 'action of separating the elements [of an idea]', as 'the most astonishing and greatest of all powers, or rather the absolute power.'[19] The net result : 'that knowledge is only real and can only be set forth fully in the form of science, in the form of system; and further, that a so-called fundamental proposition or first principle of philosophy, even if it is true, is yet none the less false just because and in so far as it is merely a fundamental proposition, merely a first principle.'[20]

Hegel does not countenance the dichotomy, so characteristic of Indian philosophy in general, of empirical (vyāvahārika) truth and transcendental (pāramārthika) truth, or, as he puts it, of 'knowledge in general...incapable of grasping the Absolute... [but] capable of truth of another kind',[21] 'common view of things',[22] 'phenomenal knowledge',[23] and 'natural consciousness'[24] on one hand and absolute knowledge or knowledge of the Absolute on the other. He straight-way rejects as 'adventitious and arbitrary' all attempt to interrogate our faculty of knowledge to find out whether it is capable of the knowledge of the

Absolute.[25] Such an attempt, on his view, proceeds on the assumption that the relations between knowledge and reality are wholly external and accidental, and does away with the very possibility of knowledge *ab initio*. We shall see how the Hegelian dialectic allows inadequate, imperfect consciousness to develop into absolute knowledge through the dialectical process.

Warning the seekers after edification that they are no seekers after knowledge, Hegel writes : 'The man who only seeks edification, who wants to envelop in mist the manifold diversity of his earthly existence and thought, and craves after the vague enjoyment of this vague and indeterminate Divinity—he may look where he likes to find this : he will easily find for himself the means to get something he can rave over and puff himself up with. But philosophy must beware of the wish to be edifying'.[26] Unless edification or intuitive perception is subjected to the ordeal of, tempered with, and tested by opposition, contradiction, or negation,—that is to say, dialectical reasoning—, it is anything but knowledge in the true sense. As Hegel puts it, 'The life of God and divine intelligence, then, can, if we like, be spoken of as love disporting with itself; but this idea falls into edification, and even sinks into insipidity, if it lacks the seriousness, the suffering, the patience, and the labour of the negative'.[27]

Those who reach 'the familiar result that Reason is incapable of cognition of the Infinite' are ridiculed by Hegel thus: 'a strange result, for—since the Infinite is the Reasonable—it amounts to saying that Reason is incapable of cognizing that which is Reasonable'.[28]

It would also be pertinent to point out in this connexion that, for Hegel, the infinite 'does not stand above the finite as something complete in itself', but 'the finite is just that which itself becomes infinity through its own nature'. 'It is', he says, 'the nature of the finite to pass beyond itself...and to become infinite.'[29] That is to say, the infinite is nothing mysterious or beyond the ken of the finite; it is the finite itself raised into and become the infinite. Indeed, according to Hegel, the infinite which is opposed 'to the finite as to its Other,...must be called the bad infinite'[30] or 'the wrong infinity of endless progression'.[31] This serves to dilute the Hegelian 'idealism' still further.

Another question, considered highly intriguing, peculiar to idealism, and pertaining to the relation between the finite and the infinite, is how the finite issues forth or derives from the primordial infinite, or, as Hegel would have it, 'how the infinite passes beyond itself and achieves finitude'[32] and 'how the infinite comes to the resolution of issuing out of itself'.[33] Rejecting the rigid duality of the finite and the infinite opposed to each other, Hegel replies that 'the infinite passes out into finitude just because, taken as abstract unity, it has in it neither validity nor permanence; and, conversely, the finite passes into the infinite for the same reason, because it is void'.[34] Improving upon this reply, Hegel goes on, 'Or, rather, this should be said, that the infinite has ever passed out to finitude; that, absolutely, it does not exist, by itself and without having its Other in itself, any more than does pure Being'.[35] (The concept of pure Being will come in for consideration in the sequel.) Elsewhere, his reply is worded thus: 'that the opposition is false, and that in point of fact the infinite eternally proceeds out of itself, and yet does not proceed out of itself'.[36] Incidentally, in his *Philosophy of Nature* also, Hegel considers the question of the diremption of the Universal as the determinate, of the finitization of the Infinite, of the birth of the world from God, and replies, 'God has two revelations, as nature and as spirit, and both manifestations are temples which He fills and in which He is present. God as an abstraction is not the true God: His truth is the positing of his other, the living process, the world which is His Son* when it is comprehended in its divine form. God is subject only in unity with His other in spirit'.[37]

What a homely unriddling of the mystery of existence, rendering the Hegelian 'idealism' far less idealistic than the idealisms so much in circulation !

Hegel is realist enough to dispense with 'things-in-themselves' but retain 'things'. Describing the Kantian 'thing-in-itself' as expressing 'the object when we leave out of sight all that consciousness makes of it, all its emotional aspects, and all specific thoughts of it', Hegel remarks that what is left is

* 'with whom, though different, he still remains in original identity', as Hegel adds in his *Philosophy of Mind*, Part III of the *Encyclopedia of Philosophical Sciences*, William Wallace, tr. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 300.

'utter abstraction, total emptiness, only described still as an "other-world"—the negative of every image, feeling, and definite thought'. He adds that 'this *caput mortuum* is still only a product of thought, such as accrues when thought is carried on to abstraction unalloyed : that it is the work of the empty "Ego", which makes an object out of this empty self-identity of its own'.[38] He writes elsewhere : 'With as much reason however as we speak of the thing-by-itself, we might speak of quality-by-itself, and of any other category....This usage is liable to the same criticism as the phrase "thing-in-itself". For if we stick to the mere "in-itself" of an object, we apprehend it not in its truth, but in the inadequate form of mere abstraction.' Illustrating the point, he continues : 'Thus the man, by or in himself, is the child. And what the child has to do is to rise out of this abstract and undeveloped "in-himself" and become "for-himself" what he is at first only "in-himself"—a free and reasonable being. Similarly the state-in-itself is the yet immature and patriarchal state....In the same sense, the germ may be called the plant-in-itself.' He concludes : 'These examples may show the mistake of supposing that the "thing-in-itself" or the "in-itself" of things is something inaccessible to our cognition. All things are originally in-themselves, but that is not the end of the matter.'[39]

Hegel compares the all-obliterating, abstract, 'vacuous knowledge' represented by the proposition 'in the Absolute all is one' with 'the organized whole of determinate and complete knowledge' and likens the former to 'the night in which... all cows are black'.[40]

Hegel's absolute is 'what is entirely present' and 'on hand and actual', not 'something over above things or behind them',[41] not 'a monster in the background'[42]. It is revealed and realized not in transcendental, supramundane vision but in such creative pursuits as art, philosophy, and religion. Hegel writes: 'Common fancy puts the Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without express consciousnesss of it, always carry it with us and always use it.[43] In fact, Findlay appears to be wholly in the right when he remarks that 'there never has been a philosopher by

whom the *Jenseitige*, the merely transcendent, has been more thoroughly "done away with", more thoroughly shown to exist only *as revealed* in human experience'.[44]

... Hegel's method is so non-transcendental, so empirical or experiential, so common-sense that, in his pilgrimage to the absolute, he starts with the most immediate certainties of sense-experience or the minimal notion of 'being', going on enriching them with other experience, till, as it were, the point of saturation with experience.

Hegel's absolute is not an abstract but a concrete universal[45]—'self-identical, with the express qualification, that it simultaneously contains the particular and the individual.'[46] He describes the absolute idea thus: 'the absolut idea is the universal, but the universal not merely as an abstract form to which the particular content is a stranger, but as the absolute form, into which all the categories, the whole fullness of the content it has given being to, have retired. Illustraing the point he continues: 'The absolute idea may in this respect be compared to the old man who utters the same creed as the child, but for whom it is pregnant with the significance of a lifetime....Each of the stages hitherto reviewed is an image of the absolute, but at first in a limited mode, and thus it is forced onwards to the whole....'[47] Compare this concrete, all-inclusive, brim-full universal—brimming with all possible content—with Śaṅkara's featureless, abstract universal (san-mātra) empty of all conceivable content. Among Indian philosophers, it is Rāmānuja who comes nearest to Hegel who ridicules Schelling's Absolute in which all is one as, as we have alredy seen, the night in which all cows are black'. His Absolute is 'essentially a result', 'only at the end is it what it is in very truth; and just in that consists its nature, which is to be actual, subject, or self-development'.[48]

Hegel regards 'the ultimate truth not as Substance but as Subject as well'[49]. Repudiating the bifurcation of reality into nature and mind (or spirit), he avers: 'Nature however is far from being so fixed and complete, as to subsist even without Mind: in Mind it first, as it were, attains its goal and its truth. And similarly, Mind on its part is not merely a world beyond

Nature and nothing more: it is really, and with full proof, seen to be mind, only when it involves Nature as absorbed in itself.'[50] It is significant that Hegel does not commit subjective idealism dismissing nature as illusory, or materlism dismissing mind as but a mode of matter, but retains both as constituents of reality, after, broadly speaking, the manner of Rāmānuja.

Hegel also maintains that the world-process, though not eternal, viz. not timeless, has neither beginning nor end in time and that inorganic nature long pre-exists life and consciousness in the world, the history of which was 'the movement and dreams of one that sleeps, until it awakes and achieves its consciousness in Man, and stands over against itself as a tranquil structure'.[51] More clearly: 'From our point of view Mind has for its *presupposition* Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its *absolute prius.* In this its truth Nature has vanished (viz. upon the emergence of mind) and mind has resulted as the "Idea" entered on possession of itself.'[52] Still more clearly: 'In time nature comes first....'[53] Hegel also maintains that time and space are the forms of external things and not the forms of intuition, in these words: 'The things themselves are in reality spatial and temporal: that double form of mutual outsidedness is not merely put on them one-sidedly by our intuition, but is provided for them from the very beginning by the infinite Spirit which is in itself, by the creative eternal Idea.'[54] These passages cannot fail to drive one to recall the words of Frederick Engels, one of the greatest realists and materialists of all times, that being precedes thinking[55] and the view of the realists that space and time, with nature or matter, are not constructs of the mind but are simply out there. Hegel's is a highly realistic position indeed.

In his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel affirms, more than once, the empirical character of his inquiry. 'We must proceed historically-empirically,' he observes.[56] He also proclaims: 'That such or such a specific quality constitutes the peculiar genius of a people, is the element of our inquiry which must be derived from experience,[57] and historically proved.' Living up to this ideal, he gives his verdict on history thus: 'It is only an inference from the history of the World, that its development has been a rational process; that the history in question has constituted the rational necessary course of the World-Spirit...,'[58]

In fact, as Findlay avers, 'No other philosopher has shown a like blend of factual knowledge and conceptual skill'.[59]

It is not to suggest, however, that Hegel was an empiricist. The fact remains that his dialectic is basically a priori.

Hegel was a historical relativist. According to him, 'every individual is a child of his time; so philosophy too is its own time apprehended in thoughts. It is just as absurd to fancy that a philosophy can transcend its contemporary world as it is to fancy that an individual can overleap his own age, jump over Rhodes.'[60]

Hegel holds that F. H. Jacobi, an upholder of abstract Space, Time, and Consciousness, enters 'a sphere *empirically* false', for the simple reason that 'there is, given empirically, neither Space not Time which is spatially or temporally unlimited, or whose continuity is not filled with the manifold limits of Determinate Being and Change, so that these limits and changes belong, unseparate and inseparably, to spatiality and temporality; similarly consciousness is filled with determinate sensation, presentation, desire and so forth; it exists only in connexion with some particular content'.[61]

Even such dialecticians as Kant and Schelling get rebuff from Hegel for applying dialectic in an abstract, aprioristic manner, without caring to study objectively the material in hand. Of Kant, he writes: 'Employing what has subsequently become a favourite fashion, he simply put the object under a rubric otherwise ready to hand, instead of deducing its characteristics from its notion.'[62] He writes elsewhere, with all the emphasis at his command: 'the triplicity, adopted in the system of Kant—a method rediscovered, to begin with, by instinctive insight, but left lifeless and uncomprehended—has been raised to its significance as an absolute method.... But the use this form has been put to in the Kantian system has no right to the name of science. For we see it there reduced to a lifeless scheme, to nothing better than a mere shadow, and scientific organization to a synoptic table. This formalism...thinks it has comprehended and expressed the nature and life of a given form when it proclaims a determination of the scheme to be its predicate.'[63] Again: 'The trick of wisdom of that sort is as quickly acquired as it is easy to practice. Its repetition, when once it is familiar, becomes as boring

as the repetition of any bit of sleight of hand once we see through it. The instrument of producing this monotonous formalism is no more difficult to handle than the palette of a painter, on which lie only two colours, say red and green, the former for colouring the surface when we want a historical piece, the latter when we want a bit of landscape.'[64]

Hegel does not demur to triplicity being taken as 'the general form of reason'. What he does demur to is its being regarded 'as a wholly external form which did not determine the nature of the content'. He contends: 'Formalists have seized even upon triplicity, and have held fast to its skeleton; and this form has been rendered tedious and of ill-repute by the shallow misuse and the barrenness of modern so-called philosophic *construction*, which consists simply in attaching the formal framework without concept and immanent determination to all sorts of matter and employing it for external arrangement.'[65] Still, in his opinion, it is 'an infinite merit of Kant's philosophy that it demonstrated this....'[66] It is, indeed, 'a great matter that the outward form of rational procedure has been discovered, albeit not understood.'[67]

Hegel is regarded as an idealist also in the sense that, according to him, all is rational. *'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational,'* he affirms.[68] But he does not actually mean to say that whatever is, is rational. His 'actuality' is the unity of universal and particular, essence and appearance, essence and existence.[69] 'Where this unity is not present, a thing is not actual even though it may have acquired existence. A bad state is one which merely exists; a sick body exists, too, but it has no genuine reality. A hand which is cut off still looks like a hand, and it exists, but without being actual.'[70] According to him, 'existence is in part mere appearance, and only in part actuality. In common life, any freak of fancy, any error, evil, as well as every degenerate and transitory existence whatever, gets in a casual way the name of actuality. But even our ordinary feelings are enough to forbid a casual (fortuitous) existence getting the emphatic name of an actual.[71] He also remarks that 'what is actual is inherently necessary'.[72]

This line of interpretation finds ample confirmation from his remarks elsewhere. After affirming that 'what is real, is

rational', he raises the question, 'what exactly is real; in common life all is real, but there is a difference between the phenomenal world and reality.' 'The real', according to him, 'has also an external existence, which displays arbitrariness and contingency, like a tree, a house, a plant, which in nature come into existence....The temporal and transitory certainly exists,...but in spite of that it is no true reality'.[73]

These words are enough to dispel all doubt about the meaning of Hegel's dictum. His following passage, however, throws his position into bolder relief: 'What is universally normal is also universally valid: *what ought to be*, as a matter of fact *is* too; and what merely *should* be, and is *not*, has no real truth.'[74]

Hegel's approach is teleological throughout—teleology, an Aristotelian notion, meaning final causation, purposive causation, causation conceived in terms of goals. According to him, the Absolute Spirit, which is the final goal or 'truth' of the thought- and world-process, is implicit, 'in itself' (*an sich*) at the start and, through a process of progressive, dialectical unfoldment, becomes explicit, 'for itself' (*für sich*).[75] As we have seen, it is essentially a result, and becomes completely itself only at the end. He does grant the priority of matter over mind or Spirit, but he does not fail to stress, wherever the context so demands, that the Spirit remains the spirit of the whole dialectical movement throughout. 'In time nature comes first, but the absolute prius is the Idea. This absolute prius is the finis, the true beginning, alpha is omega.'[76] Or again: 'From our point of view Mind has for its *presupposition* Nature, of which it is the truth, and for that reason its *absolute prius*.'[77] The whole process of evolution, dialectical in form, is working in the service of the Absolute Spirit, which it is at pains to unfold. Against this background, Findlay entitles Hegel's 'idealism' as 'teleological idealism', in which, however, according to him, there is as much materialism as in Marx, 'since matter is for him [Hegel] certainly a *stage* in the "Idea". (Just as there is certainly also a strong strain of teleological idealism in the supposedly scientific materialism of Marx.)'[78] There can hardly be any objection to this view. But we must not commit the mistake of aligning this new

type of idealism with Samuel Alexander's emergent materialism, whose 'deity' is not the root but the fruit of the process of evolution. According to Hegel, the world is an alienation from the Absolute Spirit—it is the Absolute Spirit itself *become* the world.[79] The alienation or estrangement makes reality appear as matter giving birth to mind. Its essential nature remains ideal or spiritual, however, inclusive of the material, though. Hegel considers the world an abstraction from the Absolute, and the Spirit the most concrete of all things, hence the material character of the world is not its real character. The dialectical movement, which is the real form of evolution according to Hegel, does not create mind but only reveals and unfolds it.

It would be pertinent to refer here to Hegel's definition of idealism, which is : 'The proposition that the finite is of ideal nature constitutes Idealism. In philosophy idealism consists of nothing else than the recognition that the finite has no veritable being.'[80] This being so, Hegel does deserve the title of a thoroughgoing idealist. But why only Hegel ? On this view, all philosophy becomes idealistic. Indeed, Hegel himself adds : 'Essentially every philosophy is an idealism, or at least has idealism for its principle, and the question then is only how far it is actually carried through. This is as true of philosophy as of religion; for religion equally with philosophy refuses to recognize in finitude a veritable being, or something ultimate and absolute, or non-posited, uncreated, and eternal.'

Hegel is a staunch believer in the thesis that 'Reason is the soul of the world it inhabits, its immanent principle, its most proper and inward nature, its universal'.[81] He characterizes his system as 'absolute idealism', which, as will be clear as we proceed, regards things, all fiinite, as mere abstractions from reality, struggling to be related to and grounded in the latter. 'The things of which we have direct consciousness', he writes, 'are mere phenomena, not for us only, but in their own nature; and the true and proper case of these things, finite as they are, is to have their existence founded not in themselves but in the universal divine idea. This view of things, it is true, is as idealist as Kant's; but

in contradistinction to the subjective idealism of the Critical philosophy should be termed absolute idealism.'[82] (Note that Hegel does not designate his philosophy as 'objective idealism', which term, to be sure, befits the philosophy of his predecessors rather than his own.)

Whatever the designations given, by Hegel himself or others, to the philosophy of Hegel, the foregoing discussion leaves no doubt that his is a unique type of idealism, not only not opposed to but decidedly inclusive of realism as well as what is known as materialism. As a matter of fact, Hegel himself appears to have been quite conscious of his unique position in this regard. After describing all philosophy and religion as essentially idealistic, in the words quoted above from his *Science of Logic*, he adds, very significantly and penetratingly : 'The opposition of idealistic philosophy is therefore without meaning. A philosophy which should ascribe to finite Determinate Being, as such, veritable, ultimate, and absolute being, would not deserve the name of philosophy.... Herein attention must provisionally be drawn to the same double aspect as showed itself with the infinite, namely, that first that which is of ideal nature is the concrete and veritable; but, secondly, its moments are just as much that which is of ideal nature, that which is transcended in it; while, in fact, there is but the one concrete whole, from which the moments are inseparable.'[83] That is to say, both reality and ideality are the moments of the concrete whole.

Unlike David Hume (1560–1630) and Auguste Comte (1798–1857) and other protagonists of the 'positive philosophy' following the latter down to the logical positivists and/or philosophical/logical/linguistic analysts/empiricists of today, who believe in self-surrender to the authority of the fact or the immediate 'given', Hegel begins with the negation of the given, with, as he would have it, 'the negation of that which is immediately before us'. The given, according to him, is only partially real. It is a happy synthesis of what *is* given and what *is not* that constitutes full reality. In the judgement, S is P, we have to get beyond the immediate given (S) and proceed to an 'other' (P), that we judge not that S is S but that S is P. Facts are mere 'positings' of the subject, just to be negated and transcended yielding place to higher and higher, fuller and fuller facts in

the dialectical process of self-realization of the Absolute. Viewed in this context, the interpretation of Hegel's dictum, what is rational is actual and what is actual is rational, given on a previous page, gets reinforced.

Incidentally, this consideration also serves to counter the charge, usually brought against Hegel, that he was an upholder of the status quo and an enemy to revolutionary upsurge. In the *Philosophy of Right* and elsewhere, too, he does appear to preach acquiescence in the status quo and ungrudging allegiance to the powers that be. But his whole dialectical temper is of a pro-revolutionary character. In his early writings he jubilates over the diappearance of 'the halo which has surrounded the leading oppressors and gods of the earth', the phenomenon of philosophers demonstrating the dignity of man, and the new possibility of people rising to take their rights 'which have been trampled in the dust by their oppressors'.[84] In fact, his theory and its applications are sometimes at great variance with each other.

Undoubtedly, the philosophy of Hegel comprehends as well as transcends both realism/materialism and idealism. According to him, things are neither mere illusions nor ideations, but abstractions from the concrete whole entitled the Absolute, the Spirit, or the Absolute Spirit, even as, for Wittgenstein, 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things'.[85] For Wittgenstein, only facts are, not things; for Hegel, only the Absolute is, not things. For the same reason, even as Wittgenstein is not considered an idealist, Hegel, too, does not deserve to be considered an idealist, in common parlance.

In order to throw Hegel's position as regards idealism versus realism into clearer relief, it must be mentioned that his theory of the objectivity of space and time does not make him a realist in the popular acceptation of the term. He seems to hold that space and time are there, and very much there, if we regard reality *sub specie temporis*, viz. as a series of separate events in time, taking reality moment by moment, point by point, element by element. Of course, in the *Philosophy of Religion*, *Philosophy of History*, and *History of Philosophy*, he himself explains various successions of events in time as mani-

festations of the dialectic. But, if we regard reality *sub specie aeternitatis*, viz. as existing eternally and wholly as an organism, there is neither space nor time. In fact, he himself makes it clear that time is the resultant of finite things: things are not finite because they are in time, 'Things are in time because they are finite....'[86]

Likewise, as will be clearer in the sequel, the dialectical moment envisaged by Hegel is essentially spaceless, and it is our discursive intellect which bifurcates it into several steps, not only successive but also co-existent with other phenomena.

Finally, if an idealist is one who regards reality as rational, righteous, and relishable, or true, good, and beautiful, in the ultimate analysis, Hegel is one of the most thorough-going idealists the world has produced. And, if a realist is one who regards the external world as real and not as sublated altogether in absolute knowledge, Hegel is a realist *par excellence.* Lastly, if a materialist is one who regards the external world as concrete, Hegel, the propounder of the the theory of concrete universal, is a materialist *par excellence.*

The triad of thesis-antithesis-synthesis is encountered in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, not to mention post-Hegelians. It is referred to by Hegel expressly only once, at the end of the Kant chapter in the student notes, edited and published as *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, and that, too, only in reference to Kant's use of it, rather disparagingly—as 'the "spiritless scheme of the triplicity of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis" (*geistloses Schema*) by which the rhythm and movement of philosophical knowledge is artificially pre-scribed'.[87] He also once refers to the 'triplicity', without giving the three moments, in a similar vein.[88] He, however, models his dialectic on the three-beat rhythm, without committing himself to the view that the rhythm is reducible, as a rule, to the triadic formula of thesis-antithesis-synthesis. According to some, it is so reducible only rarely. 'In the *Logic*, for example,' writes Walter Kaufmann, 'only the first triad (being, nothing, and becoming) invites this reduction, while most of the sequel is impervious to it. In his philosophy of history, Hegel divides

history into three epochs : the oriental world which knows that One is free, the Greek and Roman world, that some are free, and the German world, that All are free. Clearly this triad cannot be construed as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis....'[89] G. E. Mueller has it that such left-Hegelians as Arnold Ruge, Ludwig Feuerbach, and Max Stirner use thesis, antithesis, and synthesis just as little as Hegel. He ascribes the genesis of the Hegel legend of thesis-antithesis-synthesis to another left-Hegelian, the great Karl Marx, who, allegedly, took his cue from Professor Heinrich Moritz Chalybaüs, who is reported to have made a casual reference to the triad vis-à-vis Hegel's trilogy of being, nothing, and becoming, in the third, 1843 edition of the collection of his lectures on the philosophical developments after Kant. The Professor's words are : 'This is the first trilogy Being, Nothing, and Becoming.... we have in this first methodical thesis, antithesis, and synthesis... an example or schema for all that follows.'[90] It is said that the book was discussed at the Hegel Club, of which Karl Marx, then a student at the University of Berlin, was a member.[91]

Our finding is, however, that Karl Marx is right as against these critics. If we scritinize Hegel's texts under reference, sufficiently carefully, we shall find that Hegel disparages and disapproves not the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis as such but Kant's use of it. According to him, Kant applies the triad in an uncomprehending and lifeless manner. The relevant passage from the Preface to the *Phenomenology of Mind* has already been quoted. It is true that Hegel tends to divide things into three parts and that the triplicity thus emerging does not always conform to the thesis-antithesis-synthesis pattern. It, however, only suggests that he has not been self-consistent throughout. The triadic structure of his writings in general leaves no doubt that he conceived his dialectic as a three-beat rhythm. Barring his *Philosophy of History*, which is divided into four main divisions, his *Philosophy of Nature*, *Philosophy of Spirit*, *Philosophy of Religion*, and *Philosophy of Right* are each divided into three main parts, which are meant to correspond, and do correspond, to the three primary divisions of the Logic—Being, Essence, and the Notion. Undoubtedly it is difficult to trace any definite correspondence

between the secondary and minuter divisions of these works on one hand and the secondary and minuter divisons of the Logic on the other. But this only adds to, and confirms the charge of, self-inconsistency on Hegel's part.

Hegel's performance as a dialectician is twofold: first, he is a theorizer of dialectic and, second, he is a practitioner of it. We find that he does not fare equally well in the two capacities. To us, what appears to be the much more important of the two is his first capacity. Indeed, he is found at his best in his Logic rather than in his Philosophies of Nature, Spirit, Religion, Right, and History, which he deduces from, and where he seeks to apply, his Logic. As indicated above, these works (exceptions apart) consist, each, of a main triad, which is divided into subordinate triads, and so on for a fair number of stages. Since he professes to base these triads on the principle of contradiction, broadly speaking, as we shall see presently, he does envisage and work for the pattern of thesis-antithesis-synthesis, though, it is true, he fails to conform to the pattern sometimes.

Much, indeed, must not be made of the infrequency of the occurrence of the formula of thesis-antithesis-synthesis in Hegel's works. The three terms of the formula do figure in them, sometimes severally,[92] sometimes the first two together, in relation to Kant and Fichte, though,[93] and sometimes the three occurring in the same passage separately but linked together in significance all the same.[94] Besides, Hegel has used the expression 'negation of the negation' dozens of times,[95]— an expression which is equivalent to the third term of the formula, viz. 'synthesis', and which presupposes the other two terms.

The greatest reason, however, why Hegel does not use the formula of thesis-antithesis-synthesis as expressly and frequently as normally expected of a dialectician of his vision and depth, appears to be that, as already noted by McTaggart[96] and Findlay[97], his dialectic does not, prefessedly, follow a uniform pattern in all cases, so that it cannot always be telescoped into the formula. In the categories of Being, a thesis and its antithesis

are opposed but co-ordinate and complementary to each other, their synthesis being the resultant of both. In the categories of Essence, the antithesis is an opposition but correction of the thesis, truer, concreter, more advanced, containing the truth of the thesis, and such that the transition to the synthesis is made from the antithesis alone. Here the antithesis is not only an advance upon but also, as in the previous case, opposed to the thesis, not only a completion but also a denial of it. This element of opposition and negation characterizing the two cases tends to disappear in the categories of the Notion. The terms belonging to the apex of the dialectical process summing up all that has gone before, and implicitly containing all that is to come after, they pass beyond the realm of opposition and negation and come closest to each other. The object of the process at this stage is to make not the one-sided complete but the implicit explicit. 'In the sphere of Essence,' writes Hegel, 'one category does not pass into another, but refers to another merely. In Being, the form of reference is purely due to our reflection on what takes place: but it is the special and proper characteristic of Essence. In the sphere of Being, when somewhat becomes another, the somewhat has vanished. Not so in Essence: here there is no real other, but only diversity, reference of the one to *its* other'. Hegel continues : The transition of Essence is therefore at the same time no transition; for in the passage of different into different, the different does not vanish: the different terms remain in their relation. When we speak of Being and Nought, Being is independent, so is Nought. The case is otherwise with the Positive and the Negative.' He adds: 'No doubt these possess the characteristic of Being and Nought. But the positive by itself has no sense; it is wholly in reference to the negative. And it is the same with the Negative. In the sphere of Being the reference of one term to another is only implicit; in Essence on the contrary it is explicit. And this in general is the distinction between the forms of Being and Essence: in Being everything is immediate, in Essence everything is relative.'[98] Now listen to what Hegel has to say with regard to the transition from Essence to the Notion: 'Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in the range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is *development*: by

which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present. In the world of nature it is organic life that corresponds to the grade of the notion'. Illustrating the point, he proceeds, 'Thus *e. g.* the plant is developed from its germ. The germ virtually involves the whole plant, but does so only ideally or in thought; and it would therefore be a mistake to regard the development of the root, stem, leaves, and other different parts of the plant, as meaning that they were *realiter* present, but in a very minute form, in the germ. That is the so-called "box-within-box" hypothesis; a theory which commits the mistake of supposing an actual existence of what is at first found only as a postulate of the completed thought'. He concludes: 'It is this nature of the notion—this manifestation of itself in its process as a development of its own self,—which is chiefly in view with those who speak of innate ideas, or who, like Plato, describe all learning merely as reminiscence...'[99] Hegel sums up his position respecting the notion in the end thus: 'The movement of the notion is as it were to be looked upon merely as play: the other which it sets up is in reality not an other. Or, as it is expressed in the teaching of Christianity: not merely has God created a world which confronts Him as an other; He has also from all eternity begotten a Son in whom He, a Spirit, is at home with Himself.'[100]

Elsewhere, Hegel expresses the distinction between the three stages of dialectic in these words: 'The abstract form of the advance is, in Being, an other and transition into an other; in Essence showing or reflection in the opposite; in Notion, the distinction of individual from universality, which continues itself as such into, and is as an identity with, what is distinguished from it.'[101] We can designate the stages of Being, Essence, and the Notion as the stages of self-contradiction, self-completion, and self-expression. In the Notion, the whole thesis is really summed up in the antithesis, and the whole antithesis in the synthesis.

Here onc cannot miss noting the progressively diminishing role of contradiction or negation the higher we climb the ladder of categories, viz. from the categories of Being to those of Essence and thence to those of the Notion. The

process here is one of progressively increasing identification of the thesis and its so-called antithesis as the dialectic progresses.

We are inclined to the view that this difference of pattern in the dialectic from stage to stage is largely responsible for the infrequency of the formula of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in Hegel. The employment of the formula is justified only in regard to the categories of Being and Essence, to the exclusion of the categories of the Notion.

Hegel's Absolute is a 'self-complete and self-contained (*an und für sich selbst*)'[102], perfectly integrated, organically interrelated, all-inclusive, 'absolutely concrete'[103] whole; 'the negation of all predicates' as well as 'the positing of all predicates'[104]; a self-conscious unity; a 'good' infinite which preserves and transcends the finite;[105] the self-conscious mind or spirit.[106] Somehow, it undergoes what Hegel calls 'otherness', 'estrangement', 'self-estrangement', 'self-relinquishment', 'alienation' (*Entfremdung*), or self-alienation' from its pristine purity,[107] a process of what may profanely be described as fragmentation into countless finites, only to embark upon a process of self-recovery, of 'the surmounting of this estrangement', of retraction or transcendence of the alienation, through dialectical movement.[108] The finitude assumed by the Absolute is 'a shadow cast by the mind's own light—a show or illusion which the mind implicitly imposes as a barrier to itself, in order, by its removal, actually to realize and become conscious of freedom as *its* very being, i. e. to be fully *manifested*'.[109] Description of the Absolute as 'the divine life', as 'undisturbed identity and oneness with itself, which feels no anxiety over otherness and estrangement, and none over the surmounting of this estrangement'[110], *per se*, is an abstraction from the Absolute's real nature. Hegel writes: 'But this "per se" is abstract generality, where we abstract from its real nature, which consists in its being objective to itself, conscious of itself on its own account *für sich zu sein*); and where consequently we neglect altogether the self-movement which is the formal character of its activity.'[111] So, the self-movement of alienation and its retraction are in

the very nature of the Absolute. But what is the final end of this process? Hegel says: 'The consummation of the infinite End, therefore, consists merely in removing the illusion which makes it seem yet unaccomplished. The Good, the absolutely Good, is eternally accomplishing itself in the world: and the result is that it needs not wait upon us, but is already by implication, as well as in full actuality, accomplished.' He goes on: 'This is the illusion under which we live. It alone supplies at the same time the actualizing force on which the interest in the world reposes. In the course of its process the Idea creates that illusion, by setting an antithesis to confront it; and its action consists in getting rid of the illusion which it has created. Only out of this error does the truth arise. In this fact lies the reconciliation with error and with finitude. Error or other-being, when superseded, is still a necessary dynamic element of truth: for truth can only be where it makes itself its own result.'[112] According to him, 'spiritul evolution is not yet completed',[113] although he sometimes gives one the impression that history has reached its final end.[114]

This diremption of the absolute spirit into the diversity of existents, this its engagement in 'self-sacrifice' on one hand and resumption of the existents by it 'into its own unity' on the other,—this operation of the 'whole which is at once a flame of fire bursting out and consuming the substance, as well as the abiding form of the substance consumed'[115]—occupies the pivotal position in the Hegelian cosmology. And, as we shall see presently, this is the *raison d'être* of dialectic in Hegel's system.

We have seen that all finites originally made up an infinite whole. They cannot bear the pangs of sparation from their brother finites for long. Whenever we think of a finite thing, other finite things begin to force themselves upon our attention of themselves. Finite things are, in fact, abstractions from an infinite context, parts torn out of a whole. Abstraction means that originally united elements of thought come to be violently held apart, striving to extricate themselves from the clutches of the understanding holding them apart. As a matter

of fact, abstractions cannot rest content with themselves; they have ultimately to revert to and get reunited with their concrete ground. As Hegel says, 'every abstract proposition of understanding, taken precisely as it is given, naturally veers round into its opposite'.[116] He agrees with Spinoza's dictum, all determination is negation (*omnis determinatio est negatio*)[117] We shall just see that this negation is the lever of dialectic. 'That by means of which', says Hegel, 'the Concept forges ahead is the above-mentioned Negative which it carries within itself; it is this that constitutes the genuine dialectical procedure.'[118] Thanks to negation, everything involves a 'restless activity of cancelling and superseding itself, or its negativity.'[119] 'Reality itself contains negation, it is Being Determinate,'[120] for the simple reason that, as shown above, all determination is negation. What is a thing ? 'It is (1) a universality...; (2) negation..., which consists in *excluding* properties of an opposite character; and (3) the many properties themselves, the relation of the two first moments...'.[121] It is 'the passing of universality into individuality through specification, as also the reverse process from individual to universal through cancelled individuality or specific determination'.[122] Here, the Indian concept of 'apoha' (negation of negation) is bound to force itself on the reader's attention. It will be discussed in the sequel.

What is dialectic after all ? It is 'the indwelling tendency outwards by which the one-sidedness and limitation of the predicates of understanding is seen in its true light, and shown to be the negation of them. For anything to be finite is just to suppress itself and put itself aside'.[123] In dialectic 'terms appearing absolutely distinct pass into one another' and 'the assumption of their separateness cancels itself.'[124] The finite's 'own nature is the cause of its abrogation'[125] and 'the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-supersession'.[126] The rationale of dialectic is clear enough: 'All finte things involve an untruth.'[127] 'What is the untruth ? It is that 'everything finite, instead of being stable and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient;...the finite, as implicitly other than what it is, is forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn suddenly into its opposite. ...All things...are doomed.'[128]

This, however, must be clearly understood that Hegel's negation is not void, pure and simple. It is something real, objective, and even positive in a higher sense, even as the negation postulated by the Naiyāyika and the negative facts postulated by Meinong[129] and Bertrand Russell.[130] 'Negation is just as much Affirmation as Negation', says Hegel. He continues, 'such negation is not an all-embracing Negation, but is *the negation of a definite somewhat* which abolishes itself, and thus is a definite negation....Since what results, the negation, is a *definite* negation, it has a *content*. It is a new concept, but a higher, richer concept than that which preceded; for it has been enriched by the negation or opposite of that preceding concept, and thus contains it, but contains also more than it, and is the unity of it and its opposite.'[131] He remarks elsewhere that of the moments of opposition 'it is not true that one is positive and the other negative, but both are negative to each other. Thus in general each is, first, only in so far as the other is; it is what it is through the other, or through its own Not-being; it is only Positedness. Secondly, it is in so far as the other is not; it is what it is through the Not-being of the other....'[132]

In dialectic, there are two negations: the first negation and the second negation.[133] The second negation is also called the negation of the negation. This 'negation of the negation is not a neutralization'[134] but another negation, like the negation postulated by Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, the Navya-Naiyāyika.[135] Dialectical negation is indeed different from mathematical negation which is self-cancelling, such as $+y-y=0$.[136]

According to Hegel, negation or contradiction is the way evolution takes place. 'Contradiction is the root of all movement and life, and it is only in so far as it contains a Contradiction that anything moves and has impulse and activity.[137] First comes affirmation, which produces and is contradicted by negation. This struggle between affirmation and negation generates what is called the negation of negation, a unity of opposites, a reconciliation on a higher level. Thereafter, the negation of negation or synthesis thus attained becomes the basis for a still higher development—becomes an affirmation, produces negation, and combines with it into a negation of the negation. The higher

stage in dialectic contains the nothingness of the earlier one, and is termed 'the *experience* concerning that first object'.[138] The rule of contradiction implies that all congnition is dichotomizing and relative and that we effectively determine or actively cognize a thing only by opposing it to what it is not. Dialectic is the self-supersession of the finite, which is irresistibly driven beyond what it immediately is and turns into its opposite. According to Hegel, generation of contradiction is the way of all finite things and contradiction is the motive force of the world-process. The lower categories and forms break down because they are inadequate approximations to the sort of self-differentiating unity which characterizes only the self-conscious spirit.

We have seen how contradiction is the lever of dialectic. It is the law of thought as well as things.[139] Much fault has been found with this concept of contradiction. It is said that contradiction can operate in the realm of only propositions, not things; that in nature there are contraries, not contradictions. Hegel stoutly defends his position against this onslought.[140] He regrets the 'excess of tenderness for the things of the world' indulged in by those who aver that 'thought or Reason, and not the World, is the seat of contradiction'. As a matter of fact, by contradiction, Hegel plainly means 'opposed, antithetical tendencies trying to cancel each other, and dominate the whole field'. Such contradiction does exist and operate in nature. Conflict, polarization, and opposition would have been better expressions in this regard. In fact, Hegel himself uses these expressions, profusely.

We have it that the Hegelian dialectic is a principle of infinitization, a declaration of war by the finite against its finitude, a proclamation that the finite does not feel at home with its finitude. The home of things lies in the infinite to which they have a natural tendency to turn, on a higher plane, and thereby unfold its infinity to the extent possible.

Contradcition being the very being of things, 'in itself it is not, so to speak, a blemish, deficiency, or fault in a thing if a contradiction can be shown in it. On the contrary, every

determination, every concrete, every concept is essentially a union of distinguished and distinguishable moments, which pass over through determinate and essential difference into contradictory moments. ...Now the thing, the subject, or the concept is itself...contradictory in itself, but also it is resolved contradiction....'[141] It is, however, wrong to suppose that dialectic militates against the law of contradiction, according to which a thing cannot be both A and not-A at the same time. Though Hegel looks askance at the three laws of thought—the laws of identity, contradiction, and excluded midle—viewing them as empty tautologies or faulty statements,[142] he himself points out, after declaring that 'Contradiction is the very moving principle of the world', that 'contradiction is not the end of the matter, but cancels itself.'[143] He adds, significantly, 'But contradiction, when cancelled, does not leave abstract identity; for that is itself only one side of the contrariety. The approximate result of opposition (when realized as contradiction) is the Ground, which contains identity as well as difference superseded and deposed to elements in the completer notion.' Contradiction is the cause of the dialectical process just because it is intolerable and presses for resolution. The fundamental fact is the tendency of the finite not to negate but to outgrow and complete itself. The dialectical movement 'from Nothing to Nothing and through Nothing back to itself'[144] aims at not contradiction but the overcoming, reconciliation, or resolution of contradiction, by making them moments of a higher unity in which they may co-exist, albeit competitively. As a matter of fact, not contradiction as such but our reluctance to accept and put up with contradiction is the force behind dialectical development. As McTaggart would have it, 'Truth consists, not of contradictions, but of moments which, if separated, would be contradictions, but which in their synthesis are reconciled and consistent.'[145] In fact, dialectic is an urge not for contradiction but for completion. The tendency of the thesis is, at bottom, not to contradict itself but to complete itself. It is a search not for the contradictory but for the complementary, which, though, is, in some respects, its negation. However contradictory of A may not-A look superficially and formally, it is at bottom but a convenient shorthand for B, C, D, and so on indefinitely which are all positive.

We must note here in passing another aspect of Hegel's dialectic, transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa, the first part of which came to be much highlighted by Marx and Engels, as we shall see in the sequel. Hegel maintains that 'there comes a point in this quantitative change at which Quality changes. ...The new Quality or the new Something is subject to the same progress of change, and so on to infinity.'[146] In the case, for example, of persistent addition or subtraction, the numbers, besides having the same arithmetical relation to their predecessors and successors, also develop another relation to them, 'which makes them either such a multiple of one of them as is expressed by a whole number, or else power and root.'[147] A more or less similar process takes place in music and chemistry.[148] In ordinary experience, too, 'Water on being cooled does not little by little become hard, gradually reaching the consistency of ice after having passed through the consistency of a paste, but is suddenly hard'.[149] Likewise, levity becomes crime, right wrong, and virtue vice by a sudden transition beyond a certain point.[150] Laws and constitution change with the change in the magnitude of a State. 'The State has a certain measure of its magnitude, and if forced beyond this it collapses helplessly under that very same constitution which was its blessing and its strength....'[151] Hegel also wonders, with the Greeks, 'whether a single grain makes a heap of wheat, or whether it makes a bald-tail to tear out a single hair from the horse's tail.'[152] Passing of quality into quantity is recognized[153] but less stressed.

In dialectic, critics have pointed out the difficulty that the struggle between and idea and its criticism, thesis and antithesis, may as well lead to an elimination of the one or the other, or to total blank, like the union of+y-y instead of evolving a synthesis. Not thesis but our critical attitude towards it produces the antithesis, and, where such an attitude is lacking, no antithesis will be produced. The struggle may end in nothing, in fiasco, as they say. And, even if a synthesis comes about, it does not always preserve the better parts of the thesis and the antithesis.[154] But Hegel himself seems to have had some inkling of this fact. Pointing out that 'self-movement, or impulse in general (the appetitive force or nisus of the monad, the entelechy of absolutely simple Essence), is nothing else than the fact that something is itself and

is also deficiency or the negative of itself, in one and the same respect',[155] he finds it necessary to add that 'if an existent something cannot in its positive determination also encroach on its negative, cannot hold fast the one in the other and contain Contradiction within itself, then it is not a living unity, or Ground, but perishes in Contradiction.'[156] But it does not help resolve the difficulty to an adequate extent. A more intelligible solution would be something like this. In nature, it is very difficult to find dialectical opposites. Every pair of opposites is not a dialectical pair of opposites. In dialectic, its various stages should arise out of each other in a necessary manner, 'free from all foreign elements, admitting nothing from outside.'[157] If this element of necessity is not present, there is no dialectic.[158] There can be dialectical development only where a positive, a thesis, finds *its* negative, *its* antithesis. 'In opposition,' says Hegel, 'the different is not confronted by any other, but by *its* other.'[159] 'The critics' objection would hold good if thesis and antithesis were left to themselves. The synthesis is not just thesis and antithesis put together. Far from exhaustively analyzable into thesis and antithesis, it is more than the sum of the two, is a higher unity comprehending the two as its two aspects or moments. The barbarian invasion of Rome was not a case of antithesis, for antithesis must arise from within the thesis itself.

Thesis and antithesis are, also, not merely negative of each other. They are so only *inter se*. In themselves, or *per se*, they are each as positive as anything. Contradictions are in the nature of polarities or contraries, the combination of which seldom results in a total blank. Even where a completely negative entity is posited, it means a positive entity in the last analysis. The antithesis, for example, of 'cow' can be 'non-cow', which would mean buffalo, dog, etc. Of course, dialectic does not involve value-judgement in the narrower sense of the term. A synthesis is, therefore, not always desirable, empirically.

One thing more, in this connexion. As Findlay points out, 'The lower categories and forms of being really break down because they are felt to be inadequate approximations to the sort of self-differentiating unity which is to be found only in self-conscious Spirit'.[160] This is the key-notion of dialectic, the lubricant without whose secretly applied unction the dialectical wheels and cranks would not turn at all ![161] Marx and Engels, as we shall see in the sequel, tried to dispense with this lubricant in operating their dialectical machine and failed. Popper does not feel impelled to think in terms of the self-differentiating unity of the Absolute Spirit, so it is no wonder if he fails to see how the dialectical wheels and cranks would turn.

Negation or difference has all along been regarded as of two kinds : (1) opposition or contradiction, and (2) variety, difference, or otherness. So Plato,[162] so Hegel.[163] We shall see in the sequel that this has its counterpart in Indian philosophy as well.

Hegel's position with regard to the two kinds of negation is summed up in his following passage: 'Difference in general contains its two sides as moments ; in Variety these fall apart indifferent ; in Opposition as such they are sides of Difference....'

It is admitted on all hands that philosophy should have as its starting-point what is immediately given and absolutely certain. Fichte chose the ego as the starting-point for his philosophy. So did Descartes, almost. After giving full thought to this issue, Hegel chooses being or pure being as the poorest and most absract, most general and most contentless, most immediate and most certain, of concepts,[164] compared with which 'the ego in general is...something concrete, or rather the most concrete of all things—consciousness of self as of a world infinitely complex. In order to make Ego the Beginning and basis of philosophy, this concrete element must be removed by an absolute act by which the ego is purged of itself and is presented to its own consciousness as abstract ego.'[165] That is to say, in that case the ego will have

to be reduced to the status of pure being, so to speak. Pure being again ! In choosing 'being' as his starting point, Hegel furthers the tradition of early Greek as well as Indian thought which both took their start from a consideration and contemplation of 'being' rather than the ego. This pure being is bereft of all determination and predication, 'is indeterminate immediacy'.[166] It is, therefore, indistinguishable from pure nothing.[167] Hence the well-known Hegelian dictum that pure being is pure nothing.[168] This pure being, as 'pure indeterminateness and vacuity',[169] appears to be a valid concept. 'There is such a thing', says Findlay, 'as the mere singling out, or the taking account, or the mere "hailing" of something, which is presupposed by any act of classification or characterization. This is the sort of singling out that might be expressed by such words as "Lo and behold this !" or "Good heavens, that !" or simply by the use of a demonstrative word or phrase.'[170] Now, pure being is so perfectly contentless that 'even the determination of Being...could be omitted, so that the only requirement would be to make a pure beginning', there being nothing but the beginning itself. The pure beginning 'is not pure Nothing but a Nothing from which Something is to proceed....The Beginning thus contains both, Being and Nothing; it is the unity of Being and Nothing, or is Not-being which is Being, and Being which also is Not-being'.[171] Pure nothing, too, is nothing out of the way. If it is possible to exclude from thought some existents, it should at least be logically possible to exclude all existents whatever.[172] Hegel reconciles the concepts of being and nothing in the higher unity of becoming, which is the passing of being into nothing and vice versa. For him, being and nothing 'do not subsist for themselves, but are only in this third, in Becoming'.[173] So, Being, Nothing, and Becoming are Hegel's first triad—thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, respectively. We give below Hegel's table of categories :

HEGEL'S TABLE OF CATEGORIES

BEING

QUALITY		
Being	Being Nothing Becoming	
Determinate Being	Determinate Being as Such	Determinate Being in General Quality Something
	Finitude	Something and an Other Determination, Modification, & Limit Finitude
	Infinity	Infinity in General Reciprocal Determination of Finite and Infinite Affirmative Infinity
Being for Self	Being for Self as Such	Being Determinate and Being for Self Being for One One
	The One and the Many	The One in Itself The One and the Void Many Ones. Repulsion
	Repulsion and attraction	Exclusion of the One The one One of Attraction The Relation of Repulsion and Attraction
QUANTITY		
Quantity	Pure Quantity Continuous and Discrete Magnitude Limitation of Quantity	

Quantum	Number	
	Extensive and Intensive Quantum	Their Difference Identity of Extensive and Intensive Magnitude The Alteration of Quantum
	The Quantitative Infinity	Its Notion The Quantitative Infinite Progress The Infinity of Quantum
The Quantitative	Ratio The Direct Ratio The Inverse Ratio The Ratio of Powers	
MEASURE		
The Specific Quanity	The Specific Quantum Specifying Measure	The Rule The Specifying Measure Relation of Both Sides as Qualities
	Being for Self in Measure	
Real Measure	The Relation of Stable	Measures (Union of Two Measures) Measure as a Series of Measure-Relations Elective Affinity
	Nodal Line of Measure-Relations The Measureless	
The Becoming of Essence	The Absolute Indifference Indifference as Inverse Relation of its Factors Transition to Essence	

ESSENCE

ESSENCE AS REFLECTION INTO SELF

Show	The Essential and Unessential Show Reflection	Positing Reflection External Refletion Determining Reflection
The Essentialities or Determinations of Reflection	Identity Difference	Absolute Difference Variety Opposition
	Contradiction	
Ground	Absolute Ground	Form and Essence Form and Matter Form and Content
	Determined Ground	Formal Ground Real Ground Complete Ground
	Condition	The Relatively Unconditioned The Absolutely Unconditioned Transition of the Fact into Existence

APPEARANCE

Existence	The Thing and its Properties	Thing-in-itself & Existence Property The Reciprocal Action of Things
	The Constitution of the Thing out of Matters The Dissolution of the Thing	

Appearance	The Law of Appearance	
	The World of Appearance and the World in Itself	
	The Dissolution of Appearance	
Essential Relation	The Relation of Force and its Manifestation	The Conditionedness of Force
		The Solicitation of Force
		The Infinity of Force

ACTUALITY

The Absolute	The Exposition of the Absolute	
	The Absolute Attribute	
	The Modus of the Absolute	
Actuality	Contingency, or Formal Actuality, Possibility, and Necessity	
	Relative Necessity, or Real Actuality, Possibility & Necessity	
	Absolute Necessity	
The Absolute Relation	The Relation of Substantiality	
	The Relation of Causality	Formal Causality
		The Determinate Relation of Causality
		Action and Reaction
	Reciprocity	

THE NOTION

SUBJECTIVITY

The Notion	The Universal Notion
	The Particular Notion
	The Individual

The Judgment	The Judgment of Inherence	The Positive Judgment The Negative Judgment The Infinite Judgment
	The Judgment of Subsumption	The Singular Judgment The Particular Judgment The Universal Judgment
	The Judgment of Necessity	The Categorical Judgment The Hypothetical Judgment The Disjunctive Judgment
	The Judgment of the Notion	The Assertoric Judgment The Problematic Judgment The Apodeictic Judgment
The Syllogism	The Qualitative Syllogism	First Figure, Second Figure, Third Figure, (Fourth Figure)
	The Syllogism of Reflection	The Syllogism of Allness The Syllogism of Induction The Syllogism of Analogy
	The Syllogism of Necessity	The Categorical Syllogism The Hypothetical Syllogism The Disjunctive Syllogism
OBJECTIVITY		
Mechanism	The Mechanical Object	
	The Mechanical Process	The Formal Mechanical Process The Real Mechanical Process The Product of the Mechanical Process

	Absolute Mechanism	The Centre Law Transition of Mechanism
Chemism	The Chemical Object The Chemical Process Transition of Chemism	
Teleology	The Subjective End The Means The Realised End	
THE IDEA		
Life	The Living Individual The Life-Process The Kind	
The Idea of Cognition	The Idea of the True	Analytic Cognition Synthetic Cognition (Definition, Classification, The Proposition)
	The Idea of the Good	
THE ABSOLUTE IDEA	The Absolute Idea Nature Spirit or ABSOLUTE REALITY	

This super-triad—Absolute Idea, Nature, Spirit—is shown here in order to indicate that the whole of the Logic, culminating in the Absolute Idea, has the position of Thesis in a triadic system of which Nature is the Antithesis and Spirit the Synthesis. The Logic is part of this triad, and the triad is not part of the Logic.

Here we are not concerned to discuss Hegel's ladder of categories. A word or two must be said, however, as regards the Absolute Idea in which the dialectical process culminates. Hegel characterizes the Absolute Idea as Person or Personality[174] which, however, 'is not exclusive individuality, but is, for itself, universality and cognition, and in its Other has its own objectivity for object.'[175] He holds Personality to be 'the highest and acutest point'.[176] He goes to the length of declaring, 'Everything else is error and gloom, opinion, striving, caprice, and transitoriness; the Absolute Idea (viz. Person) alone is Being, imperishable Life, self-knowing truth, and the whole of truth.'[177] That is to say, the highest reality, according to him, is nothing mysterious and inscrutable; it is personality. And the content of the Absolute Idea ? The 'whole breadth of ground which has passed under our review up to this point.'[178] One is bound to recall here the Superman (Puruṣottama) of the *Gītā*, Who sums up all being, perishable and imperishable.[179]

In passing, it may also be remarked that like all monists[180] Hegel fails to account for the origin of illusion and imperfection in the world. The Absolute Spirit is perfect in all respects and undergoes imperfection only through self-diremption and self-alienation. Must there be some higher unity comprehending within its compass the perfection and the imperfection, on the same principle of contradiction ? This is the question raised by critics and left by Hegel unanswered. The only reply expected of him would be that, if we regard reality *sub specie temporis*, there is imperfection, to be sure; but that, if we regard reality *sub specie aeternitatis*, no imperfection would be found to exist. But is not our delusion in regarding reality *sub specie temporis* itself a proof of the reality of imperfection—on our part, if not on the part of the world ? And are we not part of the world ? McTaggart has very pertinently remarked that 'if the universe appears to us to be only imperfectly real, we must be either right or wrong. If we are rlght, the world is not perfectly rational. But if we are wrong, then it is difficult to see how *we* can be perfectly rational. And we are part of the world.'[181]

Hegel's ladder of categorics, we see, begins with the category of Pure Being and ends with the Absoluts Idea, the Pure, Universal Reason, so to speak. His supreme triad, however, of

which all other triads are moments, is Logic, Nature, and Spirit, corresponding to universal, particular, and individual.[182] We take the opportunity of suggesting that a corresponding triad can be Truth, Fact, and Law, its Indian counterparts being:

Satya	Tathya	Ṛta[183]
Cit	Sat	Ānanda[184]
Akṣara	Kṣara	Puruṣottama[185]
Vidyā	Avidyā	Adhyātma[186]
Asambhūti	Sambhūti	Puruṣa[187]

Hegel himself suggests identity, difference, and ground[188] as another, in this behalf.

Reference and Notes:

1. Fichte quoted in Frederick Coppleston, S. J., *A History of Philosophy*, Vol. VII (London: Burns and Oates, 1963), p. 45.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
4. *Ibid*, p. 46.
5. See, for example, Hegel, *Logic*, pp. 149 ff.; *The Science of Logic*, I, pp. 66-67.
6. See *The Science of Logic*, I, pp. 74-75; *Logic*, pp. 45, 50.
7. Hegel remarks that 'truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agreement of thought-content with itself'. *Logic.* pp. 51-52. He also describes truth, at the same place, as 'consistency'. But this consistency is something different from coherenc.
8. Karl Marx, *Capital*, Vol. I (Moscow, 1945), Afterword to the Second German Edition, p. 20. Also See Marx, *The Holy Family*, also called *Critique of Critical Critique* (Moscow, 1956), p. 254. Marx appears to have taken his cue from Hegel himself who speaks of 'man standing upon his head', as quoted in Frederick Engels, *Socialism: Utopaian and Scientific, Karl Marx and Frederick Engels Selected Works*, henceforth referred to as *S. W.* (Moscow, 1951), Vol. II, p. 107, f. n.; and who maintains that 'man's existence centres in his head', vide Hegel, *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, J. Sibree, tr. (New York : Dover Publications, 1956), p. 447.

9. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology* (Moscow, 1968), p. 37.
10. Engels, *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *S. W.*, II, p. 336.
11. V. I. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks, Collected Works*, Vol. 38 (Moscow, 1961), p. 288.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 278:
13. *Ibid.*, p. 234.
14. Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind*, Library of Philosophy, J. H. Muirhead, ed., J. B. Baillie, tr., Vol. I (London : Swan Sonnenschein & Co.; New York: Macmillan Company, 1910), p. 5 (Preface).
15. Engels, *Herr Eugen Dühring's Revolution in Science*, otherwise known as *Anti-Dühring* (Moscow, 1945), p. 40.
16. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 5 (Preface).
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10 (Preface).
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-19.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-76 (Introduction).
22. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
26: *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, pp. 8-9 (Preface).
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17 (Preface).
28. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 67.
29. *Ibid.*, I, p. 151.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 152. Also see p. 161.
31. *Logic*, p. 175.
32. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 165.
33. *Logic*, p. 175.
34. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 167.
35. *Ibid.*, I, p. 167.
36. *Logic*, p. 176.
37. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Nature*, Part II of the *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, M. J. Petry, ed. & tr., with an Introduction and explanatory notes (London: George Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1970), I, § 246, Addition, Vol. I, p. 204.

38. *Logic,* pp. 91-92.
39. *Ibid.,* p. 232.
40. *The Phenomenology of Mind,* I, p. 15 (Preface).
41. See Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination* (George Allen & Unwin, 1958, p. 20.
42. *Logic,* p. 89.
43. *Ibid.,* p. 50.
44. Findlay, op. cit., p. 20.
45. *The Science of Logic,* II, p. 238.
46. *Logic,* p. 238
47. *Ibid.,* p. 375. Cp. p. 292.
48. *The Phenomenology of Mind,* I, p. 15 (Preface).
49. *Ibid.*
50. *Logic,* p. 180.
51. *The Philosophy of Nature,* quoted in Findlay, op. cit., p. 271.
52. *The Philosophy of Mind,* William Wallace, tr. (Oxford. Clarendon Press, 1894), p. 163.
53. *The Philosophy of Nature,* ¶ 248, Addition, I, p. 211.
54. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Spirit,* quoted in Findlay, loc. cit., p. 289.
55. Engels, *Anti-Dühring,* pp. 42, 509.
56. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* p. 10.
57. *Ibid.,* p. 64.
58. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History,* p. 10.
59. Findlay, op. cit., p. 75,
60. Hegel, *The Philosophy of Right,* T. M. Knox, tr. (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1942), p. 11. 'Rhodes' refers to the proverb *Hic Rhodus, hic saltus,* addressed to those who boast of feats performed abroad.
61. *The Science of Logic,* I, p. 110.
62. *Logic,* p. 99.
63. *The Phenomenology of Mind,* I, pp. 46-47 (Preface).
64. *Ibid.,* p. 49. For Schelling, see *ibid.,* pp. 13-15.
65. *The Science of Logic,* II, p. 479.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*
68. *Philosophy of Right,* p. 10.
69. *Logic,* p. 257. *Science of Logic,* II, p. 160.
70. *Philosophy of Right,* Gans's Addition to Paragraph 270 culled from notes taken at Hegel's lectures, p. 283.

71. *Logic*, pp. 10-11.
72. Gans's Addition, loc. cit.
73. *Lectures on the History of Philosophy*, II, pp. 95-96.
74. *Thc Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 242.
75. *Ibid.* pp. 22, 24-25, 28, etc.
76. *The Philosophy of Nature*, ?? 248, Addition, Vol. I, p. 211.
77. *The philosophy of Mind*, p. 163.
78. Findlay, op. cit., p. 23.
79. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 488 ff.
80. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 168.
81. *Logic*, p. 46. Also see *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, p. 11.
82. *Ibid.*, pp. 93-94.
83. *The Science ef Logic*, I, pp. 168-169.
84. See Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), pp. 11-12.
85. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method (4 th ed., London : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949), 1. 1.
86. *The Philosophy of Nature* 258, ?? Addition, I, p. 231.
87. G. E. Mueller, 'The Hegel Legend of Thesis-Antithesis-Synthesis', *Journal of History of Ideas*, XIX, 3 (June, 1958), 412. Walter Kaufmann, *From Shakespeare to Existentialism* : Studies in Poetry, Religion, and Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1959), p. 153.
88. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 46 (Preface).
89. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 153.
90. See Mueller, loc. cit., pp. 413-414.
91. Loc. cit.
92. See, for example, *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 173, 295, and 300 and *Logic*, pp. 351 and 352 for 'antithesis'; *The Science of Logic*, I, pp. 108 and 109 for 'synthesis', pp. 179, 210, and 211 for 'antithesis', and p. 211 for 'thesis'; II, p. 377 for 'thesis', p. 378 for 'antithesis', and p. 466 for 'synthesis'. On p. 108, Hegel seems to suggest the other two terms of the triad as well, by calling Becoming the 'synthesis of Being and Nothing' and describing 'synthesis' as suggesting 'external juxtaposition of things already there externally to one another'.

93. See, for example, *Logic*, p. 100; *The Science of Logic*, I, pp. 107, 211.
94. See, for example, *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 107.
95. See, for example, *Logic*, pp. 176, 178; *The Science of Logic*, I, pp. 127, 128, 138, 139, 144, 145, 149, 150, 155, 159, 160, 163, 170, 255, 373; II, pp. 29, 230, 236, 237, 238, 254, 255. On p. 230 of *The Science of Logic*, II, Hegel seems to suggest the triad of thesis, negation, and negation of the negation.
96. McTaggart, *Studies in the Hegelian Dialectic* (2nd ed., Cambridge: University Press, 1922), p. 119 ff.
97. Findlay, op. cit., pp. 72-74.
98. *Logic*, p. 206.
99. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
100. *Ibid.*, p. 289.
101. *Ibid.*, p. 377.
102. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, II, p. 558. Also see p. 499.
103. *Logic*, p. 295; 'In view of the mutually determinant character of the whole, metaphysics could make the assertion...that if the least grain of dust were destroyed the whole universe must collapse.' *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 98.
104. *The Science of Logic*, II, p. 161.
105. 'To transcend (*aufheben*) has this double meaning, that it signifies to keep or to preserve and also to make to cease, to finish....Thus, what is transcended is also preserved...and is not on that account annihilated.' *Ibid.*, I, pp. 119-120.
106. *The Phenomenology of the Mind*, II, pp. 488-489, 499.
107. *Ibid.*, p. 488ff. The earliest formulation of the concept of 'alienation' is traceable in his *Theologische Jugendschriften*, vide Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution*, pp. 34-35.
108. *Ibid.*, pp. 488-499.
109. *The Philosophy of Mind*, p. 165.
110. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 17 (Preface).
111. *Ibid.*, p. 17 (Preface).
112. *Logic*, pp. 351-352.
113. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 31 (Preface).
114. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, pp. 86, 103, 108-110, 341 ff.
115. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, II, p. 499.
116. *Logic*, p. 149.
117. *Ibid.*, p. 171; *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 125.

118. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 66.
119. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, II, p. 819.
120. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 127.
121. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 109.
122. *Ibid.*, II, p. 802.
123. *Logic*, p. 147.
124. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 117.
125. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
126. *Ibid.*
127. *Logic*, p. 52.
128. *Ibid.*, p. 150.
129. See J. N. Findlay, *Meinong's Theory of Objects* (London : Oxford University Press, 1933), p. 43 ff.
130. See Bertrand Russell, 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism' (1918), in his *Logic and Knowledge*—Essays 1901-1950, Charles Marsh, ed. (London : George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1956), pp. 211-214.
131. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 65; II, p. 476.
132. *Ibid.*, II, p. 52. Also see *ibid.*, p. 63; *Logic*, pp. 171, 176, 221-222.
133. *The Science of Logic*, II, p. 230.
134. *Logic*, p. 178.
135. See Raghunātha Śiromaṇi, *Padārthatattvanirūpaṇa*, Vindhyeśvarīprasāda Dvivedin, ed. (Varanasi : Mahamandala Yantralaya, 1915), pp. 55-58.
136. *The Science of Logic*, II, p. 55.
137. *Ibid.*, II, p. 67. Also see *ibid.*, p. 69.
138. *The Phenomenology of Mind*, I, p. 87.
139. *Logic*, p. 98; *The Science of Logic*, II, pp. 67-70.
140. *Logic*, p. 98; *The Science of Logic*, II, pp. 67-70.
141. *The Science of Logic*, II, p. 70.
142. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 39-43, 65-70.
143. *Logic*, p. 223.
144. *The Science of Logic*, II, p. 26.
145. McTaggart, op. cit., p. 10.
146. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 387; *Logic*, p. 202.
147. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 388.
148. *Ibid.*, pp. 388-389.
149. *Ibid.*, p. 389; *Logic*, p. 202.
150. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 390.

151. *Ibid.* Cp. *Logic,* pp. 203-204.
152. *Logic,* p. 203.
153. *The Science of Logic,* I, pp. 170, 342, 387 ff.; *Logic,* pp. 182, 184, 202-204.
154. See, for example, Karl Popper, 'What Is Dialectic?', *Mind.* N. S., 49 (1940), p. 400 ff.; 50 (1941), p. 311 ff.
155. *The Science of Logic,* II, pp. 67-68.
156. *Ibid.,* p. 68. Also cp. p. 54, *ibid.*
157. *Ibid.,* I, p. 65.
158. Hegel defines necessity 'as the union of possibility and actuality' (*Logic,* p. 267) and the contingent as 'what has the ground of its being not in itself but in somewhat else' (*Ibid.,* p. 263).
159. *Logic,* p. 222.
160. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination,* p. 76.
161. *Ibid.*
162. 'When we speak of not-being, we speak, I suppose, not of something opposed to being, but only indifferent... . The opposition of a part of the other and, of a part of being, to one another, is, if I may venture to say so, as truly a reality as being itself, and implies not the opposite of being, but only what is other than being. ...not-being has been found to be and is not-being, and is to be reckoned one among the many classes of being.' Plato, *Sophist* 257b–258c.
163. *The Science of Logic,* II, p. 58. Also see *Logic,* pp. 216-221.
164. *The Science of Logic,* I, pp. 27-20.
165. *Ibid.,* I, p. 88.
166. *Ibid.,* I, p. 93.
167. 'Being however is an absolute absence of attributes, and so is Nought. Hence the distinction between the two is only meant to be; it is a quite nominal distinction, which is at the same time no distinction.' *Logic,* p. 162.
168. *The Science of Logic,* I, pp. 94-95; *Logic,* pp. 161-163.
169. *The Science of Logic,* I, p. 94.
170. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination,* p. 155.
171. *The Science of Logic,* I, p. 85.
172. We have tried to discuss this issue at length in 'Śūnyavāda: A Reinterpretation', *Philosophy East and West,* XIII, No. 4 (January, 1964), pp. 311-331.

173. *The Science of Logic*, I, p. 106.
174. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 466, 483.
175. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
176. *Ibid.*, p. 483.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 466.
178. *Logic*, p. 375.
179. *Gītā* 15.17-19.
180. Hegel's animadversion against dualism may be referred to in this connexion, in *Logic*, pp. 115-116.
181. McTaggart, op. cit., p. 170.
182. *The Science of Logic*, II, pp. 237, 250; *Logic*, p. 294; *The Philosophy of Mind*, pp. 299-300.
183. Cp., despite the remoteness of the association of ideas, the trilogy satya-jit, sena-jit, and ṛta-jit in *Yajur-veda*, Sripada Damodara Satavalekara, ed. (Paradi: Svādhyāya-maṇḍala, 1957), 17. 83, and satyaṁ-bhāra, tathyaṁ-bhara, and ṛtaṁ-bhara, the first and the last term adapted from *Śrīmad-bhāgavata* (6th impression, Gorakhpur : Gita Press, 2010 Anno Vikramī), 5. 20. 4 and 6. 13. 17, the last also from *Yoga-sūtra*, Śrī Gosvāmī Dāmodara Śāstrī, ed., Kashi Sanskrit Series, No. 110 (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1935), 1. 48, and the second term coined by us after the tradition. Cp. also the typology of the man of truth and the man of fact, mooted in Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, Charles Francis Atkinson, tr. (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1947), Vol. II, pp. 11–19 passim, especially p. 16, and 442.
184. *Maitreyī-upaniṣad*, with 119 other Upaniṣads including the other Upanisads refered to infra, Narayana Rama Acharya, ed. (5th ed., Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1948), 3. 12; *Nṛsiṁhottara-tāpanīya-upaniṣad* 7. 3.
185. *Gītā* 15.16-17.
186. *Yajur-veda* 40.12-14 ; *Īśa-upaniṣad* 9-11 ; for example, for Vidyā and A-vidyā only, Adhyātma being implied.
187. *Yajur-veda* 40. 9-11; *Īśa-upaniṣad* 12-14; for a-sambhūti and sambhūti only. 'Puruṣa' is referred to in *Īśa-upaniṣad* 16.
188. *Logic*, p. 294; *The Science of Logic*, II, p. 250.

Chapter III

DIALECTIC WEDS MATERIALISM

Karl Marx and his alter ego[1] Frederick Engels are responsible for giving a definite 'materialist' orientation to the Hegelian dialectic, which, nevertheless, according to Marx, 'is the basic form of all dialectic'.[2] Their feat of turning Hegel upside down has already come under reference, in passing. Engels avers that the materialist dialectic—or 'objective dialectics', as he styles it otherwise,[3] in the present context in particular—was also discovered by the German tanner-philosopher Joseph Dietzgen (1828-1888), 'independently of us and even of Hegel'.[4]

It must be stated at the very outset that the work of Marx and Engels is confined mostly to dialectical practice and procedure and that they have little contribution to their credit so far as dialectical theory is concerned. In fact, a materialist dialectical theory, if within the realm of possibility, remains a quaesitum even to this day. In a recent work, Jean-Paul Sartre remarks, 'Far from being exhausted, Marxism is still very young, almost in its infancy ; it has scarcely begun to develop.'[5] This remark is fully justified, at any rate in the present context.

Marx and Engels tend to caution their readers off and on that they do not aim at giving a system. A system, according to Engels, 'is necessarily transitory and reactionary'. Marxists in general, the world over, usually tend to out-Marx

Marx by treating Marxism as a closely knit system and rejecting all talk of its revision as unmitigably blasphemous, thereby reminding us of Marx's breathtaking statement about French Marxists, 'All I know is that I am not a Marxist.'[6] The full passage in which Engels's afore-quoted words occur reads thus: 'A man who judges every philosopher not by the enduring and progressive part of his activity but by what is necessarily transitory and reactionary—by his *system*—would have done better to remain silent.'[7] In a letter Marx protests against generalizing or metamorphosing 'my historical sketch of the origin of capitalism in Western Europe into an historico-philosophic theory of the *marche genérale* [general path] imposed by fate upon every people, whatever the historic circumstances in which it finds itself.'[8] In this connexion, he cites the failure of Rome to usher in an era of capitalism despite the favouring conditions of big landed property and big money capital on one side and a large dispossessed proletariat on the other, and he suggests that, instead of pining for 'the universal passport of a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being super-historical', each development ought to be studied separately.[9] In the same letter Marx clarifies his own approach in the *Capital* thus: 'The chapter on primitive accumulation does not pretend to do more than trace the path by which, in Western Europe, the capitalist order of economy emerged from the womb of the feudal order of economy.'[10] Lenin, who is responsible for pinning down the ideas of Marx and Engels to a rigid dogma, goes to the length of declaring, 'No Marxist has ever regarded Marx's theory as a general and compulsory philosophical scheme of history, or as anything more than an explanation of a particular socio-economic formation.' Immediately after, Lenin charges Mikhailovsky with betraying 'such a lack of understanding of Marx as to attribute to him a general philosophical theory, in reply to which he received from Marx the quite explicit explanation that he was barking up the wrong tree.'[11] In Engels's opinion, 'A system of natural and historical knowledge embracing everything and final for all time, is a contradiction to the fundamental law of dialectic reasoning.'[12]

According to Lenin, the materialist dialectic preached by Marx and Engels does not hold fast to the idealistic triad of 'thesis, negation, and negation of the negation.'[13] He writes, 'It is clear to everybody that the main burden of Engels's argument is that materialists must depict the historical process correctly and accurately and that insistence on... selection of examples which demonstrate the correctness of the triad is nothing but a relic of Hegelianism.... And, indeed, once it has been categorically declared that to attempt to "prove" anything by triads is absurd, what significance can examples of "dialectical" process have ?...Anyone who reads the definition and descripton of the dialectical method given either by Engels or by Marx...will see that the Hegelian triads are not even mentioned....' Then what is the dialectical procedure of Marx and Engels ? Lenin goes on, 'What Marx and Engels called the dialectical method is nothing more nor less than the scientific method in sociology, which consists in regarding society as a living organism in a constant state of development, the study of which requires an objective analysis of the relations of production which constitute the given social formation and an investigation of its laws of functioning and development.'[14] Lenin is only partly right. If not Engels, Karl Marx does use the triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis in the *Poverty of Philosophy* several times,[15] besides employing such expressions as 'negation' and 'negation of the negation' in the *Capital*, too.[16]

Marx considered his dialectic to be 'not only different from the Hegelian, but...its direct opposite. To Hegel, the life-process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of "the idea", he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the real world is only the external, phenomenal form of "the idea". With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought.'[17] That is why he had to perform the feat of turning the Hegelian dialectic right side up.[18]

The most fundamental defference between the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic is that Hegel is predominantly a

rationalist or apriorist, as they say, while Marx and Engels are predominantly (professedly) empiricists or aposteriorists, whatever influence Hegel might have exercised over them in the course of the shaping of their ideas. This is the reason why they tend to repudiate systematical rigidity at times despite being tempted to dogmatize about their predilections at other times. Accordingly, Engels says that 'there could be no question of building the laws of dialectics into nature, but of discovering them in it and evolving them from it.'[19] He also maintains that it is 'from the history of nature and human society that the laws of dialectic are abstracted.'[20]

Marx and Engels claim to be materialists, but, thanks to the marriage of their materialism with dialectic, they have come closer to idealism. Their matter is not the soulless inert inconscient of mechanistic materialism but something endowed with the potentiality of life and mind. 'The first and most important of the inherent qualities of *matter*', they say, is '*motion*, not only *mechanical* and *mathematical* movement, but still more *impulse*, *vital life-spirit*... . The primary forms of matter are the living, individualizing *forces of being* inherent in it and producing the distinction between the species.'[21] Engels also maintains that 'it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings. ...'[22] Despite Engels's[23] as well as Lenin's[24] leanings towards what is called the 'pictorial' or the 'copy' theory of perception, Marx's theses on Feuerbach give us an activist theory of knowledge which sees virtues in idealism unsuspected by older materialism. 'The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism...is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of *contemplation*, but not as *human sensuous activity*, *practice*, not subjectively. Hence it happened that the *active* side, in contradistinction to materialism, was developed by idealism... .'[25] So, Marx discards the passivist theory of knowledge, so to speak, upheld by traditional materialism, and seeks to replace interpretation-oriented philosophy by a change-oriented one, according to which knowing is changing.[26] When we know a thing, we do not remain passive recipients of impressions of the object; on the other hand, we actively transform it. Knowing or sensing, that is to say, is not contemplating or sensum-receiving but 'handling' or 'noticing' things, to use

Bertrand Russell's expression.[27] So, according to Marx, pure, objective truth is a fiction, an abstraction, at best pure academics; all truth is subjective-objective, the result of an interaction between subject and object. 'The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a *practical* question. In practice man must prove the truth, that is, the reality and power, the this-sidedness- of his thinking. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking which is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question.'[28] Knowing worth the name, is, therefore, a part of the process called praxis (practice) : it is knowing on the part of one who means business, so to speak. Quite consistently, Marx avers : 'The Philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways [scholastically] ; the point, however, is to change it.'[29]

Such being the case, Lenin is right is maintaining: 'Intelligent idealism is closer to intelligent materialism than stupid materialism.'[30] From the standpoint of older materialism, idealism is just nonsense; from the standpoint of dialectical materialism, it is only one-sided.[31]

Man has never in the past owed so exclusive allegiance to the given as he tends to do today. This is an age of stark positivism, of abject acquiescence in the status quo. The datum is its supreme desideratum, its quaesitum, its God, the exclusive and absolute devotion to which has become a sure mark of modernity. The Hegelian-Marxian dialectical negativism, in its pristine purity, remains a standing challenge to all positivism. That way, too, Marxism is akin to idealism, not its enemy. In a broad sense, as Hegel would have it, all philosophy is at bottom idealistic, inasmuch as it has of necessity to proceed on the assumption, express or implied, that seeming is not being, that the finite being of appearance is not the 'veritable being' of reality.[32] Even Marx seems to echo Hegel when he writes: 'But all science would be superfluous, if the appearance, the form, and the nature of things were wholly identical.'[33] The recognition of this fact by Marx is significant, indeed. Here we are tempted to add in parenthesis that the Hegelian distinction between appearance and reality and the Marxian between the appearance of things and the nature of

things correspond to the Jaina distinction between syādvāda (relative or partial truth) and kevala-jñāna (absolute or whole truth) on one hand[34] and naya (a partially true statement) and pramāṇa (a wholly true statement) on the other[35] rather than to the Advaitin's distinction between vyavahāra (empirical truth) and paramārtha (absolute truth);[36] in that, for Hegel and Marx as for Jainism, the distinction purports primarily to be quantitive rather than qualitative, as between part and whole, whereas, for the Advaitin, it is first and last qualitative, the higher truth marking an improvement upon the lower.

In dialectic, things are studied 'in their motion, their change, their life, their reciprocal influence on one another', which involves us in contradictions. 'Motion itself is a contradiction: even simple mechanical change of position can only come about through a body being at one and the same moment of time both in one place and in another place, being in one and the same place and also not in it. And the continuous origination and simultaneous solution of this contradiction is precisely what motion is.'[37] According to Engels, life is also a contradiction, for 'life consists precisely and primarily in this—that a being is at each moment itself and yet something else'.[38] Indeed, dialectic is defined by him exactly as 'the science of the general laws of motion and development of nature, human society and thought'.[39] Both the Hegelian and the Marxian dialectic are essentially at one on the 'great basic thought that the world is not to be comprehended as a complex of ready-made *things*, but as a complex of *processes*, in which...a progressive development asserts itself in the end....'[40] The materialist dialectic 'holds good in the animal and plant kingdoms, in geology, in mathematics, in history and in philosophy.'[41] Finding that dialectic is at work in different sciences in different forms, Lenin discovers the following pairs of dialectical opposites in them:

'In mathematics: + and —. Differential and integral.
'In mechanics: action and reaction.
'In physics: positive and negative electricity.
'In chemistry: the combination and dissociation of atoms.
'In social science: the class struggle.'[42]

According to Lenin, there are 'two basic (or two possible? or two historically observable ?) conceptions of development (evolution)', which are : 'development as decrease and increase, as repetition, *and* development as a unity of opposites . . .'[43] The latter is a 'development that seemingly repeats the stages already passed, but repeats them otherwise, on a higher basis ("negation of negation"), a development, so to speak, in spirals, not in straight lines;—a development by leaps, castastrophes, revolution;—"breaks in continuity"; the transformation of quantity into quality....'[44] This is dialectical development. He elsewhere describes the distinguishing features of dialectic as 'The leap. The contradiction. The intertuption of gradualness. The unity (identity) of Being and non-Being.'[45]

Engels juxtaposes dialectic to metaphysics.[46] 'To the metaphysician, things and their mental reflexes, ideas, are isolated, are to be considered one after the other and apart from each other, are objects of investigation fixed, rigid, given once for all. He thinks in absolutely irreconcilable antitheses. "His communication is 'yea, yea; nay, nay'; for whatsoever is more than these cometh of evil." For him a thing either exists or does not exist ; a thing cannot at the same time be itself and something else. Positive and negative absolutely exclude one another; cause and effect stand in a rigid antithesis one to the other.'[47] And dialectic ? 'Dialectics, on the other hand, comprehends things and their representations, in their essential connection, concatenation, motion, origin, and ending.'[48] Engels applauds Darwin for dealing the metaphysical view of nature 'the heaviest blow' by showing that all organic beings are the products of a process of evolution.[49]

Incidentally, Marx and Engels go to the extent of declaring that dialectic 'no longer needs any philosophy standing above the other sciences',[50] that everything else than logic and dialectic 'is subsumed in the positive science of nature and history,'[51] and that 'philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence. At the best its place can only be taken by a summing-up of the most general results.'[52]

Engels defines dialectic otherwise as comprehending 'things in their interconnexion instead of in isolation'.[53] Dialectic, according to him, is an unending process, for which

'nothing is final, absolute, sacred'.[54] Theoretically not postulating an absolute, the materialist dialectic differs from the Hegelian in a large measure. According to the Marxian dialectic, says Lenin, 'the difference between the relative and the absolute is itself relative' and 'there is an absolute *within* the relative'.[55]

From the discussions in Hegel's *Logic*, Engels culls and adopts the following general laws of dialectic :

1) The law of the transformation of quantity into quality and vice versa.
2) The law of the interpenetration of opposites
3) The law of the negation of the negation[56]

In illustration of the first law, Engels says that, under normal atmospheric pressure, water 'changes at O°C. from the liquid into the solid state, and at 100°C. from the liquid into the gaseous state, so that at both these turning-points the merely quantitative change of temperature brings about a qualitative change in the condition of the water.'[57] When water is being boiled, it does not go on getting hotter and hotter indefinitely; it undergoes a qualitative change from liquidity to gaseousness at a given stage. Likewise, the co-operation of a number of people creates a new power, essentially different from the sum of its separate forces. It was Mirzā Ghālib (1797-1869), the great Urdu-Persian poet of India and a senior contemporary of Marx, who sang the following dialectical lines :

'Ishrat-e qatra hai daryā meṅ fanā ho jānā
'Dard kā had se guzarnā hai dawā ho jānā'[58]
(In vanishing into the ocean does
the joy of the drop consist.
In pain surpassing the bounds does
the cure of the pain consist.)

The second law can be expressed by the formula, A is A (in one respect) and also not-A (in another respect). It is a meeting ground of opposite tendencies. The atom has positrons and neutrons both. The third law refers to the synthesis which supervenes upon the combination of thesis and antithesis. In history and philosophy, Marx and Engels observe the working of their dialectical law in such trilogies, respectively, as the following:

Primitive communism	Private property	Socialism
Primitive materialism	Idealism	Scientific materialism[59]

Summing up the principal feature of the Marxist dialectical method, Stalin gives us a list of four items, which are :

First, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard nature as an accidental agglomeration of things, of phenomena, unconnected with, isolated from, and independent of, each other, but as a connected and integral whole in which things, phenomena are organically connected with, dependent upon, and determined by each other.'

Second, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that nature is not a state of rest and immobility, stagnation and immutability, but a state of continuous movement and change, of continuous renewal and development....'

Third, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics does not regard the process of development as a simple process of growth...but as a develpment which passes from insignificant and imperceptible quantitative changes to open, fundamental changes, to qualitative changes ; a development in which the qualitative changes occur not gradually, but rapidly and abruptly, taking the form of a leap from one state to another....'

Fourth, 'Contrary to metaphysics, dialectics holds that internal contradictions are inherent in all things and phenomena of nature....'[60]

It is significant, however, that the great law of the negation of the negation is conspicuous by its absence in this list.

The most exhaustive inventory of the elements of dialectic is found in Lenin's *Philosophical Notebooks*, which must be noted here in full :

'1) the *objectivity* of consideration....

'2) the entire totality of the manifold *relations* of this thing to others.

'3) the *development* of this thing (phenomenon, respectively), its own movement, its own life,

'4) the internally contradictory *tendencies* (*and* sides) in this thing.

'5) the thing (phenomenon, etc.) as the sum *and unity of opposites.*

'6) the *struggle*, respectively unfolding, of these opposites, contradictory strivings, etc.

'7) the union of analysis and synthesis—the breakdown of the separate parts and the totality, the summation of these parts.

'8) the relations of these things (phenomenon, etc.) are not only manifold, but general, universal. Each thing is connected with *every other.*

'9) not only the unity of opposites, but the *transitions of every* determination, quality, feature, side, property into *every* other [into its opposite ?].*

'10) the endless process of the discovery of *new* sides, relations, etc.

'11) the endless process of the deepening of man's knowledge of the thing, of phenomena, processes, etc., from appearance to essence and from less profound to more profound essence.

'12) from co-existence to causality and from one form of connection and reciprocal dependence to another, deeper, more general form.

'13) the repetition at a higher stage of certain features, properties, etc., of the lower and

'14) the apparent return to the old (negation of the negation).

'15) the struggle of content with form and conversely. The throwing off of the form, the transformation of the content.

'16) the transition of quantity into quality and *vice versa.* ((15 and 16 are *examples* of 9))'[61]

It is interesting to note that transformation of quantity into quality, which Engels considered the first and foremost feature of dialectic, is here relegated not only to the last position but also to the position of mere examples of the unity of opposites.

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* Box brackets in the original.

The main field in which Marx and Engels seek to apply dialectic is history, wherein 'class' takes the place of Hegel's 'Idea' as the prime mover of the historical process. What is a class? Says Marx: 'The separate individuals form a class only insofar as they have to carry on a common battle against another class.'[62] Also: 'In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile opposition to the latter, they form a class.'[63] In fact, Marx attempted a fuller definition of class towards the close of *Capital*, Volume III, but unfortunately could not complete it.[64] History has been the history of an unceasing struggle between the exploiter- and exploited classes, which are believed to represent thesis and antithesis respectively,[65] the final synthesis being ordained as the establishment of a classless society. 'The history of all hitherto-existing society is the history of class struggles,' wrote Marx and Engels in the *Communist Manifesto*. They continued, 'Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guildmaster and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another....'[66] Engels subsequently made the emendation, that 'all past history, with the exception of its primitive stages, was the history of class struggles....'[67] That is to say, all history is marked by class struggle save primitive stages, pre-history, or proto-history—primitive Communistic society, as Engels would have it otherwise.[68] Class-struggle is the sociological counterpart of the biological theory of the struggle for existence.[69] The idea of a class struggle is found mooted in Plato as well.[70]

The modern dialectical classes are boungeoisie and proletariat. 'By bourgeoisie is meant the class of modern capitalists, owners of the means of social production and employers of wage-labour. By proletariat, the class of modern wage labourers....'[71]

The classes are economic in origin but class-struggle is far from confined to the economic sphere. Class-struggle is a universal, all-embracing phenomenon. Engels makes it clear that 'all historical stuggles, whether they proceed in

the political, religious, philosophical or some other ideological domain, are in fact only the more or less clear expression of struggles of social classes,[72] and that the existence and thereby the collisions, too, between these classes are in turn conditioned by the degree of development of their economic position, by the mode of their production and of their exchange determined by it.'[73] According to Marx and Engels, the ruling class is at once 'the ruling *material* force of society and 'its ruling *intellectual* force'[74] and the ruling ideas are the ideas of the ruling class[75] for the simple reasons that 'The "*idea*" always disgraced itself in so far as it differed from the "*interest*"'[76] and that 'theory almost becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses'[77]. Marx also holds that 'It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence that determines their consciousness."[78]

Dialectic has much to do with the law of polarity, in deference to which Marx and Engels postulated that in the capitalist society there is bound to take place a polarization of classes, all classes being ultimately reduced to the exploiting and the exploited class, at daggers drawn with each other. 'Society as a whole,' they declare in the historic *Communist Manifesto*, 'is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes directly facing each other : Bourgeoisie and Proletariat.'[79] But what about the middle classes so much in evidence even at the advanced stage of capitalism ? Their answer is that they will, in the long run, have to sink into the bourgeoisie or the proletariat and finally exit from the scene for good.[80] In fact, polarity is the sine qua non of dialectic.

In the process of polarization of classes, however, the proletariat is, according to Marx and Engels, bound to be faced with the phenomenon of increasing pauperization, increasing misery. According to the law of increasing misery, as this phenomenon has come to be styled, with the increasing development of industry there will be an increasing accumulation or monopolization of wealth on the side of the proletariat. 'The worker becomes all the poorer the more wealth he produces,' says Marx.[81] But, thanks to the inception of labour-legislation, colonization, and conquest, the lot of the

proletariat had begun to show signs of improvement in Marx's own time. Marx admits this but tries to explain it away, with the remark that, 'although the enjoyments of the worker have risen, the social satisfaction that they give has fallen in comparison with the increased enjoyments of the capitalist, which are inaccessible to the worker, in comparison with the state of development of society in general.' Generalizing the point, he continues: 'Our desires and pleasures spring from society; we measure them, therefore, by society and not by the objects which serve for their satisfaction. Because they are of a social nature, they are of a relative nature.'[82] Marx also admits that capitals invested in colonies etc. may weaken the effect of the law of increasing misery, but the law itself, he adds, 'is not suspended' or abolished. In fact, according to him, the law 'shows itself only as a tendency, whose effects become clearly marked only under certain conditions and in the course of long periods.'[83] He also came to have some appreciation of some of the implications of the development of joint-stock company system which promised to offset the tendency of the polarization of classes. The system, according to him, 'is the abolition of the capitalist mode of production within capitalist production itself...which represents on its face a mere phase of transition to a new form of production.'[84] In the newly established co-operative factories of the labourers, the associated labourers become 'their own capitalists', rather than be subjected to exploitation by the capitalist class. Within them, 'the antagonism between capital and labour is overcome'. His following words are of the greatest significance in this connexion: 'The capitalist stock companies as well as the co-operative factories may be considered as forms of transition from the capitalist mode of production to the associated one, with this distinction, that the antagonism is met negatively in the one, positively in the other.'[85] Then, it is difficult to see how the theory of increasing misery can be sustained in the form in which Marx and Engels have stated it. Is it not the victory of reform over revolution, of crawl over leap, of gradualism over dialectic?

Marx and Engels even look askance at the reform measures seeking, ostensibly, to improve the lot of the prole-

tariat. In fact they take exception to them on the ground that, by so doing, the democratic petty bougeois 'hope to bribe the workers by more or less concealed alms and to break their revolutionary potency by making their position tolerable for the moment.'[86] Explaining their aim, they write, 'For us the issue cannot be the alteration of private property but only its annihilation, not the smoothing over of class antagonisms but the abolition of classes, not the improvement of existing society but the foundation of a new one.'[87] In a nutshell, not reform but revolution.

As regards the bearing of national conquests on the law of increasing misery, Marx and Engels have themselves recognized that their 'whole interpretation of history appears to be contradicted by the fact of conquest.'[88] They recur to this issue a number of times.[89]

It seems to be clearer that Marx and Engels greatly underrate the role of the middle classes, with the result that the orthodox Marxists find themselves hard put to it to account for the rise of Nazism and Fascism as also the power wielded by bureaucracy, business managers, and scientists. Among Marx-influenced thinkers it is James Burnham, the author of the *Managerial Revolution,* who gives to the middle classes their due by assigning a decisive role to them in modern society as well as in the society to come. According to him, capitalism will yield place not to socialism, as Marx visualized (which will come up for discussion in the sequel), but to the rule of the managerial section of the middle class who will establish what he calls the managerial society.[90] Needless to point out that Burnham's forecast is coming true, slowly but surely. In fact, his analysis of post-capitalist society is almost as important as Marx's analysis of capitalist society.

It is significant, however, that even Engels sometimes came to realize that modern economy has begun to be run by salaried employees rather than capitalists themselves. 'At first', he contends, 'the capitalist mode of production forces out the workers. Now it forces out the capitalists....'[91] Had he pursued this pont in all its implications, he would in all probability have been led to a position akin to Burnham's.

Now, let us revert to the Marxian thesis of increasing misery. According to Marx and Engels, the centralization of wealth will go on increasing with a corresponding increase in the misery of the proletariat which, when at the point of starvation, will have no alternative but to destroy capitalism and put an end to its (the proletariat's) troubles for good. Marx describes the phenomenon with characteristic fire: 'Along with the constantly diminishing number of the magnates of capital, who usurp and monopolise all advantages of this process of transformation, grows the mass of misery, oppression, slavery, degradation, exploitation.... Centralisation of the means of production and socialisation of labour at last reach a point where they become incompatible with their capitalist integument. This integument is burst asunder. The knell of capitalist private property sounds. The expropriators are expropriated.'[92]

What follows upon the success of the revolution is characterized by Marx and Engels as the revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat. This concept, with slight verbal variations, occurs in Marx and Engels, subject to the present writer's computation, eleven times.[93] The dictatorship of the proletariat is a condition of society rather than the dictatorial form of government, despite Lenin's diatribe against Karl Kautsky for holding such a view.[94] Engels considers 'a democratic republic' to be 'the specific form for the dictatorship of the proletariat'.[95] In reply to a supposed question as to the course of the proletarian revolution which, according to him, is going to come, he contends that the revolution 'will inaugurate a *democratic constitution* and thereby directly or indirectly the political rule of the proletariat.'[96] More concretely: 'Look at the Paris Commune. That was the Dictatorship of the Proletariat.'[97] The Paris Commune, which lasted for two months (March 28 to May 28, 1871), was a model democratic republic, formed of municipal councillors, chosen by universal suffrage and 'composed of several parties, among which the Marxist party was neither the smallest nor the most significant'.[98] In fact, the dictatorship of the proletariat is a condition favouring 'the expropriation of a few usurpers by the people' as against capitalism which means 'the expropriation of the mass of the people by a few usurpers'.[99]

This is the state of affairs which Marx originally chose to term 'crude communism'. It differs from 'communism' in an important respect. Communism means 'Abolition of private property', a rubric in which 'the theory of the Communists may be summed up'.[100] But in crude communism private property is not abolished; it is generalized, universalized, and consummated; the 'category of *labourer* is not done away with, but extended to all men', envy and avarice are not eliminated, but re-established for satisaction in another way.[101] 'General *envy* constituting itself as power is the disguise in which *avarice* re-establishes itself and satisfies itself, only in *another* way'.[102] Sometimes Marx and Engels appear to welcome this state of affairs. They commend all sorts of excesses on the part of the proletariat during and immediately after the revolution, with a view to feeding the direct revolutionary excitement. 'Far from opposing so-called excesses', write they, 'instances of popular revenge against hated individuls or public buildings that are associated only with hateful recollections, such instances must not only be tolerated but the leadership of them taken in hand.'[103]

With the increasing success of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 'State interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then withers away of itself; the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things, and by the conduct of processes of production. The State is not "abolished". '*It withers away*.'[104] Or, then, society 'will put the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities, by the spinning wheel and the bronze axe'.[105] Or the proletariat will 'throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap'.[106] This is the theory of the withering away of the state.

The dictatorship of the proletariat or crude communism is followed by communism divisible into two phases.[107] The 'first phase of communist society' came to be called 'socialism' and the 'higher phase of communist society', 'communism'. Marxism seems to stop here, but not Marx, the author of the *Economic and Philosophic Munuscripts of 1844*, who envisages the possibility of transcendence of communism as well. This we shall advert to in the sequel.

Thus, the sequence of future events constituting the grand Synthesis of all history, the Negation of all negation, according to Marxism, would be something like this :

1) Smashing, annulment, or abolition of the bourgeois state by the revolutionary proletariat.
2) Establishment of a proletarian state characterized, first, as 'crude communism' and, later, as 'the dictatorship of the proletariat'.
3) Withering away of the proletarian state.
4) Socialism.
5) Communism.
6) Trans-communism.

Translated into history, the laws of dialectic enunciated by Engels imply that every social order or historical epoch carries within itself the seeds of its own destruction, is pregnant with its own negation, and that, though there is an underlying continuity as well as unity between the old and the new order, the transformation of the old order is abrupt, sudden, and violent, like a flash of lighthing which is the result of long-gathering forces in the clouds, like revelation which is the result of long-accumulating inner experience. In G. B. Shaw's *Back to Methuselah*, Conrad remarks : 'Nature always proceeds by jumps. She may spend twenty thousand years making up her mind to jump ; but when she makes it up at last, the jump is big enough to take us into a new age'.[108] That is why orthodox Marxists tend to reject reform in favour of revolution.

Marx and Engels believed that such transformation was bound to be violent. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions.[109] 'Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one', says Marx.[110] As they grew maturer and maturer, however, they tended more and more to envisage the possibility of peaceful, democratic revolution. So says Marx in the course of a speech at Amsterdam on September 8, 1872, on the morrow of the Hague Congress of the International Working Men's Association popularly known as the First International : 'We do not claim that the means necessary for bringing about the proletarian revolution will be the same every-

where....We do not deny that there are countries such as the United States and Great Britain—and if I know your institutions better I should, perhaps, add Holland—where the workers will be able to achieve their ends by peaceful means'.[111] In fact—believe it or not—Engels went to the length of proclaiming that the cult of armed revolution was out of date 'in every respect'. 'Rebellion in the old style,' he observes, 'street-fighting with barricades, which decided the issue everywhere up to 1848, was to a considerable extent obsolete'.[112]

According to the first law of dialectic, transformation of a social order takes place only when the full sum of its possiblities has been realized, when it has reached its culmination. 'No social order ever disappears', says Marx, 'before all the productive forces for which there is room in it have developed; and new, higher relations of production never appear before the material conditions of their existence have matured in the womb of the old society.'[113]

According to Marx and Engels, the whole of human history is divisible into

1) primitive communism,
2) slavary,
3) feudalism,
4) capitalism,
5) crude communism or the dictatorship of the proletariat,
6) socialism,
7) communism, and
8) trans-communism.

This order is unchangeable and irreversible. Society cannot overleap the natural phases of its evolution; it can, at best, shorten and lessen its birth-pangs.[114] Force can only supplement a revolutionary situation prepared by economic development. If the situation has not been so prepared, it will be abortive in the long run, whatever force is applied to it. Of course, as some critic has remarked, force is the midwife, not the mother, of revolutionary transformation.

For the same reason, Marx and Engels looked forward to the coming of the proletarian revolution in Germany,[115] France,[116] England,[117] Great Britain,[118] or 'in all civilized

countries, that is, at least simultaneously in England, America, France, and Germany'.[119] In fact, to the question whether it will be possible for the socialist or proletarian revolution to take place in one country alone, Engels said, 'No', and proceeded to give reason therefor, concluding that it 'is to be a world revolution, and will, therefore, have the whole world as its arena'.[120] This is all in full consonance with the laws of dialectic. But ugly facts have killed the beautiful theory, in so far as, like Islam which is spreading in Africa south of Sahara, 'socialist' revolution has come about not in the advanced countries but in such a backward, pre-capitalist country, inter alia, as Tsarist Russia, where Engels had once ruled out the possibility of a 'socialist revolution' altogether.[121] Engels appears to have been firmly of the opinion that no *socialist* revolution is possible in Russia till a proletarian revolution is successfully carried out in the West,[122] though 'Russia undoubtedly is on the eve of a *social* revolution'.[123]

In fact, Marx and Engels were believers in the inexorableness of the dialectical laws of motion of society. 'With the same certainty with which from a given mathematical proposition a new one is deduced, with the same certainty can we deduce the social revolution from the existing social conditions and the principles of political economy.'[124] History is moving in, say, a predetermined course, so that the proletarians are said to 'have no ideals to realize, but to set free the elements of the new society with which old collapsing bourgeois society itself is pregnant.'[125]

By and by, however, Marx and Engels seem to have visualized the possibility of a Russian Revolution becoming 'the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that both complement each other' as well as of 'the present Russian common ownership of land' serving 'as the starting point for a communist development'.[126] In 1877, Marx suggested that, since 1861, the year of the emancipation of her serfs, Russia had been in a position to avoid the castastrophe of capitalism and to make a direct change to communism.[127] In the same year, Marx also came to believe that this time 'the revolution will begin in the East....'[128] In 1885, he was convinced that a '*Russian defeat* would have greatly *hastened the social revolution in Russia,*...and

with it the revolution throughout Europe'.[129] In fact, Engels once clearly admitted that 'as to what social and political phases these [backward] countries will have to pass through before they likewise [i. e. like Europe and North America] arrive at socialist organization, I think we today can advance only rather idle hypotheses'.[130]

It must be clearly understood, however, that Marx and Engels are primarily concerned to lay bare the economic laws of motion of modern society and the successive phases of its normal development, rather than to study the impact of one civilization upon another, which latter is more or less an impossibility in the present state of human knowledge. Indeed, from the Appendix to his *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* it appears that Marx had a plan to deal with this aspect of the matter as well.[131]

The logic of the dialectical transformation of capitalist society into socialist society consists in 'the social character of the means of production and of the products'[132] and 'the complete development of modern productive forces,'[133] on the inception of which 'the existence of class distinction itself has become an obsolete anachronism'[134] and 'appropriation of the means of production and of the product...has become not only superfluous but economically, politically, intellectually, a hindrance to development'[135] giving rise to economic crises, slumps, depressions, etc. 'The expansive force,' says Engels, 'of the means of production bursts the bonds that the capitalist mode of production had imposed upon them'.[136]

What would the classless, and consequently conflictless, society be like ? Would it be static and immutable in so far as history would have reached its culmination point therein, in so far as, that is to say, history would have achieved its denouement therein ? To Engels's mind, 'the so-called "socialist society" is nothing immutable. Like all other social formations, it should be conceived in a state of constant flux and change'.[137] Marx writes, 'It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonism that *social evolutions* will cease to be *political revolutions*'.[138] But what becomes of the dialectical process, whose lever, according to Marx and Engels, is contradiction or the struggle of opposites ? Does it cease to operate ?

This question does not seem to have bothered them. N. I. Bukharin expressed the view that in classless society there would be no contradiction at all, to which Lenin reacted, 'Antagonism and contradiction are not at all one and the same. Under socialism, the first will disappear, the second will remain.'.[139] To this, Mao Tse-Tung adds, 'That is to say, antagonism is one form, but not the only form, of the struggle of opposites; the formula of antagonism cannot be arbitrarily applied everywhere'.[140]

What actually is the position in Soviet society, claimed to be classless? A. A. Zhdanov remarks that there contradiction operates 'in the form of criticism and self-criticism,' which, according to him, is the real motive force of development in Soviet society. This he calls 'a new form of movement, a new type of development, a new dialectical law'.[141]

The Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy essays the task of elucidating the concept of antagonistic contradiction thus: 'Those contradictions...are antagonistic, in which the struggle of indissolubly connected opposites proceeds in the form of their external collisions, which are directed on the part of the dominant opposite so as to preserve the subordination of its opposite and of the type of contradiction itself; and on the part of the subordinated opposite – to the destruction of the dominant opposite and of the contradiction itself as well'.[142] According to this book, the (antagonistic) contradiction in a capitalist society 'can be solved only by socialist revolution', whereas the (normal, non-antagonistic) 'contadiction of the transitional economy' can be solved 'by the industrialization of the country, by collectivization and Soviet farm construction'.[143] That is to say, antagonistic contradiction cannot be resolved save by revolution, whereas non-antagonistic contradiction would lead to social evolution without causing a complete break with the past. The authors of the book appear to have taken their cue from the following passage from Marx already quoted: 'It is only in an order of things in which there are no more classes and class antagonism that social evolutions will cease to *political revolutions*'.[144]

The book under reference essays the task of demonstrating how contradiction would exist and operate in a classless

society.[145] According to it, in the first, socialistic phase of communism, there 'will be the contradiction between the socialist character of production.. and the distribution of the "means of existence and enjoyment"...according to work done'. How will this contradiction be resolved ? By revolutionary activity ? No. 'It will be resolved by the growth of the productivity of labour and on that basis by such a refashioning of our people as will make possible the realization of the principle: "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs"'.[146]

It is, however, difficult to see what would sustain contradiction and the consequent process of progress in society when 'there are no more classes and class antagonisms'[147] and all that they imply ; when 'the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all';[148] when the 'realm of necessity' yields place to 'the realm of freedom' lying 'beyond the sphere of material production' whose 'fundamental basis' is the' shortening of the working day ;[149] and when 'there is the assent of man from the kingdom of necessity to the kingdom of freedom',[150] where 'the government of persons is replaced by the administration of things'[151] (as Engels would have it, using an expression of St. Simon). In fact Marx himself observes that with the disappearance of capitalism 'this contradiction...disappears'.[152] Significantly enough, Marx also remarks, 'No antagonism, no progress',[153] obviousiy employing the term 'antagonism' in the sense of contradiction.

From a startling passage, seldom noticed, in Marx's *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, it transpires that, instead of stopping short at communism, he goes beyond it, thereby suggesting that the dialectcal process knows no stop. Writes he, 'Communism is the position as the negation of the negation, and is hence the *actual* phase necessary for the next stage of historical development in the process of human emancipation and recovery. *Communism* is the necessary pattern and the dynamic principle of the immediate future, but communism as such is not the goal of human development—the structure of human society'.[154] The editor of the work tries to gloss over the patent import of the passage with the remark that by 'communism as such' Marx means crude, equalitarian communism, such as propounded by Babeuf and his followers. But Marx's words are clear for anybody to examine and see for himself.

In *applying* his dialectic to history, Hegel, too, appears to bring the dialectical process to a stop with the Prussian state,[155] or rather America.[156] The case with the *theoretical* Hegel is different, however. In its purely philosophical aspect, his dialectic moves from the realm of time to that of timelessness, where the question of an end is simply ruled out.

The most conspicuous feautre of classless society in the womb of the future is its statelessness, a stage where Marxism and anarchism meet ; the only difference between them on this issue being that, according to anarchism, the state has to be abolished or destroyed, while, according to Marxism, it withers away of itself, for the simple reason that 'the state is nothing but a machine for the oppression of one class by another',[157] 'an engine of class despotism',[158] and that way 'only a transitional institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, in order to hold down one's adversaries by force'.[159] When actually does it happen ? After 'such time as a generation reared in new, free social conditions is able to throw the entire lumber of the state on the scrap heap'.[160] Again : 'As soon as there is no longer any class to be held in subjection, as soon as class rule, and the individual struggle for existence based upon our present anarchy in production..., are removed, nothing more remains to be suppressed, and a special repressive force, a State, is no longer necessary'.[161] Lenin also once held that the proletarian state 'will begin to wither away immediately after its victory'.[162] The upshot of all this is that the state has to wither away as a matter of course immediately after the abolition of the exploiting class. This has not happened, however, even in Sovient Russia. It was as far back as November 25, 1936, when the new Constitution was promulgated, that Stalin proclaimed that 'all the exploiting classes have now been eliminated'.[163] But the Soviet state has shown no signs of withering away. Why ? Stalin argues that the theory of the withering away of the state is correct only on one of two conditions : first, '*if* we study the socialist state only from the angle of the internal development of a country,...isolating, for the convenience of investigation, the country and the state from the international situation ;' or, secondly, '*if* we assume that socialism is already victorious in all countries, or in the majority of countries, that a socialist encirclement exists instead of a capitalist

encirclement....'[164] According to Stalin, 'Engels proceeds from the assumption that socialism has already been victorious more or less simultaneously in all countries, or in a majority of countries'.[165] Stalin's explanation is not without force. As we have already remarked, Marx and Engels were concerned to analyze internal developments of society rather than its transformation under the impact of alien powers. This being the case, the general theory of the withering away of the state is bound to undergo modification in practice. But, then, it does not justify the withholding from the people by the state several liberties allowed in democracies the world over.

It must, incidentally, be added that Hegel, too, once envisaged the perishing of the state in his ideal society. In his *Erstes Systemprogramm des Deutschen Idealismus*, written in 1796, there is the significant passage: 'I shall demonstrate that just as there is no idea of a machine, there is no idea of the State, for the State is something mechanical. Only that which is an object of freedom may be called an idea. We must, therefore, transcend the State. For every State is bound to treat free men as cogs in a machine. And this is precisely what it should not do; hence, the State must perish'.[166]

According to Herbert Marcuse, Marx confines the jurisdiction of his dialectic to 'a particular stage of the historical process'.[167] On the strength of a relatively obscure passage in the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*,[168] Marx maintains that 'Marx criticizes Hegel's dialectic for generalizing the dialectical movement into a movement of all being'.[169] Marx's passage is as follows: 'But because Hegel has conceived the negation of the negation from the point of view of the positive relation inherent in it as the true and only positive, and from the point of the negative relation inherent in it as the only true act and self-realizing act of all being, he has only found the *abstract*, *logical*, *speculative* expression for the movement of history; and this historical process is not yet the *real* history of man—of man as a given subject, but only man's *act of genesis*—the *story* of man's *origin*'.[170] According to Marcuse's lights, Marx confines the jurisdiction of even Hegel's dialectic to the particular phase of man's history styled 'Entstehungsgeschichte', translated by Marcuse as 'the story of man's origin' in the above passage and

'the history of his maturing'.[171] This phase of human history Marx elsewhere designates as 'Prehistory;[172] distinguishing it here from 'real history'[173] and elsewhere from 'history proper'.[174] This prehistory is the history of class society; and history, the history of classless society. 'The Hegelian dialectic gives the *abstract logical* form of the pre-historical development, the Marxian dialectic its *real concrete* movement. Marx's dialectic, therefore, is still bound up with the pre-historical phase.'[175] Certain other parallels of the dyads prehistory and history, found in Marx and Engels, are culled below:

Prehistory	History
History of man's origin	Real history
Animal conditions of existence	Human conditions of existence[176]
Kingdom of necessity	Kingdom of freedom[177]
Class society	Classless society
Statism	Statelessness

Though Marcuse's finding is not without truth, especially his discovery of Marx's view of the Hegelian dialectic being in fact valid for a particular phase of human history, we for our part fail to find a single suggestion in Marx and Engels binding *their* dialectic down to the 'prehistory' of mankind. The particular mainfestation of dialectic, known as class struggle, alone, broadly speaking, would be regarded by Marx and Engels as a creature of prehistory.

In the ultimate analysis, dialectic seems to be a transcendental or trans-empirical concept. If it is carried to its logical extreme, matter would involve and be opposed to no-matter and would hence be far from ultimate.[178] In fact, in dialectic, the ultimate is never reached at all. We have shown elsewhere how Nāgārjuna's dialectic reaches a stage even beyond void and non-void.[179] As a matter of fact, dialectic must be conceived as a self-transcending process. That way, Nāgārjuna's five-moment dialectic is rather in a better position to bring out in full relief this most fundamental fact than the three-term one of Marx.[180] So, it is difficult to see how, one who, like Marx and Engels, believes in the ultimacy and irreducibility of matter can make bold to declare dialectic as

the ultimate law of thought and things. Hegel's, too, is a three-term dialectic, but, since it stretches into the Absolute which outflanks the question of a 'beyond', there is scarcely any room for such an objection in his case.

If anything, dialectic is an infinitizing, concretizing, and holistic process, so to speak. The only conceivable rationale of dialectic is the belief, firstly, that things are finite, incomplete, and in the nature of abstractions from some concrete reality and are perpetually trying to overreach, transcend, and complete themselves by positing their own contradictories and then being synthetized with them into a higher category comprehensive enough to have them as its own two monents. Indeed, dialectic is a declaration of war by things against their finitude. The lower categories subsist in and through the highest category, the only real category existing in its own right, matter or the universal being an abstraction, as a collective name for them. We would do well to note what Engels has to say in this behalf : 'Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted... ; words like matter and motion are nothing but *abbreviations* in which we comprehend many different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties.[181] Marxism is neither universalism nor idealism but particularism and matter-of-fact practicalism, the particulars of which are self-contained and self-content, having no ambition, so to speak, for self-aggrandizement through self-transcendence. This being so, it is difficult to see how dialectic could be considered essential or germane to, or even compatible with, Marxism.

For Hegel, the Absolute Spirit is the one, all-inclusive reality which alienates itself into the world of finite things, through some inscrutable finitizing principle or process. The finite things representing a lapse from the pristine absoluteness of the Absolute Spirit, they crave to return to their original self by referring beyond themselves and positing their complement masquerading as their negation, and then being synthetized with it in a higher unity. Marx propounds no such theory of alienation, whence he has no warrant for dabbling with dialectic. He does employ the concept of alienation or estrangement in a different context, as 'man's externalization in the thing,'[182] 'estrangement of man from nature and himself,'[183] the aliena-

tion of the producer (worker) from the product of his own labour,[184] etc.; but it is far from germane to our enquiry.

Hegel's Absolute is thought thinking about thought. He proceeds to deduce the necessity of the worlds of Nature and Spirit (not the worlds themselves) from Logic, from pure thought, which is necessarily of a dialectical character. Each thought engenders its opposite, so much so that in meditation every conscious effort to concentrate upon a given object and keep at bay all else is often defeated by an equally strong gust of the opposite. This being the case, if Hegel sees dialectic in the very nature of things, he is quite comprehensible. But it passes one's comprehension how a materialist, to whom thought is a secondary or tertiary product of nature—purely an accident, not affecting the constitution of the cosmos in any way whatsoever—, can claim to see dialectic at the root of the cosmos. Engels's discovery of 'the truth that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings',[185] is purely an empirical discovery without any sound logical basis.

Even granting that Marx and Engels are entitled to own dialectic, we must say that their dialectic can at best operate only on the cosmological plane, and not on the historiological plane. They overstep the bounds of their competence when they import the concept into history. In fact, Hegel also is guilty of applying his dialectic in the empirical sphere as a matter of course. If at all, dialecti can be taken to operate at the root rather than in the branches of the world-process. It is far from incumbent upon it to be at work everywhere, even in the realm of subjective choices.

From these considerations it is pretty clear that only a transcendentalist like Kant or Absolutist like Hegel can be a true dialectician.

On a close and critical scrutiny of the relation between the materialist dialectic and the rest of Marxism, the conclusion is irresistible that the two are not inextricably bound up with, or organically related to, each other. Marx does not make important use of dialectic in his dissertations on philosophy. It does not figure as a cut and dried concept in the *German Ideology* including the *Eleven Theses on Feuerbach* and the Introduction to

A Critique of Political Economy wherein he tries to set forth the summary of his philosophy of history. Significantly enough, dialectic is conspicuous by its absence in the *Communist Manifesto* as well. Bertrand Russell's statement, therefore, that 'the whole of his history of economic development may perfectly well be true if his metaphysic is false, and false if his metaphysic is true',[186] does appear to have some force. Mikhailovsky also reaches an identical conclusion when he says, 'Marx filled the empty dialectical scheme so full with factual content that it could be removed from this content like a lid from a bowl without anything being changed.'[187] Certain statements in Engels's writings, too, serve to confirm this view. In reply to Dühring's dig at Marx's so-called 'dialectical frills and mazes', 'dialectical miracles', and 'dialectical rubbish', Engels remarks, 'Marx merely shows from history...that just as formerly petty industry by its very development necessarily created the conditions of its own annihilation, i.e., of the expropriation of the small proprietors, so now the capitalist mode of production has likewise itself created the material conditions from which it must perish'.[188] That is to say, the process delineated by Marx is a historical one arrived at by him independently of dialectic. That is why Engels hastens to add immediately after, 'The process is a historical one, and if it is at the same time a dialectical process, this is not Marx's fault....'[189] In the *Capital*, Marx observes, 'The capitalist mode of appropriation, the result of the capitalist mode of production, produces capitalist private property. This is the first negation of individual private property, as founded on the labour of the proprietor. But capitalist production begets, with the inexorability of a law of nature, its own negation. It is the negation of the negation.'[190] Upon this statement of Marx, Engels comments, 'Thus, by characterizing the process as the negation of the negation, Marx does not intend to prove that the process was historically necessary. On the contrary: only after he has proved from history that in fact the process has partially already occurred, and partially must occur in the future, he in addition characterizes it as a process which develops in accordance with a definite dialectical law. That is all. It is therefore once again a pure distortion of the facts by Herr Dühring when he declares that the negation of the negation has to serve here as the midwife to deliver the

future from the womb of the past, or that Marx wants anyone to be convinced of the necessity of the common ownership of land and capital (which is itself a Dühringian contradiction in corporeal form) on the basis of credence in the negation of the negation.'[191] These words leave no doubt whatever that dialectic is far from integral or organic to Marxism, which is complete without it. To Marx and Engels, dialectic does not appear to be a law of thought and things but merely an empirical observation. Their use of dialectic appears to be an attempt at the apotheosis or consecration of their findings independently arrived at. The Marxists' habit af swearing in season and out of season by such a gratuitous and, from the materialist point of view, far-fetched assumption as dialectic sometimes assumes ridiculous proportions. 'It is a standard joke', writes Milovan Djilas, 'that the Communists first equate an economic measure with a Marxist idea and then proceed to carry out the measure'.[192]

The Marxian dialectic appears to be a hang-over of the Hegelian past of Marx and Engels, who, to use Marx's own expression, 'coquetted with the modes of expression peculiar to Hegel'[193] till the end. Small wonder, then, that early 'revisionsts' sought to dispense with dialectic altogether. E. Bernstein, indeed, went to the extent of dubbing dialectic as 'the treacherous element in the Marxian doctrine, the trap that is laid for all consistent thinking'.[194] He also came to hold, 'If we wish to comprehend the world, we have to conceive it as a complex of ready-made objects and processes.'[195]

Marxists tend to vulgarize dialectic by designating any and every term that suits them as thesis and then proceeding to complete the triad. It never occurs to them to first decide where logically to begin. Terms are not interchangeable. It is not open to us to start from anywhere we like and designate the term as thesis, arbitrarily. A is A, B is B, and C is C. If we come upon A, then we have to hunt up B and C; if B, then A and C; and, if C, then A and B. In their arbitrary procedure, they invariably tend to be guided, or rather misguided, by chronology. Theirs is the theory of linear progress.[196] They seem to proceed on the assumption that what precedes is the thesis and what succeeds is the antithesis or the synthesis, the latest member of the series being regarded as the synthesis.

They are, therefore, guilty of confusing logical with chronological sequence. It must, however, be acknowledged that, in his dialectical practice, Hegel is no less to blame for such a fault. Mc Taggart has dealt with this difficulty in Hegel at sufficient length.[197]

Both Hegel and Marx-Engels, while practising dialectic, deal with only one aspect of reality, to the neglect of all other aspects. Even in discovering contradictions native to a thing, they do not worry about examining which of these are essential and basal and which otherwise. Unless the essential and basal elements or contradictions are discovered, it would be simply unwarrantable on one's part to pass one's verdict on the thing in general. Even such a Marxist as Mao Tse-Tung shows an inkling of this issue. 'There are', he says, 'many contradictions in the process of development of a complex thing, and one of them is necessarily the principal contradiction whose existence and development determine or influence the existence or development of the other contradictions.'[198] According to him, contradiction is present in the process of development of all things, throughout. This he calls 'the universality and absoluteness of contradiction',[199] distinguishing it from 'the particularity of contradiction'.[200] Universality of contradiction seems to mean the universal presence of contradiction and the particularity of contradiction, the principal contradiction, or the contradiction peculiar to a particular thing 'determining the particular essence of a thing which differentiates it from other things'.[201]

At the cost of repetition, we would do well to record here that what is shockingly missing from the materialist dialectic is the key-notion, so conspicuous in Hegel, of the self-differentiating unity, characteristic only of the self-conscious, Absolute Spirit, in the infinitizing movement toward which the lower categories have to break down as imperfections. Findlay calls this key-notion 'the lubricant without whose secretly applied unction the dialectical wheels and cranks would not turn at all'.[202] As we have already seen, Engels maintains that it is the nature of matter to advance to the evolution of thinking beings....'[203] But why? Hegel is ready with an answer, Marxists are struck dumb.

Whatever be the merits or demerits of the dialectic of Hegel as well as Marx and Engels, it must be admitted in fair-

ness to it, that it can lay claim to no less respectability and validity than the various other theories proposed in the West in explanation of the world-process. The question why nature should go on developing higher and higher forms perpetually is the crux of all theories of evolution. Samuel Alexander, the greatest of the emergent evolutionists, at one place declares the problem insoluble while at another seeks to solve it by postulating a mysterious creative principle entitled nisus[204] ensouling the primordial space-time and goading it to evolve higher and higher forms till the emergence of deity. This nisus is no less mysterious than any other mysterious principle including the Godhead. Primordial space-time and a nisus', remarks Radhakrishnan, 'are Alexander's substitutes for the Void and God of the Old Testament'.[205] Indeed, Lloyd Morgan, another emergent evolutionist, goes to the extent of equating the nisus with God, without reservation.[206] Bergson's elan Vital (original inpetus of life, Vital impetus)[207] does point to the root of the matter, but then he, too, has to make important use of dialectical opposition. Whitehead's theory of ingression of eternal objects into the world of space-time[208] does not lead us even as far.

References and Notes

1. An epithet used of Engels by Mikhailovsky. See V. I. Lenin, 'What the "Friends of the People" Are and How They Fight the Social Democrats' (1894), *Selected Works of V. I. Lenin*, henceforth referred to as *S. W.*, Vol. I (London : Lawrence & Wishart, 1947), p. 89.

2. Engels, *Dialectics of Nature* (Moscow, 1954), p. 280.

3. Marx's letter to Kugelmann, dated March 6, 1868, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Correspondence* 1846-1898, a selection with Commentary and Notes (Ist Indian ed., Calcutta : National Book Agency, 1948), p. 208.

4. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy* (1886), *S. W.*, II, pp. 350-351.

5. Jean-Paul Sartre, *The Problem of Method*, Hazel E. Barnes, tr. (London : Methuen & Co., 1963), p. 30.

6. Engels's letter to Conrad Schmidt, dated August 5, 1890, *Correspondence*, p. 415.

7. Engels's letter to Conrad Schmidt, dated July 1, 1991, *ibid.*, p. 428.
8. Marx's letter to the editor of the *Otyecestvenhiye Zapisky* (=Notes on the Fatherland), written in French towards the end of 1877, *Correspondence*, p. 313.
9. *Loc. cit.*
10. *Loc. cit.*
11. Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 124.
12. Engels, *Anti-Duhring*, p. 39.
13. Lenin, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.
15. Karl Marx, *The Poverty of Philosophy* (Moscow, n. d.), pp. 117-118, 120, 123, 132 (leaving out 'synthesis', however), 169.
16. See, for example, *Capital*, I, p. 763.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 19 (Afterword to the Second German Edition).
18. *Ibid.*, p. 20.
19. *Anti-Duhring*, p. 19 (Preface).
20. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 83.
21. *The Holy Family*, p. 172.
22. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 278.
23. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *S. W.*, II, p. 341. Cp. p. 335, *ibid.*
24. Lenin, *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, A. Fineberg, tr. (Moscow, 1947), pp. 34, 101, etc.
25. Marx, 'Theses on Feuerbach', Thesis I, Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, p. 659 ; *S. W.*, II, p. 364.
26. Cp. Plato : 'If knowing is to be acting on something, it follows that what is known must be acted upon by it, and so, on this showing, reality when it is being known by the act of knowledge must, in so far as it is known, be changed owing to being so acted upon....' *Sophist* 248d-e. Cp. also 'Their [=genuine philosophers'] "knowing" is "creating", their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is—*Will to Power.*' Friedrich Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, Helen Zimmern, tr. (2nd impression of the 4th ed., London : George Allen & Unwin, 1967), section 211, p. 152.
27. Bertrand Russell, *History of Western Philosophy* (9th impression, London : George Allen & Unwin, 1965), pp. 749-750.

28. 'Theses on Feuerbach', Thesis II, *The German Ideology*, p. 659; *S.W.*, II, p. 364.
29. *Ibid.*, Thesis XI, *The German Ideology*, p. 662; *S.W.*, II, p. 367.
30. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 276.
31. Lenin, 'On Dialectics' (1915 or 1916), *Marx-Engels-Marxism* (4th English ed., Moscow, 1951), p. 336.
32. See p. 36 of Chapter II.
33. Marx, *Capital*, Vol. III, Frederick Engels, ed., Ernest Untermann, tr. from the 1st German ed. (1st Indian ed., Calcutta : Saraswati Library, 1946), p. 649. Cp. *Capital*, Vol. I, p. 316.
34. Samantabhadra, *Āpta-mīmāṁsā*, Gajadhara Lal Jain, ed., Sanātana-Jaina-Granthamālā, No. 10 (Varanasi : Chandraprabha Press, 1914), 10. 105.
35. Umāsvāti, *Tattvārthādhigama-sūtra* and *Bhāṣya*, Kesava Lal, ed. (Calcutta : Asiatic Society, 1903), 1. 9-12.
36. Śaṅkara, *Śārīraka-bhāṣya*, Mahādeva Śāstrī Bākre and Wasudeva Laxman Śāstrī Paṇaśīkara, eds. (3rd ed., Bombay : Nirnaya-Sagar Press, 1914), 2. 1. 14.
37. *Anti-Duhring*, p. 167. Cp. Hegel : 'Something moves, not because it is here at one point of time and there at another, but because at one and the same point of time it is here and not here, and in this here both is and is not. We must grant the old dialecticians the contradictions which they prove in motion; but what follows is not that there is no motion, but rather that motion is existent Contradiction itself.' (*The Science of Logic*, II, p. 67) One sentence later, Hegel adds : 'Abstract self-identity has no life; but the fact that Positive in itself is negativity causes it to pass outside itself and to change.' (Ibid., p. 68)
38. *Anti-Duhring*, p. 168.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 195; also see p. 510; *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 353; *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific*. *S.W.*, II, p. 121.
40. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *S.W.*, II, p. 351.
41. *Anti-Duhring*. p. 195. So does the Hegelian dialectic. See *Logic*, pp. 147, 150, 221-222, etc.

42. 'On Dialectics', *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, p. 332.
43. *Ibid.*, p. 333.
44. Lenin, 'Karl Marx' (1915), *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, p. 25.
45. *Philosophical Notebooks*, p. 284.
46. *Anti-Duhring*, p. 35, for example.
47. *Ibid.*, pp. 34-35.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 40; *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific*, *S. W.*, II, p. 123. Also see *Dialectics of Naure*, p. 279.
51. *Loc. cit.*
52. *The German Ideology*, p. 33.
53. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 351.
54. *Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy*, *S. W.*, II, p. 328.
55. 'On Dialectics', *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, p. 333.
56. *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 83.
57. *Anti-Duhring*, p. 175.
58. *Dīwān-i Ghālib* (10th ed., Lucknow : Nawalkishore Press, 1959), p. 32.
59. *Anti-Duhring*, pp. 119-192.
60. *Joseph Stalin, Philosophy of Marxism* (Bombay : People's Publishing House, 1945), pp. 3-7. This work was originally published under the title 'Dialectical and Historical Materialism' (September 1938) and included in the same author's *Problems of Leninism* (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1953), pp. 713-745, the passages quoted occurring on pp. 714-717.
61. *Philosophical Notebooks*, pp. 221-222.
62. *The German Ideology*, p. 69.
63. Marx, *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (1852)*, *S.W.*, I, p. 303.
64. See *Capital*, Vol. III, pp. 703-704.
65. *The Holy Family*, p. 51.
66. Marx and Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party*, popular as *Communist Manifesto* (1848), *S.W.*, I, p. 33. Cp. *The German Ideology*, p. 487.
67. *Anti-Duhring*, p. 41; Engels, *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific* (1880), *S.W.*, II, p. 124.
68. See note 'b' by Engels, *Communist Manifesto*, *S.W.*, I, p. 33.

69. See Engels, *Dialectics of Nature*, p. 405.
70. *Republic* 422 e sq.; 551 d. Cp. 566 a, *ibid.*
71. *Communist Manifesto*, *S.W.*, I, p. 33, Note 'a' by Engels.
72. Cp. *Republic* 338 ff.
73. Engels, Preface (1885) to the Third German Edition of the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, *S.W.*, I, pp. 223-224.
74. *The German Ideology*, p. 60.
75. *Ibid.*
76. *The Holy Family*, p. 109.
77. Marx, *Contributions to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Introduction (1844), Marx and Engels, *On Religion*, a compilation from their writings (2nd impression, Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.), p. 50.
78. Marx, *A Contribution to a Critique of Political Economy*, N. I. Stoke, tr. from the 2nd German ed., with an Appendix, entitled 'Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy', recently published among Marx's posthumous papers (Calcutta : Bharati Library, n. d.), Author's Preface, pp. 11-12.
79. *Communist Manifesto*, *S.W.*, I, pp. 33-34, 39-40, 41-42, 53. Also See Marx, *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844* (2nd impression, Moscow, 1961), pp. 24-25, 67, 206.
80. *Communist Manifesto*, pp. 39-40, 53. This prophecy has failed to materialize. The middle class is expanding and going stronger and stronger day by day.
81. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 69.
82. Marx, *Wage Labour and Capital (1849)*, *S. W.*, I, p. 87.
83. *Capital*, III, p. 187.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 353.
86. Marx and Engels, 'Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League' (1850), *S. W.*, I, p. 101.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 179.
88. *The German Ideology*, p. 34.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 92, for example.
90. James Burnham, *The Managerial Revolution*, Pelican Books, Services Edition (New York : Penguin Books, 1945), pp. 63 ff.
91. Engels, *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific*, *Selected Works* in three Volumes, Vol. III (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1970), p. 145.

92. *Capital*, I, p. 763.
93. See Marx, *The Class Struggle in France* (1850), *S.W.*, I, pp. 149, 203; Marx's letter to Weydemeyer, dated March 5, 1852, *S.W.*, II, p. 410; Marx's article entitled 'Political Indifferentism' contributed in 1873 to the German *Neue Zeit*, Vol. XXXII, I, 1913-14, p. 40, quoted in Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (1918) (Moscow, 1951), p. 97; Marx, *The Civil war in France* (1871), Engels's Introduction, p. 440; Engels, *The Housing Question* (1872-73), *S. W.*, I, p. 555, 556; Engels's letter to Schmidt, dated October 27, 1890, *S. W.*, II, p. 450; Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891' (1901-2), Marx and Engels, *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. III, p. 435, read with pp. 108 and 197; Engels, 'Programme of the Blanquist Commune Emigrants' (1874), *S. W.* in three Vols., Vol. II (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 381; Marx, 'Marginal Notes to the Program of the German Workers' Party', otherwise known as 'Critique of the Gotha Program' (1875), *S. W.*, II, p. 30.
94. Lenin, 'The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky' (1918), *Marx-Engels-Marxism*, pp. 443 ff.
95. Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891', *Seleeted Works* in three Vols., Vol. III, p. 435 read with pp. 108 and 197.
96. Engels, 'Principles of Communism' (1847, first published as a separate edition in 1914), *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. I (Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 90.
97. *The Civil War in France*, Engels's Introduction, p. 440.
98. *The Civil War in France*, p. 471.
99. *Capital*, I, p. 764.
100. *Communist Manifesto*, *S. W.*, I, p. 45.
101. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, pp. 99-100.
102. *Ibid.*, p. 100.
103. Marx and Engels, 'Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League' (1850), *S. W.*, I, p. 103-104.
104. *Anti-Duhring* (5th printing, Moscow : Progress Publishers, 1969), p. 333. Also see *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific*, *S. W.*, p. 138 and *Anti-Duhring* (1954), p. 389, which have '*dies out*' for 'withers away'. Except for the first reference to the *Anti-Duhring* which is to the 1969 edition,

all other references in this work are to the 1954 edition. Engels also uses other synonymous expressions in this connexion, such as 'will inevitably fall', in the *Origin of Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), *S.W.*, II, p. 292; 'will fall of itself' in his letter to T. Cuno, dated January 24, 1872, *S. W.*, II, p. 424; 'will disappear..., that is,... public functions will lose their political character and be transformed into the simple administrative functions of watching over the true interests of society', in 'On Authority' (1873), *S. W.*, I, p. 577.

105. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, *S.W.*, II, p. 292.

106. *The Civil War in France*, Engels's Introduction, *S. W.*, I, p. 440.

107. 'Critique of the Gotha Program', *S. W.*, pp. 30 and 23.

108. George Bernard Shaw, *Back to Methuselah* : A Metabiological Pentateuch (2nd reprint of the 2nd ed., London : Constable Company, 1949), p. 79.

109. *Communist Manifesto*, *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. I, p. 137.

110. *Capital*, I, p. 751.

111. See the report published in the French newspapers *La Liberte*, No. 37, September 15, 1872, and *Der Volksstaat*, No. 79, October 2, 1872, translated after comparing the texts of the report from both the newspapers and published under the title 'The Hague Congress' in *Selected Works* in three Volumes, Vol. II, pp. 292-293, as under : 'But we have by no means affirmed that this goal would be achieved by identical means. ... and we do not deny that there are countries such as America, England, and I would add Holland if I know your institutions better, where the working people may achieve their goal by peaceful means.' The text to this note is the translation given in Lucien Laurat, *Marxism and Democracy*, Edward Fitzgerald, tr. from the German (London : Victor Gollancz Ltd., 1940), p. 36. Cp. Engels, 'A Critique of the Draft Social-Democratic Programme of 1891', *Selected Works* in three Volumes, Vol. III, p. 434.

112. *The Class Struggle in France* (1850), Engels's Introduction (1895), pp. 113, 120.

113. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Preface, p. 12; *S. W.*, I, p. 329 (with 'perishes' for 'disappears' and 'itself' added at the end).

114. *Capital*, I, Preface to the First German Edition, p. 10.

115. *Communist Manifesto*, *S. W.*, I, p. 61.

116. Engels, Preface (1885) to the 3rd German Edition of the *Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*, *S. W.*, I, p. 224.

117. See Brij Narain, *Marxism Is Dead* (Lahore : Ram Krishna & Sons, 1939), p. 72.

118. *Ibid.*, pp. 72-73.

119. Engels 'Principles of Communism', *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. I, pp. 91-92.

120. *Ibid.*, p. 92. Cp. Engels, *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific*, Special Introduction to the Edition of 1892, *Selected Work* in three Vols, Vol. III, p. 114.

121. Engels, 'On Social Relations in Russia' (1875), *S. W.*, II, pp. 46-47, 49, 51.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

123. *Ibid.*, p. 56 read with p. 49.

124. See S. Radhakrishnan, *Religion and Society* (4th impression of the 2nd ed., London : George Allen & Unwin, 1959), p. 31.

125. *The Civil War in France*, *S. W.*, pp. 474-475.

126. *Communist Manifesto*, Preface to the 1882 Russian Edition, *S. W.*, I, pp. 23-24.

127. Marx's letter to the Editorial Board of the *Otechestvenniye Zapiski*, dated November, 1877. *Selected Correspondence*, (Moscow : Foreign Languages Publishing House, n. d.), pp. 377-78.

128. Marx's letter to Sorge, dated September 27, 1877, *Correspondence*, p. 309.

129. Marx's letter to Liebknecht, dated February 4, 1878, referred to in the *Correspondence*, p. 316, in a letter to him dated February 11, 1878. Cp. Engels's letter to Bebel, dated December 11, 1884, pp. 380–384, and to Zasulick, dated April 23, 1885, pp. 384–387.

130. Engels's letter to Karl Kautsky, dated September 12, 1882, *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. III, p. 481.

131. Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Appendix, pp. 306, 308-309.
132. *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. III, p. 145.
133. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
134. *Loc. cit.*
135. *Loc. cit.*
136. *Loc. cit.*
137. Engels's letter to Otto Von Boeningk in Breslau, dated August. 21, 1890, *Selected Works* in three Vols., Vol. III, p. 485.
138. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 197.
139. Lenin, 'Remarks on N. I. Bukharin's *Economics of the Transitional Period*', *Selected Works* (Moscow-Leningrad, 1931), II, p. 357, quoted in Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction* (August 1937), *Selected Writings* (Calcutta : National Book Agency, 1967), p. 687.
140. Mao Tse-Tung, *On Contradiction*, p. 687.
141. A. A. Zhdanov, *On the History of Philosophy*, quoted in Maurice Cornforth, *Science Versus Idealism* (London : Lawrence & Wishart, 1955), p. 259.
142. *A Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy*, prepared by the Leningrad Institute of Philosophy, A. C. Mosley, tr., revised and edited by Dr. John Lewis (Allahabad : Kitab-Mahal, 1944), p. 166.
143. *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.
144. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 197.
145. *A Text-Book of Marxist Philosophy*, pp. 152-154, 166-168.
146. *Ibid.*, p. 152.
147. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 197.
148. *Communist Manifesto*, *S. W.*, I, p. 51.
149. Marx, *Capital*, III, pp. 651-652.
150. *Ibid.*, p. 393.
151. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
152. *The German Ideology*, p. 272.
153. *The Poverty of Philosophy*, p. 68.
154. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844*, p. 114.
155. *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, p. 341.
156. *Ibid.*, p. 86: 'America is therefore the land of the future, where, in the ages that lie before us, the burden of the

World's History shall reveal itself—perhaps in a contest between North and South America. It is a land of desire for all those who are weary of the historical lumber-room of old Europe.'

157. *The Civil war in France,* Engels's Introduction, *S. W.*, I, p. 440.
158. *Ibid.*, p. 469.
159. Engels's letter to Bebel, dated March 18-28, 1875, *S. W.*, II, p. 39.
160. *The Civil War in France,* Engels's Introduction, *S. W.*, I, p. 440.
161. *Socialism : Utopian and Scientific, S. W., II,* p. 138; *Anti-Duhring,* p. 389.
162. *State and Revolution,* p. 47.
163. Stalin, 'On the Draft Constitution of the U. S. S. R.', Report Delivered at the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U. S. S. R., November 25, 1936, *Problems of Leninism,* p. 683.
164. Stalin, 'Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the C. P. S. U. (B.) on the Work of the Central Committee', dated March 10, 1939, *Problems of Leninism,* p. 793.
165. *Loc. cit.*
166. *Dokument zu Hegels Entwicklung,* ed., J. Hoffmeister, Stuttgart, 1936, p. 219 f., quoted in Herbert Marcuse, *Reason and Revolution,* p. 12.
167. Marcuse, *ibid.*, p. 315.
168. He relies on the sole authority of the Manuscripts despite his view that 'Marx's early writings are mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that should not be over-emphasized'. *Loc. cit.*, p. 295.
169. *Loc. cit.*, p. 315.
170. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* p. 146.
171. Marcuse, p. 315.
172. Marx, 'Preface' to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, S. W.*, I, p. 329. Cp. *The German Ideology,* p. 40.
173. *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,* p. 146.
174. *The German Ideology,* p. 40.
175. Marcuse, p. 316.
176. *Anti-Duhring,* p. 392.
177. *Ibid.*, p. 393.

Chapter IV

DIALECTIC REVIEWS ITS CAREER

Now comes the finale of our inquiry into the nearly 2500-year old but chequered career of dialectic on the continent.

As we have noticed, dialectic has had an honourable lineage and some of the finest philosophical minds of all times have brought profoundest thought to bear upon it with no mean results. As is evident from the foregoing account, out of the two main lines along which it has developed, viz. dialectic as a technic of reason and dialectic as the concept of constant conflict of contraries/contradictories ingrained in the texture of things, as a cosmological principle, we have chosen to concentrate upon and follow the second line. Whoever be credited with the invention of dialectic in general—to the author both the lines are found to converge first in Zeno of Elea—, it is Heracleitus who so richly deserves the title of being the first and foremost seer of dialectic as constant conflict of contradictories. As we have seen, his insights were so profound that even the great Hegel could not resist the temptation of incorporating each and every remnant of the former into his logic. Unfortunately, the work of Heracleitus has been lost to us irretrievably, leaving stray sentences numbering scarcely one hundred and a half in the form of quotations in later writers. We shall, therefore, never be lucky enough to have a clear idea of, much less to appraise properly, his contribution to human thought in general and to dialectic in particular. Indeed, not much can be said on the basis of the stray quotations or paraphrases from him available to us, some of which are bound to be non-genuine as well as misleading.

In fact, dialectic as a cosmological principle, i.e. as harmony, reconciliation, or struggle of opposites, is as old as human thought itself. Most of the ancients seem to recognize this principle to be at the root of things some way or other. The table of opposites propounded by the Pythagoreans[1] is an instance in point. Anaximander's Unlimited Body and Empedocles's Sphere

also tend to differentiate into opposites. Even Parmenides, the philosopher of the One absolutely untainted by contradiction and the first to have mooted the idea that the real is rational (without any serious concern to explain, or explain away, the irrational, however) had to assume two contrary principles—hot and cold, fire and earth—by way of explaining the difference between rational reality and irrational appearance.[2]

The next great name in the history of dialectic is Plato, who definitely surpasses other philosophers in point of exuberance, suggestiveness, and fecundity, which are often inexhaustible, so much so that the whole subsequent gamut of European philosophy seems to be engaged in trying to realize the sum of his possibilities. 'The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition', writes Whitehead, leaving the author far behind in applauding Plato. 'is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.'[3] In such Plato, dialectic makes its appearance as conversational thinking, logic, categoriology, and metaphysics. This multidimensional character of dialectic continues in Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic mind of classical antiquity. Incidentally, Cornford repudiates the idea of equating dialectic with formal logic, vis-à-vis Plato.[4] But Plato and Aristotle's reasoning dialectic cannot be denied the status of logic of some sort or other, be it ever so crude.

In one of the aforesaid senses of the term, Plato conceives dialectic as the highest kind of knowledge, the knowledge of the highest kind of reality, the knowledge of the highest form called the Form of the Good. The state of mind conducive to such knowledge is technically designated as Intelligence.[5] The mathematical forms belong to a lower order and are apprehended by Reason, a state of mind inferior to Intelligence. Such apprehension is also called knowledge, however.[6] The world of forms is the world of reality, the world of being, the world of first principles. Lower down in the scale of epistemological categories is Opinion or Belief, yielded by a peculiar state of mind jointly with sense, its object being the things of the world, the world of becoming.[7] Lowest in the scale is situated Illusion or Ignorance yielded by unreal objects, by shadows and images, by non-being, pure and simple. According to Plato, space is also a reality which 'in some mysterious way partakes of the intelligible, and

is most incomprehenble'[8] and 'which is apprehended when all sense is absent, by a kind of spurious reason, and is hardly real'.[9] The four elements—air, fire, water, and earth—are said to be 'parts' of space.[10] This being the case, space is no less real than the space (ākāśa) of the Upaniṣad which is the source of the aforesaid elements.[11] We are inclined to the view that Plato's space and the spurious reason by which it comes to be cognized must find place between being and becoming on one hand and knowledge and opinion on the other, in the scale of categories. Our finding in this behalf may be tabulated as follows:

1. Knowledge	1) Intelligence or Dialectic 2) Reason	1) The Form of the Good 2) Mathematical forms	Being
2. Mysterious knowledge	Spurious reason	Space	Mysterious being
3. Opinion	Opinion jointly with sense	Objects	Becoming
4. Ignorance	Illusion	Shadows and images	Non-being

It is clear that dialectic here means pure philosophy pure metaphysics, culminating in what is called Gnosis.

This multidimensional character of dialectic continues in Aristotle, the most encyclopaedic mind of classical antiquity.

The next philosopher who makes important use of dialectic in the architecture of his philosophy, is Kant. It fell to the lot of the Encyclopaedic Hegel, however, to work out dialectic as the most architectonic system in the Western tradition He is universally acknowledged as the very culmination of dialectical thought—the prince of dialectic, so to speak. Whatever turn dialectic has taken after Hegel and may take in the future, the Hegelian dialectic has been and will remain an inexhaustible source of inspiration for it as 'the basic form of all dialectics', as Marx would have it. Indeed, Hegel occupies the unique position of being a perennial source of inspiration for the idealist as well as such a formidable opponent of idealism as Karl Marx Yes, Marx was so passionately enamoured of Hegel that, once, while writing about Dietzgen, the tanner-thinker of Germany, he

exclaimed, 'It is his hard luck that precisely Hegel he did not study.'[12]

Considering the nature and scope of this work, our account of Hegel is complete more or less. It must, however, be added here by way of his criticism that, even though the Hegelian absolute is a stupendous whole, a universal web of connexion, a gigantic system of an all-embracing nature claiming to pigeonwhole everything that is the case in a dialectical framework, yet it does not appear to be gigantic enough to embrace the entire multiplicity of the recalcitrant phenomena of nature which have successfully defied all attempt to fit them into a neat dialectical scheme.

Indeed, Hegel has, along with all other dialecticians, failed to establish the universality of contradiction or dialectical process. As has already been observed, his dialectical philosophy of nature is the weakest link in the chain of his dialectical philosophy in general. Competent critics have found fault with the examples of contradiction selected by him to illustrate the operation of dialectic in the realm of nature. It is indeed not very difficult to establish the charge of arbitrainess on his part in this behalf.

Marx has the distinction of performing the apparently impossible feat of turning Hegel right side up and thereby metamorphosing his dialectical absolutism into dialectical materialism. We have seen, however, that materialism, too, has changed in the process, in some respects beyond recognition. In fact, the synthesis attempted by Marx and Engels between Hegel and materialism[13] is nearly as daring as the one attempted by the schoolmen between Aristotle and Christianity in mediaeval times on one hand and by the Muslim philosophers between Aristotle and Islam on the other. Marx has been able to do little, however, beyond creating a 'materialist' superstructure on the substructure of the Hegelian dialectic. In any case, the Marxian experiment with dialectic has been one of the most hazardous ventures in the history of philosophy. The wedlock, to us unhappy, of dialectic with materialism and that, too, not for academic but for pragmatic needs, for one of the most ambitious experiments in the reconstruction of humanity, for providing a credal base to a worldwide movement aiming at world-revolution,

is, whatever be its merits or demerits, a prodigious feat by itself, which only the genius of Marx could have performed. However, the minds of Marx and Engels were so empiricistically cast that at times their empiricism got the better of their dialecticism and rode roughshod over the verdicts of dialectical reason. In later Marxism, the fate of dialectic is no better than that of the platitudes that God willed this or that, that Allah is great, and that what is lotted cannot be blotted. We have already quoted the standard joke that the Marxists first equate an economic measure with a Marxian idea and then proceed to carry out the measure.

It must be acknowledged, however, that materialism cannot be summarily dismissed on the ground that, thanks to the recent developments in physics, matter has dematerialized, finally disappeared, and turned out to be no more real than mathematical equations. Lenin has countered the argument against materialism from the dematerialization of matter in the following words: ' "Matter is disappearing" means that the limit within which we have hitherto known matter is vanishing and that our knowledge is penetrating deeper; properties of matter are disappearing which formerly seemed absolute, immutable, and primary (impenetrability, inertia, mass, etc.) and which are now revealed to be relative and characteristic only of certain states of matter.'[14] According to him, the recent developments in physics call for not repudiation but redefinition of matter. He himself suggests the lines along which matter can be redefined: 'matter is that which, acting upon our sense-organs, produces sensation; matter is the objective reality given to us in sensation, and so forth.'[15] This is akin to Mill's definition of matter as a permanent possibibility of sensation. According to Lenin, 'the *sole* "property" of matter with whose recognition philosophical materialism is bound up is the property of *being an objective reality*, of existing outside our mind.'[16] George Santayana is more emphatic in maintaining that matter continues to be a reality even in this age of the so-called disappearance of matter. He contends that 'whatever matter may be, I call it matter boldly, as I call my acquaintances Smith and Jones without knowing their secrets ...'[17]

The Marxian philosophy of dialectical materialism, so much enamoured of contradiction, is itself a case of contradiction.

On the Marxists' own showing, dialectic is a crusade against absolute barriers in the realm of reality, against 'absolute boundaries in nature,' as Lenin would have it,[18] but the conception of matter as the ultimate reality sanctioned by Marxism does serve to raise such a barrier, such a boundary, inasmuch as it renders mind and spirit less real than dead matter. It thereby runs the risk of being construed to imply that matter is absolute and mind or spirit relative, proclaiming from the house-tops all the same that 'nothing is final, absolute, sacred' and that 'nothing can endure before it except the uninterrupted process of becoming and of passing away, of endless ascendancy from the lower to the higher.'[19] In very truth, the 'matter' of dialectical materialism is not so material as that of what is called mechanistic or vulgar materialism. Vulgar materialism interprets all phenomena in terms of inorganic, inanimate matter, reducing the former to the latter without residue. To it the moral and spiritual being called man is nothing but thinking matter, thinking matter is nothing but living matter, and living matter is nothing but inorganic matter. The mechanistic materialism is all for applying, exclusively, the standards of mechanics to the phenomena of life and mind, unmindful of the fact, noted by Engels, that, valid as the laws of mechanics are per se, they 'are pushed into the background by other higher laws ...'[20] On the other hand, dialectical materialism is emphatic in maintaining that, thanks to its indwelling dialectic, there is real qualitative change in 'matter,' real development from the lower to the higher, real novelty. Abram Moiseyevich Deborin (Yoffe) (b. 1881), acclaimed by many as the most important exponent of dialectical materialism in the post-Lenin Russia, has a remarkable passage on the subject: 'Either there is an absolute identity between inorganic and organic matter, and organic matter can be completely derived from the inorganic, in which case there is no sense at all in speaking of a transformation of the inorganic into the organic; or else, besides the unity of inorganic and organic, there is also a difference between them, in which case organic matter represents something qualitatively and specifically different from the inorganic.'[21] Elucidating the point further, much later, he remarks: 'So far as its *origin* is concerned, *the living is descended from the inanimate*, but so far as its specific *form* is concerned it cannot be derived from inorganic matter.'[22] From these considerations,

the conclusion is irresistible that what is called 'matter' is far from being a a simple affair : it is something complex, so complex as to manifest itself as now dead, now living, now thinking. It would, indeed, be far from Marxian to suppose that matter is an indeterminate something operating as a substratum for various modes supervenient upon or superadded to it. Engels has made it perfectly clear that 'Matter is nothing but the totality of material things from which this concept is abstracted...; words like matter and motion are nothing but *abbreviations* in which we comprehend different sensuously perceptible things according to their common properties.'[23] Elaborating the idea later, he contends, with reference to Hegel, that 'matter as such, as distinct from definite existing pieces of matter, is not anything sensuously existing. When natural science directs its efforts to seeking out uniform matter as such, to reducing qualitative differences to merely quantitative differences in combining identical smallest particles, it is doing the same thing as demanding to see fruit as such instead of cherries, pears, apples, or the mammal as such instead of cats, dogs, sheep, etc., gas as such, metal, stone, chemical compound as such, motion as such.'[24] Such being the case, matter is nothing etherial, elusive, abstract like pure, immutable substance of the metaphysician: it becomes a name for all things – mountains, animals, human beings—, which are all entitled to be called matter equally and in their own right. So, a human being is 'matter' in his own right, directly, not indirectly through derivation from matter.

The Marxian 'matter' is a reality whose very nature it is to transcend itself by evolving into higher and higher forms of existence. The ascription of such a creative role to matter turns it into a veritable absolute which it is a misnomer to term 'matter'. Vulgar materialism repudiated by Marxism is out to reduce everything to inanimate matter, whereas dialectical materialism views the world-process as a process of continual ascent extending into infinity and capable of evolving life, mind, spirit, and what not, thereby vesting matter with infinite creative power, with (potential ?) omnipotence and omniscience, the proverbial attributes of the Godhead. Nicholai Berdyaev has very aptly remarked, 'Dialectic, which stands for complexity, and materialism, which results in a narrow one-sidedness of view, are as mutually repellent as water and oil.'[25]

The foregoing considerations lead to the irresistible conclusion that dialectical philosophy, Marxian no less than Hegelian, can envisage only a perennially self-transcending developmental reality which cannot be whittled down to the much narrower concept of matter. Indeed, dialectic leads to integralism, neither materialism nor idealism. Engels contends that 'the Hegelian system represents merely a materialism idealistically turned upside down in method and content.'[26] Upon this, in the circumstances discussed above, one is tempted to retort that the Marxian system represents merely an integralism or holism materialistically turned inside out in method and content.

The starting-point of the Hegelian dialectic is pure being, which is the poorest category, absolutely indistinguishable from and identical with pure nothing. From this base, dialectic proceeds to create or occasion richer and richer forms of being culminating in the Absolute Idea, which is the richest and fullest of all categories, a concrete universal. Dialectical materialism, too, follows a similar procedure, without positing a hierarchy of categories, however, like Hegel. It chooses to designate its starting-point or poorest category as matter, which, thanks to its dialectical character, goes on evolving out of itself, ad infinitum, higher and higher forms of existence, ever richer in content. What is the source of this ever-growing, inexhaustible richness ? Hegel's position is clear: the world represents the self-enfoldment or self-alienation of the Absolute Spirit, a self-invited fall of the Absolute Spirit from its pristine perfection. Dialectic is the way of its self-unfoldment or self-recovery. So, on the Hegelian view, richness in content, fullness, or perfection is already there, hidden under a bushel, so to speak: it has but to be realized and recovered, through dialectic. Such an explanation is not available to Marxism, which does not believe in the pre-existence of perfection waiting to be realized and recovered. Then, whence the perfection presupposed by dialectic ? All dialectic aims at the attainment of perfection, of fullness, of wholeness, through self-transcendence, through demolition of cut and dried boundaries in nature and life. As we have seen already, the lower categories tend to break down for the simple reason that they are felt to be indequate approximations to the Absolute Spirit struggling to overcome its self-alienation and become completely itself, in its pristine perfection.

Marxism dispenses with the Absolute Spirit and its self-alienation and thereby removes the very lubricant from the wheels and cranks of dialectic, which, therefore, fail to turn at all. If fullness is not already there, it never can be, otherwise the principle of sufficient reason would be a nullity. If emergence of a non-existent fullness is a fact, if non-existent fullness can come to be, everything non-existent would become existent. Hence dialectic and materialism ill go together : they cannot co-exist. If, therefore, Marxism is dialectical, it cannot be materialist ; if materialist, it cannot be dialectical. In order to be dialectical, it will have to be integralist, like Hegelianism; in order to retain its materialism, it will have to bid good-bye to dialectic. It is true that, vesting matter with the power of self-movement through the conflict of opposites, dialectic obviates the necessity of an unmoved mover outside matter, altogether. But it does not and cannot obviate the necessity of a source of perfection towards which the universe is inexorably tending through the dialectical process.

Since Marxism does not countenance the pre-existence of perfection towards which the world-process dialectically gravitates, it is too much for it to take it for granted axiomatically that the dialectical process must needs bring about the development of a higher form of existence. What is there to determine the tendency and direction of the process ? What is the warrant for the assertion that a qualitative change supervenient upon a quantitative change necessarily marks a higher stage in the process of evolution ? Does it not imply a final cause, a proleptic influence of the result on the process leading up to it, a pull from without, a push from within, a propelling force behind evolution, a will dictating the process its course ? And what is the criterion to judge what is higher and what is lower at all ? Such questions remain unanswered on the Marxian view.

In dialectic, antithesis represents the unity and struggle of opposites. The struggle of opposites becomes possible only when they are basically one, when they characterize the subject in the same respect. If they belong to the subject in different respects, they will fail to struggle with each other. In Marxian parlance, dialectical unity may be said to be the substructure and the struggle of opposites the superstructure of the dialectical

fabric. So, the unity of opposites, is a must for their struggle. But Lenin assigns the first place to the struggle of opposites: 'The unity (coincidence, identity, resultant) of opposites is conditional, temporary, transitory, relative. The struggle of mutually exclusive opposites is aboslute, just as development and motion are absolute.'[27] The importance of the factor of unity was highlighted by Stalin as against conflict while discussing the problem of linguistics. In this connexion, he sought to make three points. First, he repudiated the view that language is a superstructure on the economic structure of society.[28] Second, he made bold to repudiate the class character of language and put forward the thesis that 'language serves all classes of... society equally and in this respect displays what may be called an indifference to classes'.[29] Third, he held that, between the warring classes in society, there is such a strong bond of unity that 'however sharp the class struggle may be, it cannot lead to the disintegration of society'.[30] N. Y. Bukharin also stressed the unity of opposites, maintaining that synthesis is not the negation of negation but a unification and reconciliation of opposites, 'a unifying position, in which contradictions are reconciled'.[31] Deborin also expressed a similar predilection in taking dialectical materialism to be a reconciliation of empiricism and rationalism.

As a matter of fact, both the unity and the struggle of opposites are equally necessary for the operation of dialectic and the stress that has been laid on the one or the other is purely pragmatical, provisional, and relative. As regards the question of reconciliation versus negation of negation at the stage of synthesis, it must be allowed that all dialectical processes are not identical in this respect: some end in reconciliation and some in the negation of negation. As we have already noticed, even Hegel does not countenance a uniform dialectical pattern in all cases. As his dialectic progresses, there is progressively increasing identification of thesis and antithesis. While dealing with the problem of linguistics, Stalin rules 'that the law of transition from an old quality to a new by means of an explosion is inapplicable...to the history of the development of languages' and 'does not necessarily apply to a society which has no hostile classes.'[32] This is a clear recognition of the diversity of dialectical patterns.

Dialectic, Hegelian as well as Marxian, implies that the world is not merely a congeries of disjointed objects or facts but a unity, a system, a developmental organism determining the direction it should take. Indeed, carried to its logical extreme, dialectic must involve an organismic view of reality. Hegel was fully conscious of this implication of his theory of dialectic. We are inclined to believe that, had Marx had time to work out the implications of his dialectic, he would have come nearer to Hegel. To us, no idea of reality sounds more plausible than the idea of it as an organism. But this is an issue which cannot be dealt with in this monograph.

One thing must be remarked in elucidation of the Hegelian standpoint. To Hegel, neither being nor nothing is the most fundamental category: the most fundamental category is the Absolutet—the identity, presupposition, and synthesis of being and nothing. Call it the Absolute, Pure Being, or Pure Nothing. That is why 'Pure Being is Pure Nothing.' This most fundamental category gives birth to what is called being on one hand and nothing on the other. It is wrong to suppose that being gives birth to nothing. In fact, thanks to its absolutely contentless character, Pure Being/Pure Nothing appears to be almost as good as the Void (Śūnya) of Mādhyamika philosophy.

The 2500-year old career of dialectic comes almost to a dead stop after the inception of dialectical materialism. This is an age of positivism, while the essence of dialectic is creative negativism, creative self-transcendence, revolution. 'Dialectic in the proper sense,' says Lenin, 'is the study of contradiction in the very essence of objects.'[38] Non-dialectical positivism refuses to look beyond its nose, the immediate given, the present, the fact. To it 'fact' is as inexorable as 'fate' to Greek drama. Dialectical negativism is fired with a kind of divine discontent, so to speak, and is ever restless to evolve newer and newer facts, newer and newer forms: it looks into the future. The modern man is tending more and more to rest satisfied with his present, as satisfied as a beast. Exceptions apart, all talk of nihilism on his part is tall talk or idle gossip. That is why there is today not only no living philosophy of life to govern our conduct and give meaning to our endeavours but little or no urge for such a philosophy as well. Marx sought to change the world,

the ancient sought to interpret the world, and our contemporaries seek only to interpret the interpretations. The last-mentioned thereby deserve to be called 'philologers'[34] rather than philosophers. We have already noted how, taking dialectic in a peculiar sense, Aristotle observes that philosophy aims at knowledge while dialectic is merely critical. In this sense, the bulk of our contemporaries giving themselves the airs of philosophers are not philosophers but mere dialecticians. Rather worse than they. Bertrand Russell satirized the self-righteous reluctance on the part of Oxford philosophers to face ontological questions and their whittling down the task of philosophy to discussing 'endlessly what silly people mean when they say silly things,' a task amusing but hardly important, by telling a story of a shopkeeper whom he had once asked the shortest way to Winchester. The shopkeeper called out to a man in the back premises. The man in his turn wanted to clarify the question but took no interest in answering it. Listen to the dialogue between the shopkeeper and that man :

'Gentleman wants to know the shortest way to Winchester.'

'Winchester ?'...

'Aye.'

'Way to Winchester ?'

'Aye.'

'Shortest way ?'

'Aye.'

'Dunno.'[35]

'Philosophy,' says Radhakrishnan, 'is produced more by our encounter with reality than by the historical study of such encounters.'[36] On the contrary, G. E. Moore makes no secret of the fact that 'I do not think that the world or the sciences would ever have suggested to me any philosophical problems. What has suggested philosophical problems to me is things which other philosophers have said about the world or the sciences.'[37] Indeed, philosophy has today become just the negation of philosophy. It is time the lovers of philosophy took to the German expression for it, viz. *Weltanschauung* (world-view, world-outlook). 'Philosophy' has been reduced to the status of mere linguistic exercise.

The all-out emphasis on the given, on the immediate, to the entire exclusion of what lies beyond, has. in the words of Marcuse, removed the desire both to transcend the given and to despair about it.[38] Of course, as David Hume has suggested, 'we are no sooner acquainted with the impossibility of satisfying any desire, than the desire itself vanishes.'[39] But man is a dialectical animal, so to speak, and, as Hegel suggested, thinking is 'essentially the negation of that which is immediately before us.'[40] This being the case, the dialectical negativity of man is bound to reassert itself putting an end to this abnormal state of affairs. What pains the discerning most is the arbitrary limitation, by the ultra-moderns, of the field of evidence so as to dismiss all metaphysics as nonsense. 'The chief danger to philosophy,' as a matter of fact, as Whitehead would have it, 'is narrowness in the selection of evidence,' arising, inter alia, 'from the idiosyncracies and timidities' of the so-called philosophers of today.[41] Alas! this consciousness is fading fast.

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7. *Republic* 510a, 511; *Timaeus* 52a.
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33. Lenin, *Philosophical Notebooks*, pp. 253-254.
34. Cp. the use of the word 'philologers', say in Isaac Goldberg, *The Wonder of Words* (London: Peter Owen Ltd., n. d.), p. 216.
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